CLIFFORD DECAMP

v.

THE STATE OF FLORIDA

Before, SAYFIE, ZAYAS andARZOLA, JJ.

ARZOLA, J.

' Appellant pied no contest to driving a bicycle while under fine influence of alcohol. Dming the Appcllanfs plea colloquy, the oourt imposed d six-month license suspension. Defense couneel oiajected on the ground {hat the licedse sospension sanction should not applyto under the influence while on a bicycle,‘since abicycle is not a i ' the mandatory license 1, ehicle. The court overruled the objection and imposed Z⁷ Bicycle riders are subject to Florida’s driving under the influence statute, §3l6.l93. State v. Howard, 510 So. 2d 612, (Fla. 3d DCA 1987). (“Since section 316.193 applies to all persons driving, or in actual physical control of, any “vehicle,” and since a bicycle is a “vehicle” as defined in section 3l6.003([2]), we find that section 316.193 applies to bicyclists”). While Appellant concedes this point, he argues that the license suspension iniposed by the trial court was improper. We disagree. Section 322.28(2)(a) states as follows: V (2) In a prosecution for violation of §3l6.193 or former §3i6.193l, the following provisions apply: : (a) upon conviction of the driver, the court, along with imposing sentence, §___HA___L_l',,_ revoke the driver’s license or driving privilege of the person so convicted, effective on the date ofconviction. . . . (emphasis added). Pursuant to the mandatory language insection 322.28(2), courts are required to revoke the driver’s license of a person convicted of driving under the influence under §31e.19s. Here, the trial court did precisely what §s22..2s required. As part of the appellant’s conviction for driving under the influence, the court suspended his drivcr’s license. There is nothing illegal or improper about that sentence. go; Smith v. State, I² Weekly Supp. 279a (Fla. 6th Cir. Ct. 2005) (where the court pursuant to §322.28(2) revoked the defendant’s license as part ofhis sentence aficr he was convicted ofdriving under the influence while riding a bicycle). Appellant relies on Ottersop, y. State, 5 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 428b (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct. 1998), in support ofhis argument. However, fisg is inapplicable because it relies on §322.26(2), and not 322.28(2). Section 322.260) deals with the Department ofMotor [*3] \ _ I Vehicle’s authorizaiion to suspend a driver's license, not a trial court’s obligation to suspend a driver’s license pumuant to 322.28(2). Accordingly, reliance on §322.26(2) is improper. We AFFIRM the lower com-t’s decision to suspend the appellanfs license afier entering a plea of nolo contendere tothc offense of driving under the influence while driving a bicycle in violation ofFla. Stat. §316.l93(1). Circuit Court Judge I/-.:4/{

ANGELICA D.

Circuit Judge J A __c _ ncuit Court J e

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