CHADWICK WILLACY
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA
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A successive postconviction motion based on Flowers v. Mississippi is procedurally barred and untimely when the underlying Batson challenge was previously litigated and rejected, and Flowers did not establish a new constitutional right with retroactive application.
[1] A successive postconviction motion raising a claim previously litigated and rejected in prior proceedings is procedurally barred from being relitigated.
[2] A successive postconviction motion is untimely under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851(d)(2) when based on a constitutional right that was not newly established or…
Previewing 2 of 2 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“[W]e break no new legal ground. We simply enforce and reinforce Batson by applying it to the extraordinary facts of this case.”
Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. at 2235, 2251, explaining that Flowers did not establish a new constitutional right
Willacy filed a successive postconviction motion under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851 claiming entitlement to relief based on Flowers v. Mis…
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Supreme Court of Florida
____________
No. SC20-1261 ____________
CHADWICK WILLACY, Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee.
April1, 2021
PER CURIAM.
Chadwick Willacy appeals an order denying his successive motion for postconviction relief, which was filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851.1 Ct. 2228 (2019), based on the prosecutor’s peremptory strike of juror Payne for allegedly racial
1. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.
reasons. On August 12, 2020, the postconviction court entered an order denying Willacy’s successive postconviction motion. Specifically, the postconviction court found that Willacy’s motion was procedurally barred, untimely, and without merit. We agree with the postconviction court and affirm the denial of relief. Prior challenges to the prosecutor’s peremptory strike of juror Payne for allegedly racial reasons were litigated during Willacy’s direct appeal and successive postconviction proceedings and resolved against Willacy. See Hendrix v. State, 136 So. 3d 1122, 1125 (Fla. 2014) (“Claims raised and rejected in prior postconviction proceedings are procedurally barred from being relitigated in a successive motion.”); Freeman v. State, 761 So. 2d 1055, 1067 (Fla. 2000) (“This claim was raised on direct appeal; therefore, it is procedurally barred and was properly summarily denied.”). Further, Willacy’s successive motion is untimely. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(d)(1) (“Any motion to vacate judgment of conviction and sentence of death shall be filed by the defendant within1 year after the judgment and sentence become final.”); Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(d)(2) (providing an exception to the one-year time limit for motions alleging “the fundamental constitutional right asserted was not established within the period provided for in subdivision (d)(1) and has been held to apply retroactively”). Flowers did not establish a new constitutional right that has been held to apply retroactively. Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2235, 2251 (“[W]e break no new legal ground. We simply enforce and reinforce Batson [v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)] by applying it to the extraordinary facts of this case.”). Accordingly, Willacy is not entitled to relief based on Flowers, and we affirm the postconviction court’s denial of Willacy’s successive postconviction motion. It is so ordered. CANADY, C.J., and POLSTON, LABARGA, LAWSON, MUÑIZ, COURIEL, and GROSSHANS, JJ., concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Brevard County, Robin C. Lemonidis, Judge – Case No. 051990CF016062AXXXXX
Eric C. Pinkard, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Michael Hope, Ann Marie Mirialakis, and Adriana Corso, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Middle Region, Temple Terrace, Florida,
for Appellant
Ashley B. Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Lisa- Marie Lerner, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, Florida,
for Appellee
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (U.S. 1986)
- Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228 (U.S. 2019)