ROBERTO COTO

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA

Before MUIR, BERNSTEIN, and ARZOLA, JL

PER CURIAM.

QX*6U**~u>fA*** apiMC Roberto Coto appeals his judgmentofconviction and sentence for the offenses of Assault and Disorderly Intoxication, rendered on May¹, 2013. This Court has jurisdiction. §26.012(1), & * VI [*2] CASE NUMBER: 13-262 AC Fla. Stat. (2015); Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(c)(1)(A). Mr. Coto claims one of thejurors should have been stricken for cause. We agree and reverse.

I.

BACKGROUND

On November 21, 2012, Appellant engaged in an altercation with a Mr. Porfirio Diaz and a minor, R.D. Appellant was arrested and charged with separate counts of battery and assault againsteach victim and one count of disorderly intoxication. The matter proceeded to trial. During voir dire, Appellant challenged prospective Juror Collins for cause based on her past life experiences. This Juror had disclosed issues with her stepfather.¹ Subsequently, the panel was sworn. 1Thetestimony includes: State: But so, I can't tell if it involves a similar situation to yours or not. But based on just the charge, when you're in the jury room - let's say you're picked on this jury, and you hear all the evidence,and you have to sit down with your peers and make a decision, and make a verdict based on the evidence; would you be thinking about that stuff that happened with your step dad, or wouldyou be able to thinkabout only whatyou heardaboutin court? Mrs. Collins: Um, probably, my step dad. [*3] CASE NUMBER: 13-262 AC During the closing argument, the prosecutorcommented on the fact that Mr. Coto did not testify in his own defense. The prosecutor also bolstered the credibility of a police officer who testified for the State. The defense did not object to any ofthese statements. The juryfound Mr. Coto notguilty of the two battery counts, notguilty of assault against the minor,guiltyo£assaultagainst Mr. Diaz, and guiltyofdisorderlyintoxication. This appeal followed.

II. ANALYSIS

Challenge for cause Appellant argues the trial court erred in denying a challenge for cause of prospective Juror Collins. Appellant claims there was a reasonable doubt she could be impartial - she was biased by her past life experiences with her stepfather, who used to be violent and ''under the influence a lot." These were similar to the charges Appellant was facing in this case. Trial courts have great discretion in ruling on challenges of jurors for cause, Ivey v. State, 855 So. 2d 1169, 1171 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003). The trial court's determination of juror competency will not be overturned on appeal in the absence of manifest error. Id. "The test for determining juror competency is whether the prospectivejuror can set aside any bias or prejudice and render a verdict based solely on the evidence presented and the instructions on the law given by the trial." Brown v. State, 728 So. 2d 758, 759 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999). If there is any reasonable doubt that the juror possesses the state of mind necessaryto render an impartial verdict based solely on the evidence presented and the law announced at the trial, the juror should be excused. Matarranzv. State, 133 So. 3d 473 (Fla. 2013). Here, prospective Juror Collins should have been stricken for cause. She provided equivocal responses that raised a reasonable doubt as to whether she possessed the state of mind [*4] CASE NUMBER: 13-262 AC necessary to render an impartial verdict. See Brown, 728 So. 2d at 758. Particularly, when asked whether she could render the verdict based on the evidence adduced at trial, she specifically stated that she was probably going to be thinking about her step dad. While this juror might have been able to be rehabilitated, she never was. The Trial Judge's memory about rehabilitation was simply wrong. Perhaps he was thinking about another juror. But a close examination of the record reveals that no one ever asked, and Juror Collins never volunteered, that she could set aside her feelings and reach a verdict based solely on the facts and the law. Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the denial of the challenge for cause constituted manifest error. Prosecutorial Comments We find it unnecessary to address whether the prosecutor's comments were appropriate, or whether they constituted fundamental error, as the firstissueon appealis dispositive.

III.CONCLUSION

REVERSED AND REMANDED for a new trial. Copies furnished to: Katherine Fernandez Rundle, Esq., 1350 N.W. 12th Avenue, Miami, Florida 33136 Joseph M. Wasserkrug, Esq., 1350 N.W. 12th Avenue, Miami, Florida 33136 Carlos J. Martinez, Esq., 1320 N.W. 14th Street, Miami, Florida, 33125 Maria E. Lauredo, Esq., 1320 N.W. 14th Street, Miami, Florida, 33125