LEIGH TURAY

v.

BRUCE MCCRAY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FIFTH DISTRICT

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO

FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

LEIGH TURAY,

Appellant,

v. Case No. 5D21-2247 LT Case No. 2020-SC-002510-19

BRUCE MCCRAY,

Appellee.

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Opinion filed April¹, 2022

Appeal from the County Court for Seminole County, James J. DeKleva, Judge.

Kurt E. Alexander, Kendall B. Rigdon, and Simp McCorvey, IV, of Rigdon, Alexander & Rigdon LLP, Merritt Island, for Appellant.

No Appearance for Appellee.

LAMBERT, C.J.

The appellant, Leigh Turay, appeals the final judgment for damages entered against her and in favor of the appellee, Bruce McCray. For the

2 following reasons, we reverse the judgment and remand with directions for the trial court to enter final judgment in favor of Turay.

McCray’s vehicle was damaged as a result of a collision with a vehicle driven by Turay. McCray’s vehicle was considered a total loss by his insurance company, and the company issued a check to McCray for his loss. McCray then sued Turay for additional damages, and the case proceeded to a nonjury trial. At the conclusion of trial, the court explained that it was entering judgment for McCray for the additional monies that McCray had paid to satisfy the balance owed on his car loan, minus certain adjustments that are not pertinent here.¹ We conclude that, by doing so, the trial court erred because this was not a proper element of damages in this case.

The appropriate measure of damages for the total loss of personal property is the property’s value on the date of loss. Burtless v. Pallero, 570 So. 2d 1140, 1140 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990) (citing McDonald Air Conditioning, Inc. v. John Brown, Inc., 285 So. 2d 697, 698 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973)); see also, e.g., Indep. Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Tampa Sand & Material Co., 171 So. 797, 797 (Fla. 1937) (“It is not open to question that the usual measure of damages in [claims for damage to an automobile due to negligence] is the difference between the market value of the automobile prior to and after the

3 injury . . . .”). Significant to our disposition of this appeal, the remaining balance owed on a car loan is not a compensable element of damages in this case. See Burtless, 570 So. 2d at 1140 (affirming final judgment dismissing plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice where plaintiff sought to recover damages reflecting the difference between the value of her “totally destroyed” vehicle on the date of the subject motor vehicle accident and the remaining balance that plaintiff owed on her car loan for the vehicle).

Accordingly, we reverse the final judgment entered in McCray’s favor. Additionally, because we agree with Turay that McCray did not present competent evidence at trial to show that the value of his car on the date of loss exceeded the monies that he previously received from his insurance company for the car, we remand with directions that the trial court enter final judgment in favor of Turay.

REVERSED and REMANDED, with directions. COHEN and EISNAUGLE, JJ., concur.