AQUILINO MAYORGA,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA,
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Florida Statute § 316.605(1) unambiguously requires that license plates and their markings be clear, distinct, and legible from 100 feet, and when statutory language is clear, courts need not employ principles of statutory construction.
[1] When the plain language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, courts shall not employ principles of statutory construction or look beyond the statute's express language…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“When the statutory language is clear or unambiguous, this Court need not look behind the statute's plain language or employ principles of statutory construction to determine legislative intent”
Citation to English v. State, 191 So. 3d 448, 450 (Fla. 2016), establishing the plain language rule
Aquilino Mayorga was convicted in Monroe County for a violation related to license plate visibility. The case involved interpretation of Florida's sta…
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Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida Opinion filed June 15, 2022. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing. ________________ No. 3D21-1728 Lower Tribunal No. 20-195-A-K ________________ Aquilino Mayorga, Appellant, vs. The State of Florida, Appellee. An Appeal from the County Court for Monroe County, Peary S. Fowler, Judge. Robertson & Hunter, LLP, and Dustin S. Hunter, for appellant. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Sandra Lipman, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee. Before FERNANDEZ, C.J., and EMAS and SCALES, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
2 Affirmed. See § 316.605(1), Fla. Stat. (2020) (providing: “Every vehicle, at all times . . . shall . . . display the license plate or both of the license plates assigned to it by the state . . . and all letters, numerals, printing, writing, the registration decal, and the alphanumeric designation shall be clear and distinct and free from defacement, mutilation, grease, and other obscuring matter, so that they will be plainly visible and legible at all times 100 feet from the rear or front”); English v. State, 191 So. 3d 448, 450 (Fla. 2016) (“When the statutory language is clear or unambiguous, this Court need not look behind the statute's plain language or employ principles of statutory construction to determine legislative intent”); State v. Burris, 875 So. 2d 408, 413-14 (Fla. 2004) (rejecting State’s argument that the plain language of the robbery statute would lead to an unreasonable result or one clearly contrary to legislative intent: “As the State argues here, . . . we could infer that the Legislature would intend to deter a robber from using an automobile as a weapon and, thus, that the statute should penalize a robber who uses an automobile as a weapon. However, this interpretation would extend the reach of section 812.13(2)(a) beyond its express language based solely upon a very broad inference rather than any clear indication of legislative intent. Attractive as this interpretation may be from a policy standpoint, we must resist the temptation to so expand the statute. To
3 construe the statute in a way that would extend or modify its express terms would be an inappropriate abrogation of legislative power.”)