JEROME EDWARD JOHNSON
v.
STACY ANN BEE
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A domestic violence petition dismissed due to insufficient evidence presented at a hearing is not exempt from public disclosure under Florida Statute § 119.0714(1)(k)1, which exempts only petitions dismissed for reasons having to do with the legal sufficiency of the petition itself.
[1] Under Florida Statute § 119.0714(1)(k)1, a domestic violence petition is exempt from public disclosure only when dismissed for reasons relating to the legal sufficiency o…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A petition, and the contents thereof, for an injunction for protection against domestic violence, repeat violence, dating violence, sexual violence, stalking, or cyberstalking that is dismissed without a hearing, dismissed at an ex parte hearing due to failure to state a claim or lack of jurisdiction, or dismissed for any reason having to do with the sufficiency of the petition itself without an injunction being issued on or after July 1, 2017, is exempt from s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), Art. I of the State Constitution.”
Statutory provision cited by the court defining the scope of the public records exemption for dismissed domestic violence petitions.
Appellant sought to seal records of a petition for injunction for protection against domestic violence that was dismissed by the trial court. The peti…
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SIXTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA
Case No. 6D2025-0835 Lower Tribunal No. 2023-DR-001770
JEROME EDWARD JOHNSON,
Appellant,
V.
STACY ANN BEE,
Appellee.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Collier County. Russell T. Kirshy, Judge.
July 17, 2026
PER CURIAM.
AFFIRMED.
WOZNIAK and SMITH, JJ., concur. PRATT, J., concurs with opinion.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING
AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
PRATT, J., concurring.
I fully concur in the majority's decision to per curiam affirm this appeal. I write separately to express my view that, even assuming arguendo the arguments presented by Appellant are preserved for appeal, Appellant still cannot show reversible error on the merits regarding the trial court's denial of Appellant's "motion to seal/request public records exemption" regarding a petition for injunction for protection against domestic violence. That's because Appellant fails to show that the domestic violence petition was dismissed for any reason having to do with the sufficiency of the petition itself—the sole statutory ground for exemption upon which all of Appellant's arguments hinge. See § 119.0714(1)(k)1., Fla. Stat. ("A petition, and the contents thereof, for an injunction for protection against domestic violence, repeat violence, dating violence, sexual violence, stalking, or cyberstalking that is dismissed without a hearing, dismissed at an ex parte hearing due to failure to state a claim or lack of jurisdiction, or dismissed for any reason having to do with the sufficiency of the petition itself without an injunction being issued on or after July1, 2017, is exempt from s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), Art. I of the State Constitution."). To the contrary, the record on appeal shows that although the petition was deemed by the trial court to be legally sufficient—as a hearing was held on the petition—the petition was ultimately dismissed by the trial court because insufficient evidence was presented at the hearing held on the petition. And when section 119.0714(1)(k)1 is read in its proper context, it is clear that the phrase "dismissed for any reason having to do with the sufficiency of the petition itself" refers to the legal sufficiency of the petition itself rather than the factual sufficiency of the evidence presented at a hearing held on the petition.¹
Christopher D. Donovan, of Donovan Appellate Law, PLLC, Estero, for Appellant. Cynthia B. Hall, of Silverio & Hall, P.A., Naples, for Appellee, and Stacy Ann Bee, Naples, pro se.