REGINALD FARRIOR
v.
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
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A trial court may dismiss a habeas petition when the petitioner seeks relief that is untimely under postconviction rules, raises claims that could have been raised at trial or on direct appeal, or constitutes an impermissible successive motion.
[1] A trial court may dismiss a habeas petition, rather than transfer it, when the petitioner seeks relief that would be untimely if considered as a postconviction motion, ra…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceReginald Farrior, a pro se appellant, filed a habeas petition in the Circuit Court for Hamilton County challenging his conviction or sentence. The tri…
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FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA
_____________________________
No. 1D20-2195 _____________________________
REGINALD FARRIOR,
Appellant,
v.
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS,
Appellee. _____________________________
On appeal from the Circuit Court for Hamilton County. Paul S. Bryan, Judge.
September 29, 2021
PER CURIAM.
AFFIRMED. See Baker v. State, 878 So. 2d 1236, 1246 (Fla. 2004) (explaining that a trial court may dismiss, rather than transfer, a habeas petition when the petitioner seeks relief that “(1) would be untimely if considered as a motion for postconviction relief under rule 3.850, (2) raise claims that could have been raised at trial or, if properly preserved, on direct appeal of the judgment and sentence, or (3) would be considered a second or successive motion under rule 3.850 that either fails to allege new or different grounds for relief that were known or should have been known at the time the first motion was filed.”); Zuluaga v. Dep’t of Corr., 32 So. 3d 674 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010).
2
ROWE, C.J., and LEWIS and WINOKUR, JJ., concur.
_____________________________
Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331. _____________________________
Reginald Farrior, pro se, Appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Anne C. Conley, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.