17777 OLD CUTLER ROAD, LLC

v.

VILLAGE OF PALMETTO BAY FLORIDA, A FLORIDA MUNICIPAL CORPORATION

a Florida municipal corporation, Respondent.

OPINION

Original Opinion filed: March 10, 2023 Amended Opinion filed: July⁵, 2023 On Petition for Writ of Certiorari from the Village of Palmetto Bay approval of Resolution No. 2022-05 Eileen Ball Mehta, Kenneth J. Duvall, and Liana M. Kozlowski, Bilzin Sumberg Baena Price & Axelrod LLP, for 17777 Old Cutler Road, LLC, Petitioner. [*1] IN THE CIRCUIT COURT

OF THE ELEVENTH

JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN

AND FOR MIAMI-DADE

COUNTY, FLORIDA APPELLATE DIVISION

CASE NO.: 2022-00012- AP-01 Jerry B. Proctor, Jerry B. Proctor, P.A. for 17777 Old Cutler Road, LLC, Petitioner. Laura K. Wendell and John J. Quick, Weiss Serota Helfman Cole & Bierman, P.L., for Village of Palmetto Bay, Respondent.

Before: TRAWICK, SANTOVENIA, and DE LA O, JJ.

De la O, Judge.

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING

We grant Respondent's Motion for Rehearing in part, withdraw our previous opinion, and issue the following in its place.

Petitioner, 17777 Old Cutler Road, LLC, petitions this Court to quash Village Resolution No. 2022-05, adopted by the Respondent, Village of Palmetto Bay ("Village"), on January 24, 2022. (App. 00001-00004).1 For well over a decade, Petitioner has made efforts to build a 480-unit development on property zoned for a maximum of 400 units. In 2016, the Village determined that Petitioner owned other land on which it could develop 85 units. This other land was environmentally sensitive land the Village wished to preserve and use as a park and a fire station. As a result, Petitioner obtained approval [*2] from the Village to transfer the 85 development units from this environmentally sensitive land on the condition it donate the land to the Village. Believing it had satisfied the conditions for transferring those 85 development units, Petitioner combined them with its existing right to develop 400 units on its property and sought approval for its 480 unit development. At a final public hearing, however, the Village denied the 85 development units existed because Petitioner had not fulfilled a condition which the Village had not imposed and the law does not require the rezoning of the environmentally sensitive land Petitioner was donating to the Village.

On certiorari review, the Village argues there was competent substantial evidence to justify denial of Petitioner's application for development because Petitioner did not rezone the donated land. The Village also raises a new argument: that it was not obligated to accept the donated land. Neither argument is supported by competent substantial evidence. Moreover, the Village did not observe the essential requirements of law. Petitioner relied on the Village's 2016 approval and met the conditions imposed by the Village for the transfer of the development credits. Therefore, the Village is equitable [*3] estopped from denying the transfer of the 85 units, the Petition is granted, and the Village's denial is quashed.

BACKGROUND

Petitioner owns two abutting parcels of land in the Village, comprising approximately 80 acres (collectively, the "Property").² There are two folio's - the Development Site and the Donation Sites.³ In 1985, the Development Site was rezoned to an Office Park District to accommodate office buildings for Burger King, and the Donation Sites were zoned GU-Interim District.

In 2005, the Donation Sites were designated as "Parks and Recreation" or "Environmentally Protected Parks" in the comprehensive plan. In June 2008, the Village created the Village Mixed-Use Zoning District (VMU), which zoned approximately 44 acres of the Development Site as VMU. The Donation Sites were [*4] zoned Interim in 2009, a category that coincides with the County's GU Interim District.⁴ In 2015, the Village adopted a Transfer of Development Rights ("TDR") ordinance to preserve environmentally sensitive lands and to increase park land. On January 11, 2016, the Petitioner requested a "determination of development right"⁵ from the Department of Planning and Zoning regarding the west 22 acres of the Donation Sites, pursuant to the provisions of the Interim Zoning District and the TDR ordinance. In his letter response, former Director Darby Delsalle determined that the west 22 acres "enjoy[] a potential zoning development right of 85 residential units. (App. 00733-35) ("Trending Determination Letter").

