FELIX ROMERO

v.

LA SALLE ALUMNOS LLC

DIAZ, J.

. _ - . idél-AG3-'l zi 3i.‘:;il?U.:fic Appellant Felix'Romer0 (“the tenant”) was sued by the Appellee LaSalle Alumnos, LLC (“the landlord”) in the trial court. The initial three day notice attempting to effectuate service of process said that the tenant was absent from his usual place of residence at the time of service. -The return of service indicatedthat a five day commercial eviction summons and complaint was '...-..-.4-,.A .-.+ -+1.- +..........+:,. ..,.-:.1.-...,.,. 1;. 2..-; +1.- .....+:..- ....... ......+-.1 ..... +1.- ,.1....:.. 1:...1. c.....,.,.

PUDLULI

CLL .U..lU LU1.l.G..l1l D 1UD_lL1U11\/U. 1.11 Lflbl, L].1C .l1UL1UU

WGB

PUDLUU

U¹¹ I [*2] _L l l . i i : i surrounding the vacant lot that Romero was leasing from La Sallel. The process server did not attempt personal service on Romero at his residential address, even though La Salle had that address in their records as they had collected rent from him there in the past. . ' Unaware that he was the subject of an eviction action, Romero never filed an answer in the lawsuit. The Clerk entered a default against him. The trial court subsequently entered a judgment for removal of tenant. A writ of possession was issued on January 23, 2014 and Rorr1ero"was dispossessed. On Februar emergency mouon to vacate and to ‘<1 ,_.. §:> l\Jc> ,_. “Ia;R U1,_.cuQ. set aside the final judgment for removal of tenant and for writ of possession. The trial court denied the motion without a hearing. A motion for rehearing was denied by the trial court on March 12, 2014. This appeal followed. The issue before this tribunal is whether or not the trial court’s denial of the motion for rehearing should be reversed. We conclude that it should, because of the defect in the service of process. Under §83.22(1), Fla. Stat. (1995), the procedure to post service of process on a defendant in a' nonresidential tenant case is: . - After at least two attempts to obtain service as provided by law, if the defendant cannot be found in me county in which the action is pending met either - the defendant has no usual place of abode in the county, or there is not a person l5 years of age or older residing at the defendant’s usual place of abode in the county, the sheriff shall serve the surmnons by attaching it to some part of the premises involved in the proceeding. The minimum time delay between the two - - attempts to obtain service shall be 6 hours. ‘ Service was not done properly in this matter. Here, the three day notice and the return of service both refer to Mr. Romero’s residence, not the subject property (even though the address was correct). The property in question is unimproved property with no permanent structures. The landlord knew Mr. Romero’s home address, which was on his rent checks and where they had collected rent from him in the past. Nevertheless, the process server never attempted service on him there, his usual place of abode, and certainly never made two attempts at service as the statute requires, before posting at the fence of the unimproved property. The trial cotut should be reversed on that basis alone. _ 1 Even though the service return referred to the ‘residence’, it did list the correct address for the subject property. . _ _, | [*3] ‘i is A judgment entered without due process is void. Castro v. The Charter Club, lnc., 114 So. 3d I055 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013). Where a judgment is void due to defective service, the party seeking to vacate such a judgment need not show any other basis for vacating the judgment. Castro at 1059. Because lack of personal service raises due process issues, the plaintiff seeking constructive service must strictly comply with the statutory requirements; therefore, the statute is strictly construed_against the plaintiff seeking constructive service, and, absent strict compliance with the statute, service is improper and any resulting judgment is void. Castro at 1059; §49.01l, Fla. Stat., et seq. . " _ ' j In conclusion, we find that the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to grant Appellant’s motion for rehearing. Accordingly, we reverse and remand this matter to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. _ LUCK and RODRIGUEZ-CHOMA 9, JJ., concur. (2 an ' '///i'_\) l I uunosi. .1. Luci-< .