THOMAS O. DAAKE, SR., ADELE Z. DAAKE, AND DAAKE FAMILY TRUST 126, LLC

v.

DECKS N SUCH MARINE, INC.

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

_____________________________

No. 1D18-2659 _____________________________

THOMAS O. DAAKE, SR., ADELE Z.

DAAKE, and DAAKE FAMILY TRUST 126, LLC,

Appellants,

v.

DECKS N SUCH MARINE, INC.,

Appellee. _____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Walton County. David W. Green, Judge.

May 15, 2020

PER CURIAM.

This case involves a dispute over two contracts in which the appellee agreed to construct a seawall on two properties and a home on one of those properties. At some point, the relationship between the parties deteriorated, and a dispute over payment prompted the appellee to file three separate cases that were later consolidated into one case by the trial court. The appellants, which include the Daake Family Trust 126, LLC,∗ challenge the trial

∗In its answer brief, the appellee appears to concede that it knew the trust was appealing the orders at issue even though it was left off the filed notice of appeal. Since the notice of appeal

2 court’s orders that determined the appellee was the prevailing party. The appellants raise three issues on appeal, and we find only one has merit. Accordingly, we write to address that issue and affirm all other issues raised without further comment. The Daake Family Trust 126, LLC, argues that the trial court erred by denying its motion for attorney’s fees and costs under section 713.29, Florida Statutes, because it was the prevailing party in case number 2006-CA-564. In case number 2006-CA-564, the appellee filed a complaint against all of the appellants to enforce its construction lien, and it also claimed that it was entitled to quantum meruit. The appellee also filed a breach of contract claim against Thomas and Adele Daake. The appellee eventually dismissed its claim against all of the parties to enforce its construction lien, and the trial court ruled against the appellee on its motion for quantum meruit because a contract existed between the appellee and the trust. The trial court also found that the trust violated the contract. However, the trial court did not award the appellee damages because the appellee failed to allege that the trust breached the contract. At the conclusion of the litigation, the trial court heard and reheard the different motions for attorney’s fees and costs filed by each of the parties. The trial court ultimately found that the appellee was the prevailing party on all significant issues and denied the appellants’ request for attorney’s fees and costs. The trust argues that the trial court erred by considering all three cases together when it determined that the appellee was the prevailing party. The consolidation of cases does not change the nature of each individual case or the rights of each party. Santiago v. Mauna Loa Invs., LLC, 189 So. 3d 752, 757 (Fla. 2016). In the trial court’s order, it stated that it considered all of the cases together in order to determine who was the prevailing party. This was error. Under provided enough information to inform the appellee what was being appealed and did not prejudice the appellee, the defect in the notice does not affect this Court’s jurisdiction. Tunstall v. Folsom, 616 So. 2d 1123, 1124 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993).

3 section 713.29, the trial court was required to determine who was the prevailing party on the significant issues contained in each of the separate cases. See Marocco v. Brabec, 44 Fla. L. Weekly D897 (Fla. 1st DCA April 5, 2019) (under section 713.29, the “‘prevailing party’ has been construed as the party who prevails on the ‘significant issues’” contained in the case). Since the trial court did not determine which issues were significant in each individual case, we remand this case to the trial court for it to determine who was the prevailing party in case number 2006-CA-564. AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.

ROBERTS, BILBREY, and WINOKUR, JJ., concur.

_____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331. _____________________________

John R. Dowd and Nicholas Bykowsky of Dowd Law Firm, P.A., Fort Walton Beach, for Appellants.

Robert A. Emmanuel, Charles P. Young, and Cecily M. Parker of Emmanuel, Sheppard & Condon, Pensacola; Joseph D. Steadman of Jones Walker LLP, Mobile, AL, for Appellee.