MIGUEL A. EXPOSITO

v.

CITY OF MIAMI

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES

TO FILE REHEARING MOTION

AND, IF FILED, DISPOSED OF

IN THE CIRCUIT COURTOF THE

ELEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT,

IN AND FOR, MIAMI DADE

COUNTY, FLORIDA

MIGUEL A. EXPOSITO

- (L? Petitioner, _ H ‘v. - CITY OF MIAMI, _ Respondent. - 7 / I r , Opinion filed June ,2012 ~ On appeal from City‘ of Miami City Commission Resolution 11-00834a Affirming the ' ' ' ' ' Chief of Police Miguel Exposito Suspension of Chief of Police Mlguel Exposito and Removing “E0 Instante”. ' ' _ . Steven Wisotsky and Ruben Chavez, for Petitioner. Julie 0. Bru, City Attorney; John A. Greco, Assistant city Attorney, City of City Attorney, for Respondent. I Before MANNO scnunn, LINDSEY, and HIRSCH, JJ. ' MANNO scnunn, J. Miguel A. Exposito petitions this court to issue a W 3.. APPELLATE CASE NO. =- 11-aoo AP - a » FIB1 31.2 <13 n"'g 3-<‘°—1 F-go ‘I18 3'": ‘Y1!’ IN w. qllfiflfl L³ HV L³ Itflf‘ Zill 680038 80$ G315 1... ~ )⁵ Lindse J Hirsch, J. 1-i Miami Office of the rit of Certiorari and to quash a decision I I ' him Chief of Police on by the City of Miami City Commission (Commission), terminating as ks a Writ of Quo Warranto against the September 12,2011. In the altemative, petitioner see that th Commission lacked power or authority to oust Commission on the ground e follo ‘ we deny the Petitions. office. We have j1.1I‘IS(IIOIIOI1. Based on they wing; . him fi-om £3 $7‘ -' [*2] THE FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORX The facts below are essentially undisputed. On August l, 2011, Petitioner sought approval from City Manager, Johnny Martinez, to demote certain officers in the City of Miami Police Department, and the City Manager agreed to the demotions. On August 4, 2011, when the City Manager realized that Petitioner sought to demote three high-ranking officers tiom the police department’s senior staff (the Command Staff), the City Manager sent an email to the Director of Employee Relations and to the Petitioner to hold off on the demotions until further notice. Petitioner and the City Manager also discussed the matter in person, where the City Manager instructed Petitioner to maintain the status quo and take no action with regard to the commandstaffofficers until Petitioner returned from his upcoming vacation. Notwithstanding the order of the City Manager to hold off on the demotions until further notice, on August 8, 2011, before leaving on his vacation, Petitioner reassigned the three command staffofficers. On September 6, 2011, the City Manager sent two inter-office memorandums,‘one to Petitioner and the other to the Commission, notifying both that he was suspending Petitioner pursuant to Section 26 of the Charter of the City of Miami (“Section 26”) for failing to obey the City Manager?s orders with regard to the Command Staff officers. Pursuant to the City Maaager’s suspension and Section 26, the Commission initiated proceedings on September 9, 2011, to consider whether to terminate or reinstate Petitioner as Chief of Police. The Commission heard argument and testimony until²:00 am Saturday, September 10, 2011, and reconvened on Monday, September 12, 2011, for closing arguments and deliberations, after which the Commission _voted 3-2 to adopt Resolution ll-00834a,' affirming the City Manager’s suspension and terminated Petitioner as ChiefofPolice. I This petition for Writ ofCertiorari followed. A [*3] I ’ . . STANDARD Olj‘ REVIEW Itis not the role of the Circuit Court in this proceeding to agree or disagree with the Commission’s decision to terminate Petitioner as the City of Miami Chief of Police. First-tier certiorari review of quasi-judicial actions requires a review of the record to determine: (1) whether procedural due process was afforded; (2) whether the “essential requirements of the law” were observed‘; and (3) whether the findings and judgment are supported by “competent substantial evidence.” City ofDeerfield Beach v. Vaillant, 419 So. 2d 624, 626 (Fla. 1982); go also Dusseau v.,Metro.- Dade City Bd._,Q£C’t_vACormn’rs. 794 So. 2d 1270, 1274 (Fla. 2001);" I-Iaines City Cmtyg Dev. V, I-Ieggs, 658 S0. 2d 523, 530 (Fla. 1995). On first-tier certiorari review, a circuit court should not re-weigh the evidence or substitute its judgment for that of the local government authority ' A at 626; Bd __Qf County Com’rs;of Brevard County vi . Varllant . _ _ , , _ ,, , V . Snyder, 627 So. 2d 469, 474 (Fla. 1993); Dusseau, at 1275-76; Florida Power & Light Co. v. Ciflof Dania, 76l~ S0. 2d I089, 1093 (Fla. 2000); De Groot v. fihgffield, 95 So. 2d 912, 9l6 (Fla. 1957). A

