LES BRYANT
v.
STATE
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Les Bryant was convicted of manslaughter for his role as an accessory to murder. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, rejecting arguments that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing witness recall, denying a mistrial motion, and that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing witness recall for impeachment purposes. The denial of the mistrial motion was proper. The evidence was substantial enough to sustain the manslaughter verdict. The record as a whole warrants the conviction.
“The ruling on this question was within the sound discretion of the court and we find no abuse of that discretion disclosed by the record in this case.”
The court's holding that trial courts have discretion to recall witnesses for impeachment purposes, citing precedent.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBryant was indicted as principal in the second degree to murder in the first degree but was convicted of manslaughter. During trial, the state recalle…
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In this case plaintiff in error was convicted of manslaughter on trial under an indictment charging him as principal in the second degree to murder in the first degree.
The plaintiff in error states in what he terms four questions involved for our determination as follows:
*673•' “1. After the State and the defendant have rested, may the State recall for further cross examination the defendant’s witness for the purpose of laying a predicate for the introduction of new rebuttal testimony which is prejudicial to the defendant?
“2. Should the lower court have granted defendant’s motion for a mistrial?
“3. Did the evidence in the case justify a verdict of manslaughter ?
■ 4. Should the defendant in this case have been given a new trial ?”
As to the first stated question it appears that the court after the defendant had rested its' case, allowed a defendant’s witness to be recalled for the purpose of laying a predicate for impeachment.
The ruling on this question was within the sound discretion of the court and we find no abuse of that discretion disclosed by the record in this case. See Brooks v. State, 69 Fla. 446, 68 Sou. 446; Charles v. State, 58 Fla. 17, 50 Sou. 419; Pitman v. State, 51 Fla. 94, 41 Sou. 385.
The second stated question challenges the action of the trial judge in denying defendant’s motion to order a mistrial. The motion to direct a mistrial was in the following language: ...
• “Comes now the defendant, Les Bryant, by his counsel and moves this Court to declare a mistrial in this cause because of the prejudicial testimony of the witness, Charles D. Martin, in said cause, which was permitted to go to the jury without any sufficient and legal predicate being laid for same, and because this defendant has been prejudiced without his fault and without the fault of the court, by the juror, William A. Smith, stating to the court, in the presence of the jury, that he desired to ask certain ques*674tions with reference to certain matters, to-wit, as’ to hów the stock óf the gtin was broken and whether or not there ■was any bullet holes in the automobile’driven by‘the defendant; that such testimony and such actions' and such testimony of the witness Martin and the actions of the juror, Smith, have created such a prejudice in the minds of the jury that they cannot render a fair and j'ust trial in'this cause.”
The court overruled the motion. We find no error in the ruling.
The third question challenges the correctness of the ruling of the court denying motion for new trial on the sole ground that the evidence is not sufficient to sustain a verdict of manslaughter. It is sufficient to say that there was substantial evidence to sustain the verdict.
The fourth question as stated presents no question of law for this Court to determine except as to whether or not the record as a whole warrants a conviction. We think it does. Therefore, the judgment should be affirmed and it is so ordered.
Whitfield, P. J., and Brown, J., concur.
■ Davis, C. J., and .Ellis, and Terrell, J. J., concur in the opinion and judgment. .
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Jacobs v. State, 396 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1981)…ness but could not recall her as a state witness. The reexamination of any witness is within the discretion of the trial judge. McCoggle v. State, 41 Fla. 525, 26 So. 734 (1899). See Royal v. State, 127 Fla. 320, 170 So. 450 (1936); Bryant v. State, 117 Fla. 672, 158 So. 167 (1934). The record fails to reveal an abuse of discretion on this point. Jacobs further claims the trial judge erred by giving an isolated instruction to the jury. This took place after the jury had started deliberating and had returne…
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Hahn v. State, 58 So.2d 188 (Fla. 1952)…of the proceedings of the trial. We have held that the right to recall witnesses to lay the predicate for impeachment is not absolute but such right rests in the discretion of the trial Court. Brown v. State, 40 Fla. 459, 25 So. 63; Bryant v. State, 117 Fla. 672, 158 So. 167; Johnson v. State, 55 Fla. 46, 46 So. 154. Examination and cross-examination of Kimbrough was not unduly prolonged considering the fact that he was the only witness in the immediate presence of the defendant and the deceased who saw an…
Authorities Cited
- Pittman v. State, 51 Fla. 94 (Fla. 1906)
- Charles v. State, 58 Fla. 17 (Fla. 1909)
- Vander Brooks v. State, 69 Fla. 446 (Fla. 1915)