ISABEL C CASAS

v.

ANTHONY GANAWAY

TRAWICK, WALSH and SANTOVENIA, J.J.

TRAWICK, J.

[*1] This matter arises from a dispute regarding the return of a security deposit by the landlord at the termination of a residential tenancy when the tenant vacated the premises. Appellees (Tenants), filed suit for the return of the security deposit when the landlord refused to return the full amount of the deposit. Appellants (Landlords) filed an answer with an affirmative defense along with a counterclaim. The trial court entered final judgment on the original claim in favor of Tenants. Upon a review of the record we find that the trial court erred in entering that judgment and we reverse.

Tenants entered into a written lease with Landlords to rent a residential property. Tenants provided Landlords with a security deposit in the amount of $5,100 at the beginning of the one-year lease term. The lease included the following provision regarding any required notice:

Any notice which either party may or is required to give, such notice shall be in writing and shall be deemed given when it shall have been deposited in the United States Mails, certified or registered, or hand delivered and addressed to the party for whom it is intended as follows:

FOR THE LANDLORD: Isabel C. Casas, (address omitted) FOR THE TENANT: (address omitted) [*2] When the lease term expired, Tenants remained in the premises month to month.1 Tenants subsequently notified Landlords via text message that they would vacate the property on August 10, 2018, but did not vacate the property until August 11, 2018.

On September 10, 2018, Landlords sent Tenants, pursuant to Section 83.49. Florida Statutes, a "Notice of Claim" of $3,096.83 against the security deposit as a result of damages Landlords alleged had been caused by Tenants.

On September 14, 2018, Tenants objected to Landlords' claim, contending that Landlords were not entitled to any part of the deposit. As a result of this dispute Tenants filed a small claims action for the return of the security deposit. They claimed that they were entitled to the full deposit amount of $5,100. However, within the body of the complaint and in two separate "wherefore" clauses, Tenants sought $2,909.83 and $2,003.17 in damages.2 This totaled $4,913.00, an amount within the limitation for a small claims action.

Landlords filed a pro se answer listing a litany of damages they maintained were caused by Tenants and that they were entitled to retain part of the 2 While it appears that the amount of $2,003.17 is the difference between the full security deposit and the amount claimed by the Landlords in their notice of claim, it is not clear how the Tenant arrived at the $2,909.83 figure. [*3] security deposit as compensation.³ They also filed a counterclaim for breach of contract and negligence in which they claimed that they should be awarded the entire deposit of $5,100.

Neither party requested that the Rules of Civil Procedure be invoked.⁴ On April 11, 2019, Tenants filed a motion for partial summary judgment asking the Court to find that Tenants were entitled to portion of the security deposit unclaimed by Landlords, or $2,003.17. Landlords filed a response stating that their damages exceeded the amount originally claimed in the notice of claim.

Ten days before the scheduled trial date, Tenants filed a motion to allow them to appear at the trial telephonically. The record before this Court does not indicate whether the trial court ever ruled on that motion. Additionally no record of the events of May³, 2019, were provided to this Court other than a document entitled "Non-Jury Trial Minutes" which indicates that the length of "trial" was¹ 1/4 hours and that the Plaintiff (Tenants) were awarded $5,420.5 R. 7.020(c) permits any party to ask the court to order that the proceedings be governed by the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. Neither party did so here.⁵ While Landlords maintain that Tenants did not attend the May³ proceeding, nothing in the record supports this. [*4] 8, 2019 entering judgment in favor of Tenants in the amount of $5,000. In this final judgment the trial court specifically found that the Landlords "failed to properly inform the Plaintiffs of Defendants' Intent to impose a claim against the Plaintiffs (sic) security deposit as required by Fla. Stat. 83.49(3), by failing to meet the statutory requirements of Fla. Stat. 83.49(3)(a)." No mention was made of the counterclaim. The trial court later denied Landlords' motion for rehearing.

