JERRY J. FERREIRA
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA
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A motion to suppress a traffic stop in a DUI case is necessarily dispositive for purposes of reserving appellate rights, even without an explicit trial court finding or state stipulation that the order is dispositive.
[1] A motion to suppress a traffic stop in a driving under the influence prosecution is necessarily dispositive for purposes of reserving appellate rights under Florida Rule…
Previewing 1 of 1 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Regardless under the facts of this case this court would not have held the lack of a finding of dispositiveness against Appellant.”
Court citing Hawk v. State in explaining that the absence of an explicit dispositive finding should not bar appellate review when the suppression motion is necessarily dispositive under the circumstances.
Ferreira was arrested for DUI following a traffic stop. After the trial court denied his motion to suppress the stop, Ferreira entered a no contest pl…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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SIXTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA
Case No. 6D2023-3200 Lower Tribunal No. 23-CT-500447
JERRY J. FERREIRA, Appellant,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee.
Appeal from the County Court for Lee County. Tara P. Paluck, Judge.
July 24, 2026
KAMOUTSAS, J.
After the denial of Appellant's motion to suppress a traffic stop that led to his arrest and conviction for Driving While Under the Influence, Appellant entered into a no contest plea and sought to reserve his right to appeal the ruling on the suppression motion. However, the State did not stipulate that the suppression order was dispositive, nor did the trial court make such a finding. See generally Fla. R. App. Pro. 9.140(2)(a)(i) (“A defendant may not appeal from a guilty or nolo contendere plea except as follows: (i) Reservation of Right to Appeal. A defendant who pleads guilty or nolo contendere may expressly reserve the right to appeal a prior dispositive order of the lower tribunal, identifying with particularity the point of law being reserved."). Although neither a ruling nor stipulation was secured as to the dispositive nature of the motion to suppress, since Appellant was charged with DUI, considering the facts of this case, the motion to suppress the stop was necessarily dispositive. See generally Hawk v. State, 848 So. 2d 475, 478 (5th DCA 2003) (“In the instant case, the State did not stipulate the suppression order was dispositive, and the trial court made no such finding. Regardless under the facts of this case this court would not have held the lack of a finding of dispositiveness against Appellant."). Having found no error in the denial of the motion to suppress, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
MIZE and BROWNLEE, JJ., concur.
Blair Allen, Public Defender, and Joanna Beth Conner, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Helene S. Parnes, Senior Assistant Attorney General, and James Hellickson, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.