SANCHEZ_V._STATE_ _2020 CA 10273 O_ _12.30.2020
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Denise Sanchez petitioned for a writ of prohibition to quash a trial court's order denying her motion to discharge a misdemeanor battery charge based on alleged speedy trial violation. The appellate court denied the petition, holding that speedy trial time frames were tolled by Florida Supreme Court administrative order due to COVID-19, and thus speedy trial had not expired when the trial court denied her motion.
The appellate court held that speedy trial had not expired because the Florida Supreme Court's administrative order extending speedy trial time frames was procured before the ninety-day period expired and remained in effect when the trial court denied the motion. Therefore, discharge is not appropriate, and the trial court properly denied the motion.
[1] A writ of prohibition is an extraordinary remedy that will not be granted unless the petitioner demonstrates a clear showing of necessity and the absence of an adequate r…
[2] A defendant is not entitled to a discharge for a speedy trial violation if the speedy trial period has been extended by an administrative order.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“If the trial of the accused does not commence within the periods of time established by this rule (which is 90 days for a misdemeanor pursuant to 3.191(a)), a pending motion for discharge shall be granted by the court unless it is shown that: (1) a time extension has been ordered under subdivision (i) and that extension has not expired”
Establishes the speedy trial rule framework and exception for ordered extensions
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePetitioner Sanchez was arrested on January 26, 2020, for child abuse and battery. On May 1, 2020, the State filed an Information charging her with mis…
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PER CURIAM.
Petitioner, Denise Sanchez, petitions this Court to issue a writ of prohibition directed to County Court Judge Eric DuBois to quash his order denying Petitioner’s amended motion to discharge in case number 2020-MM-003176-A-O and to direct him to discharge the same. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Article V, section 5(b) of the Florida Constitution. We deny the Petition for Writ of Prohibition. On January 26, 2020, Petitioner was arrested for the offenses of child abuse and battery. On May 1, 2020, Respondent filed an Information charging Petitioner with a single count of misdemeanor battery. Filing # 118894404 E-Filed 12/30/2020 02:17:28 As a preliminary matter, the plain language of Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(p)(1), that is, the speedy trial rule, states: “No remedy shall be granted to any defendant under this rule until the court has made the required inquiry under subdivision (j).” The Rule continues on: “If the trial of the accused does not commence within the periods of time established by this rule (which is 90 days for a misdemeanor pursuant to 3.191(a)), a pending motion for discharge shall be granted by the court unless it is shown that: (1) a time extension has been ordered under subdivision (i) and that extension has not expired . . .” Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.191(j) (emphasis added). Additionally, “[t]he periods of time established by this rule may be extended, provided the period of time sought to be extended has not expired at the time the extension was procured. An extension may be procured by: . . . (5) administrative order issued by the chief justice, under Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.205(a)(2)(B)(iv), suspending the speedy trial procedures as stated therein.” Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.191(i). [*3] 3 of 4 Here, Petitioner was arrested on January 26, 2020, and the Florida Supreme Court subsequently suspended speedy trial time frames on March 13, 2020. See In re: COVID-19 Emergency Measures in the Florida State Courts, Fla. Admin. Order No. AOSC20-17 (March 24, 2020); In Re: COVID-19 Emergency Procedures in the Florida State Courts, Fla. Admin. Order AOSC20-13 (March 13, 2020). An extension for speedy trial, therefore, was procured before the ninety days required by Rule by way of the administrative order, in accordance with Rule 2.205(a)(2)(B)(iv), and that extension was in effect when the trial court denied Petitioner’s motion to discharge and has not yet expired. Finally, nothing in Rule 3.191 requires the state to file an Information or Indictment within ninety days for a misdemeanor; instead, the Rule only requires a defendant to be brought to trial within ninety days on a misdemeanor unless that time is extended, in which case the defendant must be brought to trial within the period of time speedy trial was extended. Moreover, discharge is only appropriate once speedy trial has expired, which, as explained above, it has not in this case. Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to a discharge under the rule, as speedy trial has not yet expired. The trial court properly denied Petitioner’s motion. Based on the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Petition for Writ of Prohibition is DENIED. DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers, at Orlando, Orange County, Florida, on this 30th day of December, 2020.
ALAN S. APTE
Presiding Circuit Judge TYNAN and WEISS, JJ., concur. [*4] 4 of 4 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order has been furnished by the Florida E-Portal to: Savannah Brown, Assistant Public Defender; Lisa Gong Guerrero, Assistant State Attorney; and The Honorable Eric DuBois on this 30th day of December, 2020.
Judicial Assistant