MICHAEL D. LYNCH, ET AL.

v.

DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, ETC., ET AL.

Third District Court of Appeal

State of Florida

Opinion filed August 5, 2026.

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

No. 3D26-1142 Lower Tribunal No. 24-12072-CA-01

Michael D. Lynch, et al., Petitioners,

vs.

Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, etc., et al., Respondents.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Lourdes Simon, Judge.

Michael D. Lynch and Candence B. Lynch, in proper persons.

Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP, and Lauren Raines and Jacob Hanson (Tampa), for respondents.

Before FERNANDEZ, MILLER, and LOBREE, JJ.

MILLER, J.

In this run-of-the-mill foreclosure dispute, petitioners, Michael D. Lynch and Candence B. Lynch, seek a writ of certiorari quashing an interlocutory order limiting the scope of discovery. The challenged discovery bears on whether respondent, Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, is entitled to enforce a promissory note and mortgage Mr. Lynch executed in favor of New Century Mortgage Company many years ago in exchange for a loan. We reiterate the unremarkable proposition that "[i]rreparable injury can rarely be shown where discovery is denied, as any error is generally reviewable on appeal.” Katz v. Riemer, 305 So. 3d 663, 666 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020). And here, notwithstanding the fact that the precise issue the discovery targeted has been adversely adjudicated against the Lynches at every level of the federal courts, the trial court sagely authorized alternative avenues for pursuing relevant information. Accordingly, we find that petitioners have failed to satisfy the jurisdictional threshold for certiorari, and we therefore dismiss the petition. See Williams v. Oken, 62 So. 3d 1129, 1132 (Fla. 2011) (certiorari relief requires a petitioner to show “(1) a departure from the essential requirements of the law, (2) resulting in material injury for the remainder of the case[,] (3) that cannot be corrected on postjudgment appeal."); Holmes Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Dumigan, 151 So. 3d 1282, 1284 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014) (“The second and third prongs of this three-part

standard are often combined into the concept of 'irreparable harm,' and they are jurisdictional.”); see also In re Lynch, Adv. No. 14-01786-AJC (Bankr. S.D. Fla. June 8, 2017), reprinted in Petition for Writ of Certiorari at App. 40– 53, Lynch v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co., No. 18-1294, 48–50 (U.S. Apr. 9, 2019) (granting summary judgment in favor of Ocwen and Deutsche Bank finding the blank indorsement constituted a signature and blank indorsement, Ocwen is a holder of the note, Ocwen can enforce the note, and the Allonge constitutes a signature and indorsement under Florida law); Lynch v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co., No. 17-22250-CIV, 2017 WL 6884389 at *2, *6 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 9, 2017) (affirming bankruptcy court because Deutsche Bank and Ocwen are "entitled to enforce the note as non-holders in possession with the rights of holders” and “the [a]llonge constitutes a valid indorsement” and “[thus,] the Court need not address the [a]ppellants' various arguments that the Bankruptcy Court erred in concluding that the blank indorsement stamp constitutes a valid indorsement under Florida law"), aff'd, 755 F. App'x 920, 923 (11th Cir. 2018) (affirming summary judgment for Deutsche Bank because it was “entitled under Florida law to enforce the [n]ote and the [m]ortgage as: (1) ‘holders' in possession of the [n]ote with a 'blank indorsement'; (2) 'holders' in possession of the [n]ote through a 'special indorsement,' by way of the [a]llonge; or (3) ‘nonholders'

in possession of the [n]ote with rights of a holder” and the Lynches did not "dispute the validity of the mortgage or the underlying debt”), cert. denied, 587 U.S. 1016 (2019).

Dismissed.