In March and May 2016, the Village conducted quasi-judicial public hearings which resulted in the Village adopting: (1) the VMU Comprehensive Plan Amendment (Resolution 2016-13); (2) the VMU Zoning Amendment (Resolution 2016-14), and (3) the TDR [*5] Amendment (Resolution 2016-28) (collectively, the "2016 Approvals").⁶ The 2016 Approvals permitted up to 400 multi-family units on the Property. Resolution No. 2016-28 specifically transferred the development rights of 85 residential units from the Donation Sites to the Development Site. (App. 00689-00698) if certain conditions were met.

On October⁵, 2017, relying on the 2016 Approvals, the Petitioner submitted an application to construct a 480-unit multifamily development on the Development Site ("Site Application”). Several public hearings were held regarding the Site Application. For the first public hearing on October 18, 2021, the Village staff prepared a thorough 74-page report ("Staff Report”) recommending [*6] approval of the Site Plan for 480 units and acceptance of the deed pursuant to the 2016 Approvals. (App. 00005-00078). The Staff Report also recommended acceptance by the Village of the declaration of restrictions, covenants and reservations pursuant to Ordinance No. 2016-14, and Resolution No. 2016-28. (App. 00006). The second public hearing on November 15, 2021 consisted of Petitioner's presentation to the Village, along with testimony from the public for and against Petitioner's Site Application.

At the third public hearing, on January 24, 2022, the Village approved Resolution No. 2022-05 which denied Petitioner's Site Application. The Village denied the Site Application solely based on the January 26, 2016 Trending Determination Letter from Darby Delsalle, former Director of the Department of Planning and Zoning. (App. 00733). The Conclusions of Law section determined that the Donation Sites had to first be rezoned, and the comprehensive plan amended, to allow for 85 development units before those units could be available for transfer to the Development Site.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A three-part standard governs this Court's review: (1) whether procedural due process was accorded; (2) whether the essential [*7] requirements of law have been observed; and (3) whether the administrative decision is supported by competent substantial evidence. Village of Palmetto Bay v. Palmer Trinity Priv. Sch., Inc., So. 3d 19 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012).

A decision granting or denying a site plan is governed by local regulations that must be uniformly administered. An applicant must first demonstrate grounds for approval according to the legislated zoning criteria. See Irvine v. Duval Cty. Planning Comm'n, 495 So. 2d 167 (Fla. 1986). An application satisfies these criteria once consistency with a zoning authority's land use plan and zoning criteria have been demonstrated. See Jesus Fellowship, Inc., v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 752 So. 2d 708, 709 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000). Once an applicant meets that burden, the burden shifts to the opposition to demonstrate that the application does not meet the criteria and is in fact adverse to the public interest. "The application must be granted unless the opposition carries its burden, which is to demonstrate [by competent, substantial evidence] that the applicant's request [does not meet the standards and are in fact adverse to the public interest." Id. [*8] We have used the term "competent substantial evidence" advisedly. Substantial evidence has been described as such evidence as will establish a substantial basis of fact from which the fact at issue can be reasonably inferred. We have stated it to be such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind would accept as adequate to support a conclusion. We are of the view that the evidence relied upon to sustain the ultimate finding should be sufficiently relevant and material that a reasonable mind would accept it as adequate to support the conclusion reached. De Groot v. Sheffield, 95 So. 2d 912, 916 (Fla. 1957) (cleaned up).

PETITIONER MET ITS BURDEN UNDER IRVINE

Petitioner satisfied its burden of proof as required by Irvine v. Duval Cnty. Planning Comm'n, 495 So. 2d 167 (Fla. 1986). The Village's professional staff recommended approval of the Site Application to construct a multi-family residential development consisting of 480 multi-family development units. (App. 00005- 00078). The staff's favorable recommendation constitutes competent substantial evidence for approving the Site Application. In Palmer Trinity, the Third District Court of Appeal held that a similar review by Village staff constituted competent substantial evidence that the request served the public interest. Id. at 26-27 (and cases cited therein). "Based on this record, the burden shifted to the opponents [*9] of the request to introduce competent substantial evidence demonstrating that the application did not meet the standards and was, in fact, adverse to the public interest." Id. at 27 (cleaned up).

