STATE OF FLORIDA

v.

ERIC BERNARD WRIGHT

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FIFTH DISTRICT

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO

FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellant,

v. Case No. 5D20-1807

ERIC BERNARD WRIGHT,

Appellee.

________________________________/

Opinion filed August 20, 2021

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Seminole County, Donna L. McIntosh, Judge.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee and Kristen L. Davenport, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.

Eddie J. Bell, of Law Office of Eddie J. Bell, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.

NARDELLA, J.

The State appeals a portion of the trial court’s order granting Defendant’s request to suppress evidence obtained through an authorized wiretap. We reverse.

2 The following facts are undisputed. Law enforcement was investigating Defendant in connection with a series of shootings. The investigation involved several wiretaps of Defendant’s telephones. During the investigation, Phil Archer, the elected state attorney for the Eighteenth Judicial Circuit of Florida, took a leave of absence. In his stead, assistant state attorney P. Kent LeBlanc was appointed by the circuit court as acting state attorney for the Eighteenth Judicial Circuit of Florida. While serving as acting state attorney, Mr. LeBlanc authorized two applications to tap Defendant’s telephones, both of which were approved by the trial court. The evidence obtained through the wiretap applications authorized by Mr. LeBlanc led to Defendant being charged with various offenses, including attempted first-degree premeditated murder. The Defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained through the wiretap applications authorized by Mr. LeBlanc, arguing that he was not one of the officials who, pursuant to Florida’s wiretap statute, could authorize a wiretap application. The trial court agreed, relying on the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Daniels, 389 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 1980). The State argues that as acting state attorney, Mr. LeBlanc had all the powers appurtenant to that position and, thus, had authority to authorize the wiretap applications. We agree.

18 U.S.C. § 2516(2). This provision represents the minimum requirements for obtaining a wiretap, leaving states with the option to pass more restrictive measures. State v. Rivers, 660 So. 2d 1360, 1362 (Fla. 1995) (discussing the interplay between federal and state law governing wiretaps). This led to

§ 934.07(1), Fla. Stat. (2016). This statute “must be strictly construed and narrowly limited in its application by the specific provisions set out by the legislature.” Rivers, 660 So. 2d at 1362. The trial court’s interpretation of who may authorize a wiretap application reads out acting state attorneys and writes in elected state attorneys. A plain reading of Florida’s wiretap statute, however, does not support this interpretation. State v. Maisonet-Maldonado, 308 So. 3d 63, 68 (Fla. 2020) (“If the language of the statute is clear, the statute is given its plain meaning, and the court does not look behind the statute’s plain language for legislative intent or resort to rules of statutory construction.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Here, the statute clearly and unambiguously provides that “any state attorney,” as opposed to just an elected state attorney, may authorize a wiretap application. § 934.07(1), Fla. Stat. (2016) (emphasis added); see also Buechel v. Shim, 46 Fla. L. Weekly D265 (Fla. 5th DCA 2021) (explaining that this court is without constitutional

This case is distinguishable from the situation in Daniels. In that case, an assistant state attorney authorized a wiretap application. Daniels, 389 So. 2d at 633. The State argued that since assistant state attorneys have all the powers of state attorneys except with regard to signing informations,

In light of the foregoing, the portion of the trial court’s order suppressing the evidence obtained through the wiretap applications authorized by Mr. LeBlanc is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings.

REVERSED and REMANDED. EISNAUGLE and WOZNIAK, JJ., concur.