KANSTANTSIN HRYSHANKOU

v.

CITY OF MIAMI

Eric J. Eves, Chief Appellate Counsel, and George K. Wysong III, City Attorney, as counsel for Appellee, City of Miami.

Before: TRAWICK, ARECES, R., and DE LA O, JJ.

TRAWICK, J., [*1] This matter is before this Court on an appeal filed by Appellant, Kanstantsin Hryshankou ("Appellant") against the City of Miami from four Final Orders2 rendered by the City of Miami Code Enforcement Board ("Appellee" or "Board"). The Final Orders held that Appellant violated the "unlawful lodging" section of Miami 21 (the City's zoning code), specifically Article⁴, Table 3, Lodging, and Section 7.1.2.2. of Miami 21 pertaining to short-term rentals. The Board imposed a $10,000 "irreparable/irreversible" fine on the Appellant.

Appellant is the owner of Units 1102 and 2312, located at 41 SE 5th Street in Miami. On December 15, 2024, two Notices of Violation Potential Property Lien "Notice" were posted on Appellant's Properties (Units 1102 and 2312) by City of Miami Code Enforcement Inspectors alleging one violation: 2525 Unlawful Lodging. Article⁴, Table 3, Lodging, Miami 21 and Section 7.1.2.2. City's App. 004 & 084.

The Notices required that all violations be corrected by December 26, 2024, and specifically stated that Appellant should "notify the Inspector that the violation(s) has been corrected." (City's App. 004 and 084).

On February 26, 2025, the Board held a hearing on Appellant's alleged violations. Two different City inspectors testified regarding both units (1102 and 2312), and a resident of Appellant's condo testified regarding Unit 1102. The City entered two Composite Exhibits.

N 2 Appellant was charged with violations for two condominium units (units 1102 and 2312). The Board rendered two Final Orders for each condominium unit. [*2] On February 27, 2025, the Board issued two Final Orders for Unit 2312. The first order was a Final Administrative Enforcement Notice, finding Appellant guilty of violating the Unlawful Lodging section of the Code. Appellant was ordered to correct the violation that day or face a fine of $1,000 per day. (City's App. 158). In addition, the second order was a Final Administrative Enforcement Notice – FEO Irreparable/Irreversible Violation Fine. Appellant was assessed a $10,000 fine. The second order was also based upon the "gravity of the violation, the actions of the violator and any previous history." (City's App. 159). For unit 2312, there was no witness testimony, and the inspector admitted during his testimony that no complaints were received. The Inspector filed an Affidavit of Compliance on March 25, 2025, stating that the violations had been corrected on March 25, 2025.

On March 31, 2025, the Board issued two final orders for Unit 1102. The first order a Final Administrative Enforcement Notice - assessed a $1,000 fine per day. The second final order a Final Administrative Enforcement Notice – FEO Irreparable/Irreversible Violation Fine did not assess any fine to Appellant. (City's App. 81). An Affidavit of Compliance was filed on March 31, 2025 for Unit 1102 by the City Inspector. It stated that Appellant had corrected the violations on March 31, 2025.

When this Court reviews a final administrative order, it must determine (1) whether procedural due process was afforded, (2) whether the essential requirements of the law were observed, and (3) whether the administrative [*3] findings were supported by competent substantial evidence. Haines City Cmty. Dev. v. Heggs, 658 So. 2d 523, 530 (Fla. 1995).

Were the Findings Supported by Competent Substantial Evidence?

"Substantial evidence has been described as such evidence as will establish a substantial basis of fact from which the fact at issue can be reasonably inferred." De Groot v. Sheffield, 95 So. 2d 912, 916 (Fla. 1957). "Competent, substantial evidence must be reasonable and logical." Wiggins v. Florida Dep’t of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, 209 So. 3d 1165, 1173 (Fla. 2017). The test is whether there exists any competent substantial evidence to support the decision maker's conclusions, and any evidence which would support a contrary conclusion is irrelevant. See Dusseau v. Metro. Dade Cty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 794 So. 2d 1270, 1276 (Fla. 2001).

Appellee argues that no findings were made that connect his specific conduct to any code provisions. “. . . [E]very final order entered by an administrative agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions must contain specific findings of fact upon which its ultimate action is taken." Hayes v. Monroe Cnty, 337 So. 3d 442, 446 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022) (citation omitted).

Appellant also claims that he ceased all short-term rental activity prior to the City's stated compliance deadline of December 26, 2024, and only submitted 30-day leases to the City Inspector as an interim compliance measure.

This Court has authored several recent opinions pertaining to short-term condominium rentals. In 3005 Washington, LLC v. City of Miami, Case No. 2023- 68-AP-01 (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. Nov. 13, 2024), this Court quashed the decision of [*4] the Code Enforcement Board and stated that the Board failed to make findings of fact in its Final Order, as required by law.

In Mahmoud Shehata v. City of Miami, No. 2025-26-AP-01, 2026 WL 865628 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 27, 2026), Appellant Shehata lived in the same condominium complex (Brickell on the River) as Hryshankou, the Appellant here. The Shehata case similarly pertained to a short-term rental situation wherein the Appellant argued that the $10,000 fine imposed was excessive and unlawful. This Court held that the City of Miami Code Enforcement Board's decision was unsupported by competent, substantial evidence and that Shehata was denied due process.