THE VILLAGE FAILED TO MEET ITS BURDEN

Under Irvine, the burden shifted to the Village to demonstrate, by competent substantial evidence, that the Site Application did not meet the relevant standards and was adverse to the public interest. In response to the Petition, the Village presented two arguments to justify its denial of the Site Application.

In seeking to develop 480 multifamily units, the success or failure of the application depended upon the completed transfer of development rights to 80 extra units to the Development Site. This did not occur for two reasons. First, the contingency for the transfer was not met, namely, that the Village accept title to lands, subject to a declaration of restrictions, covenants and reservation, on which terms the Village and the Developer failed to agree. Second, the transfer of the 80 extra units was incomplete because no rezoning or amendment to the PR land use designation on the 22-acre "sending site" has as yet occurred.

Response at 60.

We initially note that the Village's first argument was not included as a basis for denial in Village Resolution No. 2022-05. (App. [*10] 00003). The sole reason set forth in the resolution was the Village's conclusion that the Petitioner failed to rezone the Donation Sites and amend the Comprehensive Plan and, therefore, the 85 units were unavailable for transfer to the Development Site.

Id.

Based on the letter dated January 26, 2016 issued by Mr. Darby DelSalle, the-then Village Planning & Zoning Director, which constitutes substantial competent evidence, the Village Council DENIES the application based on the above facts and the requirement that rezoning and a comprehensive plan amendments must be approved for the 85 units to first exist and then be available for transfer to the Receiver Site.

Nevertheless, we will also address the Village's argument that the Petitioner did not meet the condition in Resolution No. 2016-28 because the Village did not accept title to the Donation Sites. [*11] PETITIONER WAS NOT REQUIRED TO REZONE THE DONATION SITES OR AMEND THE COMPREHENSIVE PLAN The Village's conclusion that the Petitioner did not have 85 units to transfer to the Development Site, and therefore its Site Application had to be denied, is unsupported by any evidence, much less competent substantial evidence, and is contradicted by the evidence in the record. The only support for the Village's conclusion comes from a skewed interpretation of the Trending Determination Letter. Because the interpretation ascribed to the Trending Determination Letter is so obviously wrong, unsupported by either law or reason, we can only conclude that it was crafted to support a predetermined conclusion.

During the November 15, 2021 public hearing, a Village Commissioner asked the Village Attorney if the Village was "required" to give the Petitioner the 85 units to transfer from the Donations Sites to the Development Site.

COUNCIL MEMBER MATSON: Okay. Mr. Attorney, are the 85 TDRs required to be given, or is that optional for the Council?

MR. DELLAGLORIA: Well, that actually brings up a very interesting question. And as I read the resolution, which actually be able to find, as I read Resolution 2016-28, the Village has [*12] agreed to this transaction under that resolution. ... But the deal has been made through that resolution. Okay.

The problem is, and I might as well get to it now to address it. The problem is that I don't believe the transaction was ever correctly completed. And I say that based on the very letter that the applicants have relied on, which is the Director's letter of January 26th, 2016.

Now, the last line of the letter says, applying the assumptions it appears that the building right potential for the 22 net acres would be 85 units.

But the director had a lot of language in front of that last sentence. At the last sentence of the third paragraph of that letter, after the director went through some analysis as to what should, you know, this be. He states, "For private development to occur on the property, be it residential or commercial, the land use designation shall change accordingly."

In the next paragraph, the Director writes, "Typically a determination would be applied to the property, and then be followed by a rezoning request consistent with the identified uses." You see, this is what they did wrong. Back in 2015 or '16 when the Council passed this resolution, they should have immediately come forward and done three things.

They should have asked for the covenant, the 1985 covenant to go away, just be rescinded or whatever. Then they should have applied for both a rezoning and a re-comp plan, but they [*13] didn't do that. The Director's letter says, they had to do both.

And now the conundrum we are in is that even though we have a transaction that was approved by the Council to do a resolution, they still have to finish the steps necessary to make that happen.

They can't get there from here. And they can't get there from here based on the very letter that they've been relying on all this time.

(App. 00496-00498).

To state the obvious, the Village Attorney's understanding of the Trending Determination Letter is not competent substantial evidence. The Trending Determination Letter would be competent substantial evidence if it in fact required rezoning of the Donation Sites as the Village asserts. It does not.

