EDWARD VIGLIOTTI
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA
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A trial court's oral pronouncement of sentence controls over written sentencing documents in determining the conditions of probation, and the appellant's probation was properly revoked based on the oral pronouncement requiring electronic monitoring compliance.
[1] A trial court's oral pronouncement of sentence controls over written sentencing documents in determining the conditions of probation, and when conflict arises between the…
Previewing 1 of 1 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a court's oral pronouncement of a sentence controls over the written sentencing document. . . . [T]he oral pronouncement controls and constitutes the legal sentence imposed.”
Citation to Williams v. State, 957 So. 2d 600, 603 (Fla. 2007), establishing the controlling principle of law.
Edward Vigliotti's probation was revoked for violating an electronic monitoring requirement. Vigliotti argued the trial court's written sentencing doc…
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SIXTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA
Case No. 6D2024-2270 Lower Tribunal Nos. 2006-CF-001360 and 2022-CF-000973
EDWARD VIGLIOTTI, Appellant,
V.
STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Charlotte County. Shannon H. McFee, Judge.
July 17, 2026
PRATT, J.
We affirm as to all issues raised by Appellant. We write to briefly explain why we reject one of Appellant's probation-related arguments.
Appellant argues that the trial court improperly revoked his probation for violating a requirement that the trial court's written sentencing documents allegedly do not contain—i.e., Appellant must comply with electronic monitoring while on probation. However, Appellant's argument misses the mark for two reasons. First, on their face, the trial court's written sentencing documents required Appellant to comply with electronic monitoring while on probation. Second, and more importantly (and dispositively), the trial court's oral pronouncement of sentence— not the trial court's written sentencing documents—controls. See, e.g., Williams v. State, 957 So. 2d 600, 603 (Fla. 2007) (“[A] court's oral pronouncement of a sentence controls over the written sentencing document. . . . [T]he oral pronouncement controls and constitutes the legal sentence imposed." (citations omitted)); Ashley v. State, 850 So. 2d 1265, 1268 (Fla. 2003) (referencing the "longstanding principle of law" that “a court's oral pronouncement of sentence controls over the written document”); Justice v. State, 674 So. 2d 123, 125 (Fla. 1996) ("Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.700(b) . . . mandates that the sentence or other final disposition 'shall be pronounced in open court."). Because the transcript from the sentencing hearing shows that the trial court's oral pronouncement of sentence required Appellant to comply with electronic monitoring while on probation, Appellant's argument necessarily fails.1,2
AFFIRMED.
TRAVER, C.J., and GANNAM, J., concur.
Blair Allen, Public Defender, and Karen M. Kinney, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Marena S. Ramirez, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING
AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF TIMELY FILED
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Columbus Rickey Ashley v. State, 850 So. 2d 1265 (Fla. 2003)
- Williams v. State, 957 So. 2d 600 (Fla. 2007)
- Justice v. State, 674 So. 2d 123 (Fla. 1996)