In another case, 102 NE 50 Holdings v. City of Miami, Case No. 2025- 000003-AP-01, (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. Jan. 14, 2026), it was alleged that Appellant committed similar code violations to those before us in this appeal. The City of Miami Code Enforcement Board likewise determined that Appellant's violations were of an irreparable and/or irreversible nature. This Court held that the Board's findings were not supported by competent substantial evidence. Moreover, the Court reasoned that there was no evidence that the violations were irreparable and/or irreversible.

Here again, the Board specifically failed to make any findings as to why the violation was irreparable and/or irreversible in nature, as required by Section 162.07(4).3 While the Final Order alludes to the violation being irreparable N 3 Section 162.07(4), Florida Statutes states: "[a]t the conclusion of the hearing, the enforcement board shall issue findings of fact, based on evidence of record and conclusions of law, and shall issue an order affording the proper relief consistent with powers granted herein." See also Section 2-815(e), City of Miami Code. [*5] and/or irreversible in nature - there are no findings except for the generic explanation that it is "based upon the gravity of the violation, the actions of the violator and any previous history."⁴

Due Process

Generally, "due process requires fair notice and a real opportunity to be heard and defend in an orderly procedure before judgment is rendered." Richard v. Bank of America, N.A., 258 So. 3d 485, 487 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018) (citation omitted).

N⁴ These factors are not intended to determine whether an irreparable violation has, in fact, occurred. Instead, these factors are to be considered after the Board has made findings that a violation is irreparable and during its consideration of appropriate amount of the irreparable fine. City of Miami Code at § 2-817(c). [*6] Here, Appellant contends that he was denied the ability to cross-examine key witnesses or present rebuttal evidence. Appellant maintains that the Board's conduct violated Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), and contravened Keys Citizens for Responsible Gov't Keys Aqueduct Auth., 795 So. 2d 940, 948 (Fla. 2001). Appellant contends that he was "admonished, interrupted, and denied an opportunity to fully present his case." Upon consideration of the manner in which this Board treated Appellant, we agree.

Appellant was initially informed by a Board member that he could not object to testimony:

City Attorney: Now we have there he is. These are photos. We have both from Zillow and the Airbnb that show it's the same apartment, the same unit, same furnishings, same views, correct? Inspector: Correct. City Attorney: All right. And you went through these yourself in terms of verifying the similarities? Appellant: These are these are the photos of different apartments by the way. Board member: Excuse me. You're not allowed to speak. Appellant: Sorry. First time doing this. I'm sorry. Board member: Give me a second. City Attorney: So there's this sorry, with all due Second City Attorney: With -with respect, and I'm going to advise you on this. He is a party, he's a respondent, he can object to anything and respectfully he can object. And I'm -I'm keeping a clean record because there's a court reporter taking notes. [*7] Board member: Well, in the past we've been here, and when they're not the the individuals turn to speak, you have advised us that they need to wait until they finish the inspector speaking so it's -we're giving them -letting him present his case. We'll come back to him. That's why we come back to him. So even though there's court reporter here, we're not doing anything illegal. Continue inspector. Tr. at 7:17-25; 8:1-18.

The record also reflects Appellant was repeatedly interrupted, scolded or lectured as follows:

Appellant: The complaints that we're getting right now is that we don't have a proper certification, which is, we don't have CU, but according to our counter (sic) documents, the - any transient user is allowed, there's no restriction on the on the daily rental. Board member: You're absolutely incorrect. Appellant: May I speak, please? Board member: You're totally incorrect.

Tr. at 17:8-15.

Board member: I'm not asking you that. I'm asking you if you have that information with you. Did you bring that proof? Appellant: This is -this is how I know -this is how I know how a lot of people bought a lot of units. Board member: That's hearsay. Appellant: That's why the property values has (sic) been going up ever since and then started going down. Board member: Okay. What's your point?

Tr. at 18:5-13. [*8] Appellant (to witness): How is that possible? I never had complaints and there's no complaints in the -in the management under my unit. I never -I never get any calls from anybody. Board member: So how-how you (sic) here? By miracle?

Tr. at 16:9-13.

During another part of the Appellant's presentation, Appellant had just started his cross-examination of the witness and asked his fourth question of the witness when both the Board member and City attorney interjected and answered for the witness as follows:

Appellant: Okay. So my apartment's all the way in the back. Yours is on the other side. You telling me you see what's going on in my unit? Board member: He didn't say he -he saw anything. He says he hears, he didn't say that he saw, he hears noise. City attorney: Actually, his testimony is he sees people coming and going to that unit That's his testimony. Board member: But he's talking about the balcony.

Tr. at 15:13-20.

Board member: You have to deal -you don't have to deal with-with people that live there- Appellant: May I present my case? Board member: --and live there for the whole time. Appellant: Is that okay if I present my case? Board member: Excuse me? Appellant: Is it okay if I present my case? I'm here to- Board member: Present your kids (sic). [*9] Tr. at 19:1-9.

Finally, the record reflects the Appellant was not given an opportunity to speak.

Appellant: What we're trying to do, we're trying to come Board member: What you're trying to do is illegal. Appellant: -- together so it's beneficial for everybody. Board member: No. It's not beneficial, beneficial for your pocket.

Tr. at 23:19-25.

Given the repeated disruption of the Appellant in the presentation of his case, as well as the lack of appropriate decorum exhibited toward him highlighted in the above quoted hearing excerpts, we find that the Appellant was denied due process of law. Any purported due process afforded Appellant in this case was fictitious.

For the aforementioned reasons, the four final administrative orders entered by the Board in this case are VACATED and this matter REMANDED for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

ARECES, R. AND DE LA O, JJ., CONCUR.