RUSSELL HARVEY

v.

CAMPTON ASSOC (LTD)

filed Defendanfs Answer and Defendant’s Motion for a Hearing to Deterrnine How Much, If Any, Rent Should be Paid into the Court Registry. The Appellant disputed the amount of rent due based on the offset of counterolaims included in his motion and/or his reliance on an alleged settlement with the Appellee. The appellate record reflects that the Appe1lant’s Answer and" Motion for a Hearing to determine rent were timely.‘ ' V i On April 25, 2013, the Appeliee moved for entry of an Order Striking Pleadings and for Entry of a Default and a Default for Possession. This niotion alleged that in his Answer and Motion, the Appellant had admitted to not paying the rents due into the Registry of the Court, that the Appellant did not assert any legal excuse for failure to do so, nor did the Appellant allege that the rents due were in error or should he re-determined by the trial court. On April 29, 2013, the trial court’ entered its Order Striking Appellant’s Answer and Entering Default. The trial court found that the Appellant failed to pay the accrued rent into the Registry ofthe Court and without oonducting a hearing it entered Default Possession in favor of the Appellee. May 1, 2013, 2013, the Appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration-——this motion was denied on the same day. appeal followed." V _, _ ~ . V _‘ Our jurisdiction to resolve this appeal arises from § 26.012(1), Florida Statutes (2013). “Issues governing the interpretation of a statute are subject to a de novo standard of review.” Ruiz v. Thomas, 20 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 885a (Fla. 17th ca. ct. 2013) (citing I-Io1ly_wood_Mobile Estates La1,,,v. Hollywood Estates, Indep, Tenants Ass’n Ind, 67 So. 3d 1194, 1196 (Fla. 4"? DCA 2011)). The county couit’s factual findings are presumed co1*rect—we do not disturb these findings unless clearly erroneous. Kendrick v. Corser, 19 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 72a, 72a (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. 201i)(citing State v. Shipman, 370 S0. 2d 1195, 1196 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979)). 1 On appeal, the -Appellce did not assert appellate argumentsiregarding whether the Appellant timely filed the Answer and Motion for Hearing to Determine “How Much, If Any, Rent Should be Paid into the Court Registry.” We do not consider this an issue for review. - [*3] Hereby REVERSED AND REMANDED for Determination as to what amount was required to be placed in the registry. The Appellant makes two arguments. One of which is that the notice provided by" the Appellee was insufficient. This court will not address that issue because of its decision to remand the case. Additionally, the Appellant contends that the trial court was required to hold a hearing-to determine the amount he needed to deposit into the registry, prior to the granting of the defaultjudgment. He relies on § 83.60(2), Florida Statutes (2013), which reads: ' g In an action by the landlord for possession of a dwelling unit, if the tenant interposes any defense other than payment,_the tenant shall pay into the registry of thepcourt the accrued rent as alleged in the complaint or as determined by the court and the rent that accrues during the pendency of the proceeding, whendue... __ p I A ‘ _ _ _ . . w Pursuant to § 83.60(2), Florida Statutes, the tenant must pay the accrued rent, alleged in the complaint or as determined by the trial court, into the registry. _ _ . g A _ p The Appellant moved the trial court “for a Hearing to Determine How much, If Any, Rent Should Be Paid into‘ the_Court Regist1y.”_On April 23, 2013, although such request was filed along with and included in the Appel1ant’s Answer, and they are normally two separate pleadings, we find that he unequivocally requested the rent determination and no hearing was had. Subsequent to the rent determination motion, the Appellee moved for default, alleging that the Appe1lant’s motion merely asserted that the Appellee had not acted in good faith, that the Appellant had reported the Appellee to a governmental agency, and that the Appellee’s prior attorney shad drafted a proposed settlement agreement that was never executed. The lower court found that the Ap_pellant’s motion “was not, in fact a Motion requesting determination of the amount of rent to be paid into the Registry.” This factual finding overlooked the pending motion for rent determination. Consequently, the trial court prematurely granted the landlord an immediate default judgment. We reverse the April 29, 2013 default order and [*4] l| ; \ m remand for the trial court to resolve the Appellanifs rent determination motion in compliance with § 83.60(2), Florida Statutes. ' _ This _____ MA _ day of’ @2014. *"---Q--»——

CRIST

A MIRANDA

SAMANT

RUIZ COHEN

E /

ROBERT J LUCK

Cc: ' RUSSEL HARVEY, PRO SE

FREDRICK C SAKE, ESQ.

PO BOX 190434 - 4770 BISCAYNE BOULEVARD, SUITE 640

A

MIAMI BEACH, FL 33119 MIAMI, FL 33137

O M