GREGORIO ANTONIO DICKSON,

v.

GRETCHEN CURTIS, ETC.,

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida

Opinion filed February⁹, 2022. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

No. 3D21-1086 Lower Tribunal No. 18-14161 ________________

Gregorio Antonio Dickson, Appellant,

vs.

Gretchen Curtis, etc., Appellee.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Samantha Ruiz Cohen and Christina Marie DiRaimondo, Judges.

Rhonda F. Goodman, P.A., and Rhonda F. Goodman, for appellant.

Holland & Knight LLP, and Stacy D. Blank and Jessica S. Kramer (Tampa), for appellee.

Before EMAS, HENDON, and BOKOR, JJ.

HENDON, J.

I. Facts and Procedural History

On June 14, 2018, Gretchen Curtis (“Ms. Curtis”), o/b/o her minor son, Ryan Gregory Dickson (“Ryan” or “Petitioner”),1 filed a sworn Petition for Injunction for Protection Against Domestic Violence Without Children against the Respondent under section 741.30 (“Petition”). The Petition provides that Ryan is either the victim of domestic violence or has a reasonable cause to believe he is in imminent danger of becoming a victim of domestic violence because, among other things, the Respondent, who is Ryan’s father: a. Committed or threatened to commit domestic violence defined in s. 741.28, Florida Statutes, as any assault, aggravated assault, battery, aggravated battery, sexual assault, sexual battery, stalking, aggravated stalking, kidnapping, false imprisonment, or any other criminal offense resulting in injury or death of one family or house member by another.

b. Previously threatened, harassed, stalked, or physically

1 Ryan turned eighteen in August 2019.

. . . .

f. Used, or has threatened to use, against the petitioner any weapons such as guns or knives.

The Petition provides, in relevant part, that on July 14, 2017, the Respondent physically abused Ryan in front of his younger siblings and the Respondent’s friends. More specifically, the Respondent punched Ryan’s head and body and then went into his room to retrieve a weapon. The Respondent returned with the weapon, cocked the weapon, placed it to Ryan’s head, made a negative comment to Ryan, and then pulled the trigger. Ryan ran from where he was at and went to his mother’s home. Further, although the incident occurred on July 14, 2017, it was not until May 23, 2018, that Ryan revealed to his mother, Ms. Curtis, that the Respondent put a weapon to his (Ryan) head and pulled the trigger.

The trial court entered a temporary injunction. Over several days, the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the Petition, hearing testimony from Ryan, Ms. Curtis, the Respondent, and individuals who were present during the incident, including the Respondent’s friends and other children. The Respondent and his counsel were present at the evidentiary hearings. On November 19, 2019, the trial court reviewed and then rejected

The trial court informed the parties that it will enter a final order that same day with specific factual findings, and that the injunction shall be in effect for a one-year period until January 22, 2021. At the hearing, the trial court ruled that Ryan is the victim of domestic violence by the Respondent; the Respondent committed an act of child abuse on Ryan; on July 14, 2017, the Respondent committed an act of battery when he grabbed Ryan in a headlock and tried to shove him to the ground using excessive force to reprimand Ryan; the Respondent committed an act of aggravated assault when the Respondent put a gun to Ryan’s forehead and pulled the trigger; and the Petitioner met his burden of proving an act of domestic violence by the preponderance of the evidence. On January 22, 2020, the trial court entered both the Order and the Final Judgment of Injunction for Protection Against Domestic Violence. In

II. Analysis

A. Whether the trial court acted in excess of its jurisdiction or violated the Respondent’s right to adequate notice and due process?

The Respondent contends that the trial court acted in excess of its jurisdiction under section 741.30 and violated his right to adequate notice and due process by finding that the Respondent committed acts of child abuse, battery, and aggravated assault, because the only relief sought in the Petition was a determination that based on the Respondent’s acts, Ryan was a victim of domestic violence or has reasonable cause to believe he is in imminent danger of becoming a victim of domestic violence under section 741.30(1)(a). We disagree.

Section 741.30(1)(a) provides that there is a cause of action for an injunction for protection against domestic violence if a family or household member is a “victim of domestic violence as defined in s. 741.28 or has reasonable cause to believe he or she is imminent danger of becoming the victim of any act of domestic violence.” Section 741.28(2) defines

B. Whether the trial court delegated its decision-making authority?

Next, the Respondent argues that trial court delegated its decisionmaking authority by adopting the Petitioner’s amended proposed judgment. We disagree. In Perlow v. Berg-Perlow, 875 So. 2d 383 (Fla. 2004), the Florida Supreme Court did not prohibit a trial judge from adopting verbatim the proposed order of one of the parties. However, the Court did caution that a party’s proposed order “cannot substitute for a thoughtful and independent analysis of the facts, issues, and law by the trial judge.” Id. at 390. In

Id. (footnote omitted). Further, the Court provided guidance to trial judges when requesting proposed orders: (1) the trial judge may ask both parties or one party to submit a proposed final judgment; (2) if proposed final judgments are filed, each party should be given an opportunity to review the other party’s proposed final judgment and make objections; (3) if only one party submits a proposed final judgment, there must be an opportunity for review and objections by the opposing party; and (4) prior to requesting proposed final judgments, the trial judge should, when possible, indicate on the record the court's findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Id. at 384.

In the instant case, the trial court rejected the initial proposed orders submitted by the parties, and then requested both parties to submit amended proposed orders. Further, the trial court did not adopt verbatim Petitioner’s amended proposed order. Instead, the trial court made several

C. Whether the incident of domestic violence was too remote in time to support the entry of the domestic violence injunction?

Finally, the Respondent contends that the trial court abused its discretion by entering the injunction because the sole domestic violence incident occurred eleven months prior to the filing of the Petition, and therefore the incident was too remote in time to support the entry of the domestic violence injunction. Under the circumstances of this case, we disagree.

Florida courts have found that the remoteness of a prior act of domestic violence or abuse may render the entry of a domestic violence injunction improper. There does not appear to be a bright line rule as to what would be considered too remote in time to support the entry of a domestic violence injunction. However, in Curl v. Roberts ex rel. E.C., 279 So. 3d 765 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019), the First District Court of Appeal held: “Incidents remote in time by as little as a year are insufficient to support entry of a new injunction, absent allegations of current violence or imminent

In the instant case, the Petition was filed eleven months after the incident of domestic violence occurred. Ryan, who was a minor when the incident occurred, did not inform his mother, Ms. Curtis, that the Respondent placed a firearm to Ryan’s head and pulled the trigger. Ryan’s

III. Conclusion

Based on the above analysis, we affirm the entry of the Order, but remand for the sole purpose of correcting the scrivener’s error in Paragraph 24 of the Order to reflect that the domestic violence injunction was entered for a one-year period until January 22, 2021, not indefinitely.

Affirmed; remanded for correction of scrivener’s error.