The Village Attorney's analysis, and the Village's argument on certiorari, rests wholly on the word "typically." In the Trending Determination Letter, Director Darby Delsalle explained that "Typically, a [trend of development] determination would be applied to the property and then be followed by a rezoning request consistent with the identified uses and intensity." (App. 00734). [*14] Based on a fair reading of the plain meaning of the Trending Determination Letter, and a review of the applicable ordinances and resolutions, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Village is deliberately misreading the Trending Determination Letter and misapplying the relevant law.

First, the Trending Determination Letter does not refer to transferring development rights. In fact, the word "transfer" does not appear anywhere in Director Delsalle's letter. This is unsurprising because the Trending Determination Letter only establishes the potential number of units which could be developed on a site.

Second, the Trending Determination Letter makes the unremarkable observation that "For private development to occur on the property, be it residential or commercial, the land use designation shall change accordingly." This was written in the context of explaining that because the land was zoned PR (Parks and Recreation), its land use designation would have to be changed if residential or commercial development was actually going to occur on the land. The entire point of transferring development rights, however, is to prevent such development on the land which is transferring those rights. See Resolution 1016-28 ("once [*15] development rights are transferred, they are not available for private development on the sender site") (App. 00689). As Village Attorney Dexter Lehtinen noted during the March 7, 2016 public hearing: "The 22 acres is currently found to have 85 residential development rights on it. They can build 85 units on that 22 acres. Those 85 units are not increased, but transferred." (App. 00819).

Third, the Trending Determination Letter notes that "typically" (i.e., usually) a trending determination is followed by a rezoning request. But "typically" does not mean "always," "must," or "shall." Indeed, by saying "typically," one acknowledges that sometimes things are done differently. Which is precisely the case here where, 7 Indeed, Director Delsalle explained exactly why the zoning designations on the Donations Sites were not typical. The property in question is presently zoned Interim (I) with a land use designation of Parks and Recreation (PR). The I zoning category was applied to the property when the Village adopted its own land development regulations in 2009. It was previously zoned Government Use (GU) under Miami-Dade County's zoning provisions. The PR designation was applied in 2005 when the Village adopted its Comprehensive Plan and corresponding Future Land Use Map (FLUM). Chapter 163 of the Florida Statutes requires zoning to be consistent with land use. Although the I zoning category is consistent with a PR designation, it may be considered awkward in the context of the private ownership of land. [*16] rather than trying to develop the land subject to the Trending Determination Letter, the owner is transferring to another property the rights to the units which could potentially be developed.

Fourth, the very point of the Trending Determination Letter was to determine the "potential" units which could be built on the Donation Sites so that an equal number could be transferred to the Development Site without the need to rezone. As far back as 2014, the Village Manager noted:

The property in question is presently zoned Interim (I), with a land use designation of Parks and Recreation. The I zoning category created by the Village was designed to mirror Miami- Dade County's Government Use (GU) designation which essentially provided for a trending of development. In other words, if a property is surrounded by one (1) acre single family homes, then you could apply those regulations to that property in lieu of rezoning.

(App. 01758) (emphasis added).

(App. 00733). [*17] Fifth, the Staff Report recognized that Resolution 2016-28 transferred the development rights from the Donation Sites to the Development Site (subject to five conditions):

On May 2, 2016, the Mayor and Village Council of the Village of Palmetto Bay adopted Resolution 2016-28, pursuant to Section 30- 30.15 of the Village code, entitled the transfer of development rights (TOR), transferring 85 residential development units from the donor site at 17901 Old Cutler Road, consisting of 21.22 acres of wooded upland along Old Cutler Road, presently referred to as the West Donation Site: to the receiver site that is the VMU-zoned land abutting it to the east, and presently referred to as the Development Site.

(App. 00042).

Sixth, the Village's TDR ordinance does not require that a sender site be rezoned before the development rights can be transferred to a receiving site. (App. 00652-00653). The Petitioner complied with all the requirements of the TDR ordinance, as evidenced by the Village's approval of the transfer of development rights in Resolution 2016-28.

Seventh, and most significantly, Resolution 2016-28 expressly granted the transfer of the development rights as requested by the Petitioner subject to five conditions. [*18] The Village Council grants the transfer of developments request with the following conditions:

1. The applicant shall provide sealed surveys

that accurately depict the sender site, receiver, and land dedication site, prior to the transfer of the 85 residential units. Said surveys will be deemed acceptable for purposes of transferable rights and land dedication upon staff determination that they are generally reflective of the Attachments A, B, and C of the Resolution.

2. As part of the land dedication process, and

prior to transfer of the 85 residential units, the lands involved shall comply with Chapter 28, Subdivisions, of the Miami-Dade County Code of Ordinances, and/ or record any other legal instrument deemed necessary to ensure clear title.

3. The approved Resolution shall be recorded to

the titles of all lands involved.

4. Prior to transfer of the 85 residential units

The Village shall receive clear title to the dedicated lands as generally described in Attachment C of the Resolution and as further depicted in the survey submitted and accepted pursuant to condition of² of this recommendation.

5. All previous conditions, approvals, covenants

and resolutions shall remain in effect unless otherwise altered by the granting of this request and any conditions assigned therein.

This is a final order. [*19] (App. 00691). Resolution 2016-28, by its terms, rejects the Village's newfound rezoning requirement because such a condition was not listed when it approved the transfer of the 85 units to the Development Site. See Miami-Dade Cnty. Expressway Auth. v. Elec. Transaction Consultants Corp., 300 So. 3d 291, 294 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020) ("The deficiency in this interpretation is plainly encapsulated within the maxim, expressio unius est exclusio alterius. If one subject is specifically named in a contract, or if several subjects of a large class are specifically enumerated, and there are no general words to show that other subjects of that class are included, it may reasonably be inferred that the subjects not specifically named were intended to be excluded.") (cleaned up).

Finally, although judicial and collateral estoppel may not be technically applicable here, Petitioner correctly notes that in a different certiorari proceeding the Village acknowledged that the development rights were rightfully transferred to the Petitioner. Instead, the Village staff followed the provisions in the existing TDR Ordinance, 2015-17, and made a trend determination of what development rights may exist for the Sender Site, and the Council then transferred the potentially available development rights to the [*20] Receiver Site. This procedure ensured that the Sender Site will be donated to the Village and remain free of residential development in perpetuity, one of the primary purposes articulated in Ordinance 2015-17 for the granting of the TDR, and ultimately what Petitioner wants most fervently. A Council determination that the Sender Site had "vested rights" was neither necessary nor was it ever made. . . . It is irrelevant whether there is competent substantial evidence in the record whether the Sender Site had "vested rights." The site had potential development rights, which is all that is required for a transfer of such rights under the TDR Ordinance.

(App. 01212) (emphasis added).

In summary, the assertion that the Petitioner was required to rezone the Donation Sites and amend the Comprehensive Plan before the development rights for 85 units could be transferred to the Development Site is unsupported by any evidence in the record. Nothing in the Interim Zoning District ordinance, the TDR ordinance, the 2016 Approvals, or in any other legislation of the Village, Miami- Dade County, or the State of Florida, requires rezoning before development rights can be transferred. We know this to be so because nowhere in the Village's 62-page Response does it cite to any authority for this proposition other than the Village Attorney's comments during the 2021-2022 hearings. We also know this is so [*21] because the Village Attorney relied exclusively on his interpretation of the Trending Determination Letter. There is not a scintilla of other authority relied on by the Village, the Village Attorney, or the Response.

In light of the plain meaning of the Trending Determination Letter, Resolution 2016-28, and the other applicable resolutions and ordinances, we have no difficulty concluding that the Village did not have competent substantial evidence to support its denial of the Site Application.

THE VILLAGE WAS REQUIRED TO ACCEPT THE DONATION SITES

Resolution 2016-28 transferred the development rights from the Donations Sites to the Property if five conditions were met. The Village now claims that condition⁴ was not satisfied. "[T]he contingency for the transfer was not met, namely, that the Village accept title to lands, subject to a declaration of restrictions, covenants and reservation, on which terms the Village and the Developer failed to agree." Response at 60; see also id. at 55-56 ("the transfer of those rights depended on the contingency that the Village Council choose to accept ownership of the West Donation [*22] Site"). This position is not supported by competent substantial evidence.

