GLENN V QUINTANA, D.C., A/A/O OMAR MANSO

v.

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTO INS CO

“‘' ..i=.__;:_,'_, -u.-L ‘:1-I tlift onnmnfinam:%%dbcb Y; §n3\Lf ,20hi fiigé dE- 7--1-"-'3" =._.i~.J1:Jv-\ /" _< M, -v I Q V‘ Marlene S. Roles, for Petltioncr. L; - -0 D Nancy W. Gregoire, Carlos Carinona, Jr., for Respondent. Before VENEER, HIRSCH, and SANCHEZ-LLORENS, JJ. Per Curiam. On or about February 1, 2009, Mr. Omar Manso, insured by Respondent State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, was involved in an automobile accident. Petitioner, Glenn V. Quintana, 'D.C., P.A., provided Mr. Manso with medical treatment fi‘0m February l0, 2009 through March 3, 2009. Petitioner submitted claims to Respondent for the medical treatment, and a dispute arose regarding the proper amount of reimbursement. Petitioner filed a two-count Complaint against Respondent in January 2012. Count 1 of the Complaint sought a declaratory judgment regarding the appropriate method of‘reimbursement under the insurance policy. Count II of the'C0mpiaint alleged a breach of contract for failing to reimburse 80% of reasonable charges. Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss in July 2012, arguing that that the declaratory judgment claim sought the same relief as the breach ofcontract claim, and that Petitioner was not I _b T~323 Poooixoooo F-455 if lp/’ 9% we ‘_ _ » alto -LY -

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES

E? [*2] 4‘ r . or-0?-’ is 11 =50 FROM— T—828 P0002/0005 F~45'5 t ‘ 4" ti in doubt as to its rights under the policy, and thus there was no need for a declaratory judgment. The lower court held a hearing on the Motion to Dismiss on April 1, 2013, and entered an order dislnissing the declaratory judgnrent count with prejudice because Petitioner “ha[d] an adequate remedy for breach of contract.” Petitioner filed the Petition for Writ of Certiorari on May 2," 2013. \ §.feI.1$lEs' . As a first preliminary issue, Respondent asserts that this court lacks jurisdiction to consider the Petition for Writ of Ceitiorari because Petitioner lacks standing to seek review of the lower cou1t’s order. Respondent claims that Dr. Quintana is listed in his personal capacity as the Petitioner in the style of the Petition, rather than the professional association Glenn V. Quintana, D.C., P.A., who is the Plaintiff in thc_u.ndorlylng case. Respondent argues that Dr. Quintana is at nonparty to the proceedings and has no standing to seek review of an order entered by the lower court. Petitioner asserts that any error in omitting “RA.” i.n the style of the Petition was rt minor scriVcner’s error that does not affect Pctitioncr’s standing in this case. This Court agrees with Petitioner that thcomission of .“P.A.” from the style represents a minor sorivener‘s error, and finds that Petitioner has standing to seek review ofthe lower eou1t’s' order. N n fR ' a ll‘6 o evrew _ As a second preliminary issue, Petitioner requests this Court to consider its request for appeilate review as either a petition for writ ofconlorari, or as a final appealofthe lower court’s order. This Court finds that the lower co11rt’s order is not revicwable on appeal at this juncture. Several Florida District Courts of Appeal have ruled that an order dismissing counts of a n1uiti~ count complaint, even with prejudice, is a nonfinal, 11011-appettlablc order. See, e.g., Floricla Lifestyle Realty, -Inc. v. Goodwin, 917 So. 2d I060 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (holding that the court lackedjurisdiction to consider an appeal ofan order dismissing with prejudice one count ofa sixcount complaint where the claims were interdependent); -Santana v. Florida Intern. Ur_ziv., 922 So. 2d 242 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (holding that piecemeal appeals from nonfinai order dismissing with prejudice two counts of a six-count complaint was not permissible where the claims were interrelated and involved the same transaction and parties). See also Binsetti v. Palm Beach Blood Bank, Ina, 654 So. 2d 237 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (“An appeal from an order dismissing a count of a complaint, where other counts against the same parties remain, is authorized only [*3] 0?-or-=1411=eo FROM— H t~s2s P0008/0005 F-455 6: .‘ when the dismissed count arises from a separate and distinct transaction independent ofthe other pending, pleaded elaimsf’) Petitioner‘s two-count Complaint contains lntelrelatecl causes of action regarding the proper reinrbursenrent rates for medical coverage. Based on the relevant precedent case law, -the iower court’s order dismissing with prejudice Petitioner’s claim for a deeiaratory judgment is a nonfinal, non-appealahle order. Accordingly, this Court will review the lower court order pursuant to its certiorarijurisdiction. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(c)(2). l ' Certiorari Review The standard for granting a writ of certiorari for a non-final order is: (I) the order to be reviewed must-constitute a departure from the essential requirements of law; (2) theorder must cause material injury through subsequent proceedings; and (3) the injury must be irreparable, i.e., one for which there will be no adequate remedy after finaljudgurerit. Sheridan Healthcorp, Inc. v. Total Health Choice, ]nc., 770 So. 2d 221, 222 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (citing Martindoimson, Inc. v. Savage, 509 So. 2d 1097 (Fla. 1987)). A departure from the essential requirements of the law necessary for the issuance of a writ of certiorari is something more than a simple legal error... A decision made according to the form ofthe law and the rules prescribed for rendering it, although it may be erroneous in its conclusion as applied to the facts, does not rise to . the necessary level. - ' ' Barker v. Barker, 909 So. 2d 333, 337-38 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (citing Haines City Cram Dev. v. Heggs, 658 So. 2d $23, 525 (Fla. 1995). Petitioner argues that the lower court’s order departs from the essential requirements of law because it is in direct conflict with Florida Statutes § 36.111, which states in pertinent part that “[t}he existence of another adequate remedy does not preclude a judgment for declaratory relief.” See Fla. Stat. § 86.111. Petitioner further asserts that the lower court's ruling creates irreparable harm in two ways: (1) that Petitioner is now precluded from obtaining a deelaratoryjudgment as to its rights under the policy, and (2) that the lower court order has potentially exposed Petitioner T0 ii lliflglllflllt for t1tt0rney’s fees and costs pursuant to an offer ofjudgment from Respondent. See Fla. Stat. § 1ss.79. ' Respondent asserts that the lower court order did not depart from the essential requirements of law because the lower court properly found that the declaratory judgment claim did not [*4] O?—U7—’ 14 11 :51 FROM— (“E <f 3 VENZER, HIRSCH, and SANCHEZ-LLORENS, JJ., 0(n1cur. CIR

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CIRCUITCURT JUDGE

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