EUCLID AVENUE LLC

v.

CITY OF MIAMI BEACH

SIMON, Judge. Appellant, Euclid Avenue, LLC (Euclid), seeks appellate review of a decision by the Special Master of the City of Miami Beach (City) regarding a building code violation for failure to comply with a forty year recertification requirement for a property located at 1552 Euclid Avenue. On September², 2010, the City mailed notice for a hearing to Euclid to an incorrect address located on Meridian Avenue. The City had been provided a more current mailing address of 2829 Bird Avenue, #5, PMB 295, Miami, Florida 33133. The mail was returned as undeliverable. Notice was not sent to the correct address (Bird Avenue). At the initial violation hearing, the Special Master ordered full compliance with the building code by November², 2010. Failure to comply with said order would result in a $150 per day fine with a cap of $10,000. Euclid was not present at the hearing. W _\ ... R, I /Z7? W"I

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES

, A i _ Q ,5’ TO FILE RE-HEARING MOTION, k., A W/I My”/\/1

AND, IF FILED, DISPOSED OF

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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE

ELEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN

AND FOR MIAMI-DADE COUNTY,

FLORIDA

I3

EUCLID AVENUE, LLC

APPELLATE DIVISION

Appellant/Petitioner, vs. APPELLATE CASE NO.: 12-318 AP CITY OF MIAMI BEACH, , LOWER CASENO: IE1q00037;.§'§ Appellee/Respondent. g fig I? T1513 ===-= 5‘%°§’€§’ snguuv s- aasaaz caosaaaos‘ltd T7 LL / (I3 -1'40 ‘.3552-‘E An Appeal from a decision rendered by the Special Master ofthe City of Mia1i‘Ii§j3e {,2 Flagg, Esq., Appellant/Petitioner. Steven I-I. Rothstein, First Assistant City Attorney, for Appellee/Respondent. Before COHEN, HERSCH, AND SIMON, JJ. SIMON, Judge. Appellant, Euclid Avenue, LLC (Euclid), seeks appellate review of a decision by the Special Master of the City of Miami Beach (City) regarding a building code violation for failure to comply with a forty year recertification requirement for a property located at 1552 Euclid Avenue. On September², 2010, the City mailed notice for a hearing to Euclid to an incorrect address located on Meridian Avenue. The City had been provided a more current mailing address of 2829 Bird Avenue, #5, PMB 295, Miami, Florida 33133. The mail was returned as undeliverable. Notice was not sent to the correct address (Bird Avenue). At the initial violation hearing, the Special Master ordered full compliance with the building code by November², 2010. Failure to comply with said order would result in a $150 per day fine with a cap of $10,000. Euclid was not present at the hearing. W _\ [*2] In February 2011, Euclid entered into a sale agreement to sell the property in question. A title search revealed the City’s lien. Buyer and Seller agreed to enter into an Escrow Agreement wherein proceeds of the sale were deposited with an escrow agent pending resolution of the lien. On July 12, 2011, Euclid sued the buyer in the llth Judicial Circuit Court (case no. ll-21408CA0l) for control and disbursement of the money set aside pursuant to the escrow agreement. On April 23, 2012, the Circuit Court Judge entered an order requiring the escrow agent pay the lien out of the escrow funds. Thus, the lien was satisfied out of Euclid’s purchase money funds. A mitigation hearing was set for July 26, 2012. Euclid argued lack ofnotice of the initial violation. The Special Master denied the petition for mitigation ofthe fine. The City has conceded that Euclid did not receive proper notice of the initial violation hearing and thus the fine is void ab initio. Therefore, this Court does not need to address the issue ofproper notice. The standard of review used by the appellate court when reviewing the actions of a local administrative agency decision requires it to determine, (1) whether procedural due process was accorded; (2) whether the essential requirements of the law were observed; and (3) whether the administrative findings and judgment were supported by competent substantial evidence. Haines City Comty. Dev. v. Heggs, 658 So. 2d 523, 530 (Fla. 1995); Castilleja v. City ofJacksonville, 738 So. 2d 335, 336 (Fla. lst DCA 1998). When applying the