First, condition⁴ did not require the Village to accept title. Rather, condition⁴ required that "[p]rior to transfer of the 85 residential units The Village shall receive clear title to the dedicated lands." (App. 00691) (emphasis added). Resolution 2016-28 required the Village to accept the Donation Sites if clear title were provided by the Petitioner. The suggestion that the Village had to "choose to accept" the Donations Sites is a position unsupported by the plain language of the resolution.

The record evidence establishes that the Petitioner was, and is, prepared to provide clear title to the Donation Sites. Refusing to accept such title, and as a result claiming Petitioner has not complied with the conditions required by Resolution 2016-28, does not satisfy the Village's obligation to support its denial with competent substantial evidence.

Second, Resolution 2016-28 contained no requirement that the Donations Sites be subject to acceptable restrictions, covenants, and reservations. It is true the parties attempted to negotiate restrictions on the future use of the Donation Sites that would be acceptable, but [*23] this was not a condition of Resolution 2016-28. Regardless, the Petitioner proposed the very restrictions which the Village is obligated to impose on the Donation Sites upon obtaining ownership pursuant to Resolution 2018-68. (App. 00699).

The Village Council hereby states its intention to preserve in its natural state the land currently zoned Interim ("I"), located east of and contiguous to Old Cutler Road, and north of and contiguous to SW 184th Street (that is, located at the northeast corner of Old Cutler Road and SW 184th Street), when the Village becomes the owner of such land, by taking the following steps at such time:

(A) Adopting and recording a covenant running with the land, which requires the land be preserved in its natural state and prohibits any development, except for the development of: (1) bicycle or pedestrian trails which do not disturb the fundamental natural condition of the contiguous land; and (2) a Miami-Dade Fire and Rescue facility at the southeast corner of the land, no larger than necessary and appropriate to accommodate a fire/rescue station in the health and safety interests of area residents.

(App. 00699-00700). Resolution 2016-28 also recognized that the purpose of the Village receiving the Donations Sites was to make "available [] a passive park and conservation area with only ancillary structures,... [and] a much needed fire rescue facility," and that the [*24] donation was "consistent with and in furtherance of the recognized purpose of the TDR program including the creation [of] additional open[] space, preservation of environmentally sensitive lands, and public facilities." (App. 00689). The Petitioner's proposed restrictive covenants where aligned with these goals. (App. 00090-00093).

In short, the Village's denial did not pretend to rely on the argument it raises now on certiorari review. Consequently, it cannot post-hoc assert it to justify its denial. Especially when the given reason is unsupported by the Village's 2016 Approvals and the proposed restrictive covenants comply with Resolution 2016-68.

Even if we ignore the fact that disagreement over the restrictive covenants was not a stated basis for the denial of the Site Application, the Village's invocation on certiorari review of a disagreement over the language of the proposed restrictive covenants is not competent substantial evidence given the nature of the restrictions proposed by the Petitioner. As such, the Village departed from the essential requirements of the law.

"Every citizen has the right to expect that he will be dealt with fairly by his government." Hollywood Beach Hotel Co. v. City of Hollywood, 329 So. 2d 10, 18 (Fla. 1976). [*25] Stripped of the legal jargon which lawyers and judges have obfuscated it with, the theory of estoppel amounts to nothing more than an application of the rules of fair play. One party will not be permitted to invite another onto a welcome mat and then be permitted to snatch the mat away to the detriment of the party induced or permitted to stand thereon. A citizen is entitled to rely on the assurances and commitments of a zoning authority and if he does, the zoning authority is bound by its representations, whether they be in the form of words or deeds.

Town of Largo v. Imperial Homes Corp., 309 So. 2d 571, 573 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975).

EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL

Equitable estoppel is available on certiorari review.⁸ The rules of fair play require us to conclude that under the facts of this case, the County is equitably estopped from enforcing section 33-50 of the Code against the Castros. Thus, we hold that the circuit court erred in failing to Because we've been at this for a while, we've spent a lot of money in this process. We've relied on the zoning, the resolutions, the ordinances that are out there, and the law. [W]e have judicial doctrines that provide protection to people, like my clients, who rely on those decisions even though the elected officials change. And those doctrines include equitable estoppel and res judicata. [W]e are relying on those doctrines. . . .

