UNIVERSAL PROPERTY & CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY,
v.
GUILLAUME DIMANCHE, ET AL.,
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
A default judgment entered against a defendant for failure to comply with a court order must be set aside when the defendant demonstrates excusable neglect, a meritorious defense, and due diligence, and when the default was entered without proper notice and opportunity to be heard on whether the noncompliance was willful or in bad faith.
[1] When a default judgment is entered against a party for failure to comply with a court order, the trial court must provide prior notice and opportunity to be heard on whet…
[2] A party seeking relief from a default judgment under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b) must demonstrate three elements: excusable neglect, a meritorious defense, a…
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“It is fundamental and well-established under Rule 1.500(b) that when a party against whom affirmative relief is sought has appeared in the action by filing or serving any papers, no default may be entered against such party without prior notice of the application for default.”
Establishes that due process requires notice and opportunity to be heard before entry of default, even when a court order threatens default for noncompliance.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceUniversal Property received a homeowners insurance claim from the Dimanches and denied coverage. The Dimanches sued for declaratory relief. The trial …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida
Opinion filed April 20, 2022. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
________________
Nos. 3D21-1805, 3D21-1658 Lower Tribunal No. 20-16326 ________________
Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company, Appellant,
vs.
Guillaume Dimanche, et al., Appellees.
Appeals from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, David C. Miller, Judge.
Russo Appellate Firm, P.A., and Elizabeth K. Russo, for appellant.
No appearance for appellees.1
Before FERNANDEZ, C.J., and LINDSEY and LOBREE, JJ.
FERNANDEZ, C.J.
I.
BACKGROUND
This suit concerns a typical homeowners’ insurance policy issued by Universal Property to the Dimanches. The Dimanches filed suit against Universal Property after the Dimanches filed a claim, and Universal Property did not issue payment. The Dimanches sought a declaration of coverage, a decision on “the scope of coverage and the Replacement Cost Value of the subject insurance claim”, and attorneys’ fees and costs. The Dimanches attached an estimate to their complaint indicating a projected replacement cost value of $65,910.87 in proposed repairs to their home. After service of process, neither party took any action in the suit. On May12, 2021, the trial court entered an “Order to Take Action Based on Eligibility for Default After Personal/Substitute Service,” stating that Universal Property was eligible for entry of a judicial default. The trial court directed
JUDICIAL DEFAULT AGAINST THE DEFENDANT
Ordered and Adjudged that a Judicial Default is hereby entered against Universal Property and Casualty Insurance Company.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers at Miami-Dade County, Florida on this 7th day of June, 2021.
The next day, on June 8, 2021, Universal Property filed its Answer and Affirmative Defenses denying that the Dimanches had sustained a covered loss. Universal Property contended in its first affirmative defense that the subject policy was an H08 “named peril” policy and not an “all risk” policy. Thus, coverage was only provided for certain perils. It then outlined Section I of the subject policy which provided the list of perils. Universal Property stated that based on documentation received from the Dimanches, their report, and Universal Property’s inspection of the alleged loss, there was no coverage for the subject loss because the damages were the result of a plumbing leak and not a “named peril.” On the same day, Universal Property filed a Verified Motion to Set Aside Judicial Default. It outlined its legal assistant’s error in failing to put the due date for its Answer on the calendar and cited Florida case law regarding clerical/secretarial errors being deemed excusable neglect when setting aside defaults. It also argued that a meritorious defense was presented in its
2 Universal Property filed a motion with the trial court for it to enter an Amended Final Declaratory Judgment to reflect the trial court’s amended ruling. This Court relinquished jurisdiction for the trial court to amend the final
8
II.
ANALYSIS
We review the denial of a motion to vacate a default under an abuse of discretion standard. Robles v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 255 So. 3d 986, 988 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018). Universal Property contends that the trial court should not have entered the default against it because the default could not be based on Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.500(c), and neither was the default justified under the trial court’s self-executing order. Universal Property further argues that the trial court should have set the default aside, and thus the default final declaratory judgment should be vacated. We agree. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.500(c). In addition, the entry of default is improper when a party has filed a responsive pleading or otherwise defended before entry of default. Carder v. Pelican Cove W. Homeowners Ass'n, Inc., 595 So. 2d 174, 175 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992).
Here, the trial court entered its order on May12, 2021 stating that the Dimanches had to file a motion for entry of default within ten days of the trial court’s order. They did not file anything. Also on May12, 2021, Universal
declaratory judgment, which the trial court did on September2, 2021. On September3, 2021, Universal Property filed its notice of appeal from the Amended Final Declaratory Judgment. This Court then consolidated the two appeals to proceed under Case No.: 3D21-1805.
The appellees do not contest the fact that International was entitled to receive notice, but assert essentially that the court's admonition in its Uniform Order that any noncompliance might result in the imposition of sanctions, including dismissal, satisfied the notice requirement under Rule 1.500(b). We disagree. Even if the Uniform Order had specifically listed default as a possible sanction for noncompliance, notice and opportunity to be heard must still be given to the defending party for a determination of whether the noncompliance was willful or in bad faith. Neder [v. Greyhound Financial Corp., 592 So. 2d 1218 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)], at 1218 (“Although the order which appellant failed to comply with threatened dismissal for noncompliance, notice must still be given.”); . . . .
Hackett, 687 So. 2d at 942-943 (emphasis added; footnotes omitted; some internal citations omitted). Here, there was no motion for default filed by the Dimanches. The trial court had ordered them to file one, but they did not. Even though the trial court stated in its May 24, 2021 order that it would enter a default if Universal Property did not comply with the deadline of May 31, 2021, Universal Property is correct that it was nonetheless entitled to notice and a determination by the trial court on whether Universal Property’s failure to comply with the order was willful or done in bad faith. “When a default judgment is entered against a party for failure to obey a court order, the order of default must contain specific findings of the noncomplying party’s willful or deliberate refusal to obey the court order.” Deer Valley Realty, Inc. v. Beck & Lee, P.A., 260 So. 3d 413, 415 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018). The trial court did not
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