above standard, the appellate court cannot reweigh evidence or substitute its judgment for that of the Board. See Haines City, 658 So. 2d at 530. Rather, if the record contains competent substantial evidence to support the administrative agency’s decision, the court should uphold the decision. Fla. Power & Light Co., v. City of Dania, 761 So. 2d 1089, 1093 (Fla. 2000). Thus, the court is prohibited from performing a de novo court review, and by law is limited to a review of the record made at the administrative hearing. Battaglia Fruit Co. v. City ofMaitland, 530 So. 2d 940, 943 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988). This Appellate Court finds the Appellant has standing to appeal the Special Master’s Mitigation Order since Euclid is an “aggrieved party” under Section 162.11 On July 12, 2011, Euclid sued the buyer in the llth Judicial Circuit Court (case no. ll-21408CA0l) for control and disbursement of the money set aside pursuant to the escrow agreement. On April 23, 2012, the Circuit Court Judge entered an order requiring the escrow agent pay the lien out of the escrow funds. Thus, the lien was satisfied out of Euclid’s purchase money funds. A mitigation hearing was set for July 26, 2012. Euclid argued lack ofnotice of the initial violation. The Special Master denied the petition for mitigation ofthe fine. The City has conceded that Euclid did not receive proper notice of the initial violation hearing and thus the fine is void ab initio. Therefore, this Court does not need to address the issue ofproper notice. The standard of review used by the appellate court when reviewing the actions of a local administrative agency decision requires it to determine, (1) whether procedural due process was accorded; (2) whether the essential requirements of the law were observed; and (3) whether the administrative findings and judgment were supported by competent substantial evidence. Haines City Comty. Dev. v. Heggs, 658 So. 2d 523, 530 (Fla. 1995); Castilleja v. City ofJacksonville, 738 So. 2d 335, 336 (Fla. lst DCA 1998). When applying the above standard, the appellate court cannot reweigh evidence or substitute its judgment for that of the Board. See Haines City, 658 So. 2d at 530. Rather, if the record contains competent substantial evidence to support the administrative agency’s decision, the court should uphold the decision. Fla. Power & Light Co., v. City of Dania, 761 So. 2d 1089, 1093 (Fla. 2000). Thus, the court is prohibited from performing a de novo court review, and by law is limited to a review of the record made at the administrative hearing. Battaglia Fruit Co. v. City ofMaitland, 530 So. 2d 940, 943 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988). This Appellate Court finds the Appellant has standing to appeal the Special Master’s Mitigation Order since Euclid is an “aggrieved party” under Section 162.11 Florida Statutes. This Court also finds that Euclid is a pa1'ty whose substantial interests were affected by the City due to the fact that it was forced by court order to pay the lien out of its sale proceeds. Furthermore, this Appellate Court finds Euclid is a “violator” as required by Section 30-76(a) & (b) of the City of Miami Beach Code. Although Euclid was not the owner of the property at the [*3] time of the petition, ownership is not a requirement set forth by the Code. Euclid is considered a violator under the Code since it was the party who incurred the fine for noncompliance with the building cede. ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the decision of the Special Master of the City of Miami Beach is QUASHED. COHEN and HERSCH, JJ., concur

COPIES FURNISHED TO COUNSEL

OF RECORD AND TO ANY PARTY

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time of the petition, ownership is not a requirement set forth by the Code. Euclid is considered a violator under the Code since it was the party who incurred the fine for noncompliance with the building cede. ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the decision of the Special Master of the City of Miami Beach is QUASHED. COHEN and HERSCH, JJ., concur

COPIES FURNISHED TO COUNSEL

OF RECORD AND TO ANY PARTY

NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL