HARRY SCHOOLEY, AS TAX ASSESSOR, LEE COUNTY, FLORIDA, ET AL., APPELLANTS,
v.
KIMI T. JUDD, APPELLEE

Fla. | 1962-06-29
No. 31609
TERRELL, THOMAS, THORNAL, O’CONNELL and CALDWELL, JJ., concur., ROBERTS, C. J., and DREW, J., dissent.
142 So. 2d 727 Florida Supreme Court (1962) Negative Treatment
Cited by 4 cases

Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Upon consideration by the Court of the reasons advanced by the Tax Assessor of Lee County, Florida, why this cause is one which should be heard and determined by this Court instead of being transferred to the District Court of Appeal, Second District, it is

ORDERED that the reasons so assigned are deemed to be insufficient and are hereby overruled and the order herein of May 29, 1962 transferring this cause to the District Court of Appeal, Second District, be and the same is hereby adhered to.

TERRELL, THOMAS, THORNAL, O’CONNELL and CALDWELL, JJ., concur.

ROBERTS, C. J., and DREW, J., dissent.

DREW, Justice

(dissenting).

I cannot agree that this cause is one which lies within the orbit of the jurisdiction of the District Court of Appeal, Second District. It is my view that the decree here under attack indubitably construed Article X, Section 7, of the Florida Constitution, F.S.A. to mean that a married woman —whose husband is a resident of another state — but who owns a house in Florida and resides therein is entitled to a homestead exemption under said Article and may lawfully “make the same her permanent home” as contemplated by said Article.

Being of this view, I think this Court has jurisdiction of this cause and should retain it and dispose of it on the merits.

ROBERTS, C. J., concurs.

Dissent
DREW, Justice

DREW, Justice

(dissenting).

I cannot agree that this cause is one which lies within the orbit of the jurisdiction of the District Court of Appeal, Second District. It is my view that the decree here under attack indubitably construed Article X, Section 7, of the Florida Constitution, F.S.A. to mean that a married woman —whose husband is a resident of another state — but who owns a house in Florida and resides therein is entitled to a homestead exemption under said Article and may lawfully “make the same her permanent home” as contemplated by said Article.

Being of this view, I think this Court has jurisdiction of this cause and should retain it and dispose of it on the merits.

ROBERTS, C. J., concurs.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Kimi T. Judd v. Schooley, 158 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 1963)
    …appeal from the circuit court. Having the view that the chancellor did not, by his decree, construe a controlling provision of the Constitution, we transferred the appeal to the District Court of Appeal, Second District. Schooley v. Judd, Fla.1962, 142 So. 2d 727. The District Court, by its decision now under review, did construe a controlling constitutional provision. The matter now comes to us on appeal to review that decision. The appellant here has also filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to revie…
  • Schooley v. Kimi T. Judd, 149 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963)
    …tution, F.S.A., defendants-appellants, the Tax Assessor of Lee County, the Board of County Commissioners, and the Comptroller of Florida, bring this appeal which was transferred here from the Supreme Court of Florida. See Schooley v. Judd, Fla.1962, 142 So. 2d 727. The plaintiff filed her claim for homestead tax exemption for the year 1961, asserting that she held the legal title to the real property involved; that she resided thereon on January 1st; and that she in good faith makes the same her permanent ho…
  • Fla. State Bd. OF Health v. Lewis, 149 So. 2d 41 (Fla. 1963)
    …is particular office, does not constitute a “class.” The reason, of course, was that an individual cannot be a class in the sense used in the Constitution. There is only one State Treasurer, not a class of State Treasurers. Larson v. Harrison, Fla., 142 So. 2d 727. There is only one Secretary of State, not a class of Secretaries of State. Crown Central Petroleum Corp. v. Standard Oil Co. et al., Fla., 142 So. 2d 731. The obvious purpose of the subject constitutional provision was to authorize this Court to r…

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