(App. 00441, 00446). [*26] apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel to the circumstances of this case and thereby departed from the essential requirements of the law.

Castro v. Miami-Dade Cnty. Code Enf't, 967 So. 2d 230, 234 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007). See The Florida Companies v. Orange Cnty., Fla., 411 So. 2d 1008, 1012 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982) (“appellant's petition for certiorari demonstrated that the county should be estopped from denying appellants the right to develop their property in accordance with the plat preliminarily approved, since substantial expenditures had been made in reliance on the county's approval of the plat. The circuit court should have granted the writ of certiorari on this ground."); Equity Res., Inc. v. Cnty. of Leon, 643 So. 2d 1112, 1119– 20 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) ("The fact that the county continuously issued permits for the unrestricted construction of the project over a period of 18 years with knowledge of expenditures for improvements to be made for the benefit of the undeveloped as well as developed land is legally sufficient to establish that it would be grossly unfair to allow the county to deny Pelham and Equity Resources a vested right at the eleventh hour of their development of Phase II. The doctrine of equitable estoppel is based fundamentally on rules of fair play. The [*27] trial court applied incorrect legal principles in ruling on the merits of the estoppel claim and thereby departed from the essential requirements of law.") (cleaned up).

The Petitioner relied upon Resolution 2016-28's approval of the transfer of development credits. The Village Manager and the Village Attorney confirmed that the Applicant could build 400 units on the Development Site as a matter of right and that the Donation Sites had 85 development rights eligible for transfer. (App. 00815, 00819). The 2016 Approvals transferred the 85 development units from the Donation Sites to the Development Site subject to conditions which did not include rezoning. (App. 00678-00697). The Village and the Petitioner successfully defended Resolution 2016-28 in the appellate division of the Circuit Court. (App. 01126-01347). The Applicant spent more than $720,000 in preparing the Application and engaging the professional consultants and attorneys necessary to pursue it. (App. 00442).

The Village's additional condition that the Donation Sites had to be rezoned before their 85 development rights could exist is, therefore, inequitable. This Court has previously held that [*28] unreasonable conditions imposed by the Village amount to a departure from the essential requirements of law:

the court can consider whether the conditions are whimsical or capricious. Conditions on a use, just like exceptions to a rule, can swallow or drown the use which was intended to be approved in the first place. Owners are entitled to fair play; their properties, which may represent their life fortunes, should not be subjected to whimsical or capricious conditions.

Palmer Trinity Priv. Sch., Inc. v. Village of Palmetto Bay, 18 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 342a (Fla. 11th Jud. Cir. Ct., Feb. 11, 2011) (quoting Caps-On-The Water, Inc., v. St. Johns County, 841 So. 2d 507, 508- 09 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003).

CONCLUSION

The Village denied the Site Application because the Petitioner had not rezoned the Donations Sites. The denial was based on a faulty interpretation of the Trending Determination Letter, an interpretation not supported by a plain reading, the 2016 Approvals, or any statute or ordinance. In other words, an interpretation unsupported by competent substantial evidence. On certiorari, the Village raised another reason for the denial: its voluntary decision not to accept the warranty deed from the [*29] Petitioner for the Donation Sites. The Village was required to accept the Donation Sites. Choosing not to so that it could claim the Petitioner had not transferred the 85 units to the Development Site was inequitable and departed from the essential requirements of the law.

As the Petitioner correctly asserts:

Reply at 2.

Foisting a park designation on private property, prohibiting private, beneficial use, repudiating previously granted development rights and denying entirely a site plan that staff recommended as compliant with all published criteria is viscerally, intellectually and legally wrong.

We grant the Petition for Writ of Certiorari. Village Resolution No. 2022-05 is QUASHED.⁹ TRAWICK, SANTOVENIA, concur.

TDR.

The Findings of Fact section of Resolution No. 2016-28 stated that "[t]he Rules that govern transfer of development rights are at Section 30-30.15 of the Land Development Regulations." (App. 00690). The Conclusions of Law section specified that "the transfer of development rights application was reviewed pursuant to Section 30-30.15(f) of the Village of Palmetto Bay's Code of Ordinances and was found to be conditionally consistent." Id.