HORACIO SEQUEIRA

v.

GATE SAFE

Before: WALSH, TRAWICK, and SANTOVENIA, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal from an order granting a motion for partial summary [*2] judgment on one of two claims asserted within Appellant's statement of claim. The first of those claims is an alleged violation of the Miami-Dade Living Wage Ordinance for failing to pay Appellant certain hourly wages. The second claim is that Appellee improperly garnished his pay. The trial court entered partial summary judgment in favor of Appellee on the Living Wage Ordinance claim. The remaining claim was not addressed, and the case below is open and pending. Finding we have no jurisdiction, we dismiss this appeal. Nothing prevents the Appellee from raising the trial court's entry of partial summary judgment on plenary appeal.

Appellant filed a notice of non-final appeal pursuant to Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure 9.110 pertaining to final orders, and 9.160 pertaining to the discretionary review of county court decisions by a district court of appeal. Neither rule is applicable here. Because the order on appeal is neither an appealable non-final order nor a final order, this appeal must be dismissed.

Jurisdiction to hear nonfinal appeals in the district courts of appeals is governed by Rule 9.130. See Art. V, § 4(b)(1), Fla. Const.; Rule 9.130(a)(1), Fla. R. App. P. However, jurisdiction to hear appeals from nonfinal orders in the circuit courts is governed by general law. See Art. V, § 5, Fla. Const. ("The circuit courts shall have original jurisdiction not vested in the county courts, and jurisdiction of appeals when provided by general law"); Blore v. Fierro, 636 So. 2d 1329 (Fla. [*3] 1994) ("The authority for appeals to the circuit court is established solely by general law as enacted by the legislature"). Here, no statute authorizes an appeal from an order granting partial summary judgment. Therefore, this appeal must be dismissed until such time as the lower court enters an appealable final order. See Padovano, P., Florida Appellate Practice § 5:3 (2019 ed.); 911 Dry Solutions, Inc. v. Florida Family Insurance Company, 259 So. 3d 167, 169 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018) (where Legislature has not enacted law authorizing appeal from order compelling appraisal, appeal from county court to circuit court was properly dismissed); Shell v. Foulkes, 19 So. 3d 438, 440 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (appeal of county court order of default in eviction action properly dismissed); State v. Sowers, 763 So. 2d 394 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (no circuit court jurisdiction to hear appeal of order in limine).

Nor is the trial court's order a final order or judgment which would be appealable under section 59.06, Florida Statutes. "Florida's test of finality for appellate purposes is well established: the order constitutes the end of judicial labor in the trial court, and nothing further remains to be done to terminate the dispute between the parties." Bloomgarden v. Mandel, 154 So. 3d 451, 454 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014), citing Miami-Dade Water and Sewer Auth. v. Metro. Dade County, 469 So. 2d 813, 814 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985). Clearly, judicial labor is not at an end the case below remains pending. And again, Rules 9.110 and 9.160 do not establish [*4] the jurisdiction of this Court to hear such an appeal - only the Florida Statutes may authorize circuit court appellate jurisdiction.

Nor is the trial court's order reviewable by certiorari because there was no departure from the essential requirements of law resulting in irreparable harm. See Pannell v. Triangle/Oaks Ltd. Partnership, 783 So. 2d 325 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001); citing Rodriguez v. Young America Corp., 717 So. 2d 621 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) (citing numerous cases). The trial court's order merely granted a partial motion for summary judgment the case remains pending. There was no error for which Appellant cannot seek redress through plenary appeal if and when a final judgment is secured against it.

Further, the fact that Appellant will be forced to litigate this case does not constitute the type of irreparable harm which would authorize the writ. See, e.g., AVCO Corp. v. Neff, 30 So. 3d 597 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (because the error complained of may be addressed on plenary appeal, the trial court's order denying summary judgment did not cause irreparable harm).

This appeal is hereby DISMISSED.

TRAWICK, WALSH and SANTOVENIA, JJ., concur. COPIES FURNISHED TO COUNSEL

OF RECORD AND TO ANY PARTY

NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL