ERIC FLORES ALVARADO

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA

Before: TRAWICK, WALSH, and SANTOVENIA, JJ.

TRAWICK, J.

[*1] Erick Alvarado, the Appellant, was driving a vehicle that struck a vehicle driven by Pedro Pedemonte and Vidal Perez ("victims") on a multiple lane roadway. The crash resulted in damage to the rear passenger side and the rim of the tires of the victims' vehicle. Appellant pulled up next to the passenger's side of the victims' car, which was stopped at a red traffic signal. Appellant's window was rolled down, and he motioned toward the victims' car as if he was trying to talk with them. The victims did not roll down their window or respond in any way. Instead, Pedemonte began video recording Alvarado and the surrounding scene. Perez called the police. After a short period of time,¹ when the traffic signal turned green, Appellant drove off. In so doing, he failed to wait for law enforcement to arrive, and he likewise failed to provide any identifying information or proof of insurance to the victims.

Appellant was charged with leaving the scene of an accident with property damage without providing identifying information, in violation of section 316.061(1), Fla. Stat. (2019). During a non-jury trial, Appellant twice moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that Appellant acted without criminal intent. He contended that before he left the scene, he waited for some period of time and N 1 Perez testified that Appellant's vehicle remained at the light for five minutes. Pedemonte testified that Appellant's vehicle remained for "some minutes." The trial court accepted the fiveminute estimate as true. This finding by the court does not seem to be corroborated by the video tape taken by Pedemonte, as it appears that Appellant left the scene when the traffic signal turned green, a much shorter period of time than five minutes. The victims' time estimates instead appear to be hyperbole. However, our decision in this case does not hinge on this discrepancy. [*2] attempted to communicate with the victims. Appellant argued that this effort was all that was required by the statute. Appellant further maintained that when, as here, a statute does not have specific language regarding intent, there must be proof of scienter. Without establishing such "guilty knowledge," Appellant argues, the State failed to meet its burden of proof.

Section 316.061(1), Fla. Stat. (2019), in applicable part, reads as follows:

The driver of any vehicle involved in a crash resulting only in damage to a vehicle or other property which is driven or attended by any person shall immediately stop such vehicle at the scene of such crash or as close thereto as possible, and shall forthwith return to, and in every event shall remain at, the scene of the crash until he or she has fulfilled the requirements of s. 316.062. (emphasis added).

Section 316.062(1), Fla. Stat. (2019) states:

The driver of any vehicle involved in a crash resulting in injury to or death of any person or damage to any vehicle or other property which is driven or attended by any person shall give his or her name, address, and the registration number of the vehicle he or she is driving, and shall upon request and if available exhibit his or her license or permit to drive, to any person injured in such crash or to the driver or occupant of or person attending any vehicle or other property damaged in the crash and shall give such information and, upon request, exhibit such license or permit to any police officer at the scene of the crash or who is investigating the crash and shall render to any person injured in the crash reasonable assistance, including the carrying, or the making of arrangements for the carrying, of such person to a physician, surgeon, or hospital for medical or surgical treatment if it is apparent that treatment is [*3] necessary, or if such carrying is requested by the injured person.

When construing a statute, we must look at its specific wording and plain meaning. Calabro v. State, 995 So. 2d 307, 314 (Fla. 2008) ("courts should first apply the plain meaning of the statute"); State v. Debaun, 129 So. 3d 1089, 1091 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (statute's plain and ordinary meaning best reflects legislative intent). In looking at section 316.061(1), the statute requires that the driver of a vehicle involved in a crash resulting in property damage remain at the scene of the accident in every event until the following requirements of section 316.062 are met: 1) the driver must provide his name, address, registration number of the vehicle he is driving, and if requested his driver's license to the driver or occupant of the other vehicle; 2) the must driver provide the same information to any police officer at the scene or who is investigating the case; and 3) the must driver provide reasonable assistance to any person injured in the crash given the extent of that person's injuries. By using the language and in every event shall remain at, the scene of the crash until he or she has fulfilled the requirements of s. 316.062, it is clear the Legislature did not authorize an attempt to satisfy these requirements. Instead, the statute imposes a duty on the part of a driver in an accident to fully comply with the above stated requirements. Any scienter requirement is met when the driver actually fulfills any of the requirements of section 316.062 that are applicable under the circumstances. [*4] When Appellant merely attempted to communicate with the victims and then left the scene without actually accomplishing any of the above-mentioned requirements of section 316.062, he violated section 316.061(1). As a result, the trial court was correct in denying Appellant's motions for judgment of acquittal and finding Appellant guilty of violating section 316.061(1). The trial court is therefore AFFIRMED.

WALSH and SANTOVENIA, JJ. concur. COPIES FURNISHED TO COUNSEL

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