LEGAL ANALYSIS

Essential Requirements, ofLaw Petitioner argues that his termination was improper because the City Manager did not have cause to suspend him under Section 26 and that the Commission departed fi'om the essential requirements oflaw by affirming the City Manager’s suspension and terminating him as Chiefof Police. ‘Applying the correctlaw is synonymous with observing the essential requirements of law. l)__t1_s',_s§at1___\g, Metro, Dagle C’ty Bd. ofC’ty Comm’rs. 794 So. 2d 1270, 1274 (Fla. 2001); , v. Heggs, 658 So. 2d S23, S30 (Fla. 1995). - [*4] l . . Specifically, Petitioner contends he was suspended and terminated for disregarding the City Manager’s directive not to demote three command staff officers. However, Petitioner argues that he did not demote the officers as defined by Section 40-61 of the City Code, and therefore did not disobey the City Manager’s order and that his actions were within his discretion and control. However, both the City Chatter and the City Code are replete with provisions that clearly establish the City Manager’s authority over the Chief of Police, and that the Chief of Po1ice’s . , ' powers and duties are subject to the supervision and control of the City Manager in all matters. S_ee; Charter of the City ofMiami, §§ 15, 16, 20; Code of the City ofMiami, Florida §§ 42-'2, 42- 3. These provisions confirm that the City Manager’s instructions to Petitioner regarding the command staff officers were clothed with the authority described in Section 26 of the City Charter. _ ' ' Respondent correctly argues that the definition of “demotion” found in Section 40-61 does not apply to unclassified employees such as the command staff officers and asserts that a more general definition ofdemotion is applicable, where a demotion is evidenced by a decrease in pay, responsibility, supervisory duties, or p1'6Stig6.2 Therefore, this Court finds that, the Commission’s decision to affirm the suspension and termination of the Petitioner as the Chief of Police complied with the essential requirements of the law. 1 see , tss 1=.a<1 923 (5th ca. 1999); Hgoks v. Qiamond Cflfilal S@§|'a_]_tyFm, mg, 991 F. 2d 793 (10th Cir. 1993); CrgdJL[, Lib_erty Na1.iQn_al_Banlc_&_Tn1st Co” 993 F. 2d 132 (7th Cir. 1993). 4 . [*5] , . ' ,,C_0m,m,tent Substantial Evidence “Competent substantial evidence is ‘such evidence as will establish a substantial basis of fact from which the fact at issue can reasonably be inferred (or) . . ._ such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind would accept as adequate to support a conclusion’.” Duval Util. (Co. v._Florida Pub. Serv. Co@‘n, 380 S0. 2d 1028, 1031 (Fla. 1980) (quoting De Groot v. Sheffield, 95 So. 2d 912, 916 (Fla.1957)). Vaillant, at 626. Even if there is conflicting evidence, the~Commissi0n’s decision must be upheld if supported by competent substantial evidence. §_ge;_ Qity of Migi v. Walsh, 139 So. 2d 165 flila. 3d DCA 1962). This Appellate Cou1t’s role is not to reweigh evidence presented to the Commission or substitute its judgment for that ofthe Commission, but rather to determine whether the Commission’s decision is supported by competent substantial evidence. ‘ . Petitioner asserts that, because he did not “demote” the officers ofhis command staff, there is a lack of substantial competent evidence to support his firing. Irrespective of whether the Petitioner demoted the command staff ofiicers the record contains competent substantial evidence for the Commission to have reasonably concluded that Petitioner disobeyed the City Manager’s order not to take action regarding the command staffofficers. ' This evidence includes, but is not limited to the City Manager’s instructions to Petitioner, both by e-mail and orally, to maintain the status quo until he returned from vacation, the Petitioner’s own email notifying the City Manager of his actions to ‘reassign the officers, testimony from the City Manager, and testimony of the three command staff officers regarding the effect of Petiti0ner’s actions. Accordingly, this Court finds that the Resolution adopted by the Commission is supported by competent substantial evidence. _ [*6] Progural Due Process In support ofhis claim that he was denied procedural due process and in support ofhis request for a reliefPetitioner contends the Commission failed to abide by the time restrictions contained in Section 26, which states in pertinent part: ' _ If [the police chieflbe so suspended the city manager shall forthwith certify the fact, together with the cause of suspension, to the commission who within five (5) days from the date of receipt of such notice, shall proceed to hear such charges and render judgment thereon, which judgment shall be final. were-tar ofthe City ofMiami, § 26 (2001). . Petitioner argues that the language set forth in Section 26 requires the Commissiongto hear charges and render judgment within five days ofreceiving notice of a suspension fiom the City Manager. Petitioner claims that Bryan v. Landis, 142 So. 2d 650 (FIa.1932), supports his interpretation of Section 26, and further contends that the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the issuance of a writ of quo warranto where the City of Miami did not comply with the “five-day rule”. Id. However, the Bggan court only held that Section 26 is the proper method under the City Charter toiremove the Chief of Police, and affirmed the writ of quo warranto because the City of Miami removed the Chief of Police without complying with Section 26. _I_d, The _B_i3Lan_ court did not discuss the application of the “five-day rule” and is therefore inapposite to Petitioner’s position on this issue. I_d. ' Respondent argues the five-day requirement in Section 26 only requires the Commission to begin proceedings regarding the suspension within five days ofreceiving notice of a suspension V \ [*7] r__... ,7 W7 __ __ from the City Manager, and argues that Petiti0ner’s' suggested interpretation leads to an unreasonable and illogical construction ofthe City Charter, which must be rejected.³ World Ain~va§gs,,Inc._v,,Flon'da Pub. ‘Sew. Com’n, 427 So. 2d 716, 719 Gila. 1983); Atl.,_S,h0res Resort, LLC v. 507_§,_ _St_,_C9_1‘_p_., 937 S0. 2d 1239, 1245 (Fla. sa nca 2006); Paloumbis v. City ofIyliaini Beach, s40 So. 2a 297, 29s-99 (Fla. sq DCA 2003). By affording judicial deference to the Con1mission’s interpretation of its own Charter, this Court cannot find that the Conn:nission’s interpretation of Section 26, or itslfinal action to renderjudgment on Monday, September 12, 2011, was unreasonable. .Fu1-themiore, when detennining the timeliness of an act, when the last day falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or holiday, the period of time is generally extended. to the following day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or holiday. _S_eg Fla. R. Civ. P. l.09t)(a). Thus, even if this Court applied Petitioner’s interpretation, the Commissionis decision to render judgment on Monday, September 12, 2011, would still _faIl within the generally accepted computation oftime for rendering a decision. Accordingly, the ‘Court findsthat the Commission afforded Petitioner procedural due process and finds no basis in which to grant Petitioner’-s request for relief.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing analysis, this Court finds that the City of Miami City Commission afforded Petitioner procedural due process, and that the City Commission’s decision to affirm the³ Respondent cites to Qjty of Boga Eaton 1, Q-iigggn, 440 So. 2d 1277, 1281 (Fla. 1983) (“No literal interpretation should be given that leads to an unreasonable or ridiculous conclusion or to apurpose not designated by the lawmakers") ' [*8] _ _ _ ,........,._._. suspension and to terminate Petitioner as Chief of Police complied with the essential requirements oflaw and was supported by competent substantial evidence. _ THEREFORE, Miguel A. Exposit0’s Petitions for Writ of Certiorari and Writ-of Quo Warranto are hereby DENIED, and the decision of the City of Miami City Commission is hereby AFFIRMED ' e LINDSEY and HIRSC JJ. eoncg⁵

N.

A

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CIRCUIT CO

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Date: iQ~ ' I A.- H

N. NORIVIA S. LINDS

'

CIRCU T COURT JUDGE

Date: éiéik ‘ HON. M%0~N'HlRSCH;

CIRCUITC

TJUDGE

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