Landlords have raised several arguments. First, they maintain that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because the amount claimed in both the original claim and the counterclaim exceeded the threshold for a small claims matter. Second, they maintain that they were denied due process since a) the trial court awarded Tenants more than what they asked for in the complaint; b) the trial court entered summary judgment under Fla. Sm. Cl. R. 7.135 on the day of trial; c) the Tenants failed to appear for trial; and d) the trial court failed to address their counterclaim. Third, they argue that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because the Tenants failed to prove a condition precedent to their claim, that they provided proper notice pursuant to requirements in the lease to the Landlords prior to vacating the property. Fourth, they contend that their notice of lien under Section 83.49 (3)(a) substantially complied with the requirements of the statutes. Finally, the Landlords believe that the [*5] trial court erred in granting summary final judgment because there was a genuine issue of material fact raised by their affirmative defense of set off.

The Landlord first argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction. This argument is premised on a mistaken understanding of the jurisdiction of the county courts of this State. "Small Claims Courts" are not a constitutional creation, but are part of the county court. As a matter of procedure, not jurisdiction, such courts are limited to matters in controversy that do not exceed $5,000. If the amount in controversy should exceed $5,000, the county court maintains jurisdiction as long as the sum sought does not exceed $15,000. See Lasalla v. Pools by George of Pinellas County, Inc., 125 So. 3d 1016, 1017 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013). The Lasalla court held that for purposes of the concept of subject matter jurisdiction, a county court that applies the Florida Small Claims Rules in a particular proceeding is not a separate court from a county court that applies the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure.

Id. Lasalla continued by stating that a shift in the rules that from the Small Claims Rules to the Rules of Civil Procedure "is not a change of jurisdiction." Id. See also Conner v. Moran, 278 So. 3d 790, 791-92 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019). As a result, the trial court here did not lose jurisdiction simply because the amount in controversy alleged in both the original complaint and the counterclaim exceeded $5,000. [*6] Landlords next claim that they were denied procedural due process for several reasons. First, they aver that the trial court's award of $5,100 to the Tenant exceeded the amount the Tenants claimed in their complaint. This argument is refuted by the plain language of the complaint which specifically stated that Tenants were entitled to the return of the full amount of the security deposit. Indeed in their counterclaim, the Landlords sought the same sum. Landlords were well aware of the amount in controversy, and the trial court acted within its discretion in awarding the sum of $5,000 to the Tenants.

The Landlords also claim that they were denied due process because the trial court entered summary judgment on the day of trial. We do not agree. Since there is nothing in the record to indicate that either party invoked the Rules of Civil Procedure, the Small Claims Rules were properly applied. Fla. Sm. Cl. R. 7.135 states:

At pretrial conference or at any subsequent hearing if there is no triable issue, the court shall summarily enter an appropriate order or judgment.

This provision gave the trial court the discretion to enter summary judgment at the pretrial conference or at any time thereafter, including on the day of trial. While the record is not clear as to whether the court granted the Tenants' motion for summary judgment or not, any such order was well within the [*7] province of the trial court.⁶ Such a determination would not have denied Landlords' due process.

As to the assertion that the Landlords were denied due process because the Tenants failed to appear for trial, there is no record before the Court establishing the Tenants absence on the trial date. Without such a record, this Court is unable to determine whether the Landlord's assertions are accurate and whether any error may have occurred. See Applegate v. Barnett Bank of Tallahassee, 377 So. 2d 1150 (Fla. 1979). The decision of the trial court comes before this Court cloaked with the presumption of correctness, and the burden is on the Landlord to rebut that presumption. Smith v. Orhanma, Inc., 907 So. 2d 594 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005); Ahmed v. Travelers Indem. Co., 516 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 3d D A 1097). Landlords have failed to meet their burden.⁷ The trial court declined to accept the proposed statement, stating that the statement "cannot reasonably be relied upon by the Appellate Division panel for accuracy....” [*8] we must remand this matter for the trial court to conduct further proceedings on the counterclaim.

Landlords also contend that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in that the subject lease imposes a condition precedent to the filing of a notice of lien under Florida Statutes section 83.49(3)(a). The lease requires that the Tenants submit a written notice of their intent to vacate the premises and that the notice would be deemed received upon posting in the U.S. Mail by either certified or registered mail or upon hand delivery to the Landlords. Tenants instead sent the Landlords a text. In addition, the Landlords argue that the Tenants' text failed to include the address where the Tenants could be reached, thus violating the landlord-tenant notice requirements contained within Florida Statutes section 83.49(5). While there is certainly an argument that the notice requirement has been substantially complied with, we need not reach this issue. The Landlords do not contest the fact that they received the text or that they responded by timely submitting to Tenants their Notice of Claim. Additionally, as we observed above, the record does not conclusively establish whether the trial court entered summary judgment.

The Landlords next attack the primary finding of the final judgment. They believe that their notice of claim substantially complies with the notice of lien requirements under Florida Statutes section 83.49(3)(a). The trial court [*9] specifically found that it did not. We disagree. Section 83.49(3)(a) states in pertinent part:

Upon the vacating of the premises for termination of the lease. the landlord shall have 30 days to give the tenant written notice by certified mail to the tenant's last known mailing address of his or her intention to impose a claim on the deposit and the reason for imposing the claim. The notice shall contain a statement in substantially the following form:

This is a notice of my intention to impose a claim for damages in the amount of ___________ upon your security deposit, due to _______________. It is sent to you as required by s. 83.49(3), Florida Statutes. You are hereby notified that you must object in writing to this deduction from you security deposit within 15 days from the time you receive this notice or I will be authorized to deduct my claim from your security deposit. Your objection must be sent to (landlord's address).

If the landlord fails to give the required notice within the 30-day period, he or she forfeits the right to impose a claim upon the security deposit and may not seek a setoff against the deposit but may file an action for damages after return of the deposit. (emphasis added).

The Landlords' notice states in pertinent part:

This letter shall serve as formal notice of our intent to impose a claim for damages, due to the condition in which you left the house upon vacating, in the amount of $3,096.83 against your security deposit pursuant to [*10] Florida Statutes Section 83.49(3). The reasons for the imposition of this claim are as follows (damage itemization omitted). Pursuant to Section 83.49 of the Florida Statutes, you have fifteen (15) days after the receipt of this letter to object to the imposition of this claim on your security deposit. Should you fail to object within fifteen (15) days the landlord may then deduct the amount of the claim. Your objection must be sent to: Isabel C. Casas and Isola Casas (address omitted).

We find that the notice provided by the landlord provides all of the information necessary to inform Tenants of why the claim was being made, the total amount of the claim along with itemized damages, as well as the Tenants right to submit an objection within 15 days to the landlords' address. Tenants were also informed that if they failed to respond, the Landlords' claim would be deducted from the security deposit. The Landlords' notice substantially comports with the form language contained in Section 83.49(3)(a). The trial court erred in finding otherwise. Consequently, the Landlords were entitled to prove their damages entitling them to keep a portion of the security deposit. Likewise, the judgment does not state whether it resolved the counterclaim filed by the Landlords. On remand, the trial court shall conduct proceedings on the counterclaim. [*11] Finally, Landlords argue that the trial court erred in granting summary final judgment because there was a genuine issue of material fact raised by their affirmative defense of set off. As there is an insufficient record to determine whether the trial court entered summary judgment or conducted a nonjury trial, we decline to address this point.

The final judgment entered by the trial court is hereby REVERSED. This case is hereby REMANDED to the trial court for trial on the merits of the original claim and counterclaim provided that a trial on the merits of either or both was not conducted. If a trial was held, the trial court should make appropriate findings consistent with this opinion and conduct a hearing on damages as appropriate.

Appellees' motion for attorney's fees is DENIED. Appellant's motion for attorney's fees is conditionally GRANTED upon a determination by the trial court of entitlement as well as the appropriate amount of fees.

WALSH and SANTOVENIA, concur. COPIES FURNISHED TO COUNSEL

OF RECORD AND ANY PARTY NOT

REPRESENTED BY AN ATTORNEY.