CHARLES MORGAN CARPENTER
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA

Fla. 1st DCA | 2026-08-26
No. 2024-2821
Roberts, J., Winokur, J., Nordby, J., Allman, Francis J., Jr.
2026 FL 10880 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (2026)

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Holding

An Apprendi claim challenging PRR designation as a violation of the Sixth Amendment cannot be raised by motion under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 3.800(b)(2) and must be preserved at trial by contemporaneous objection.


Headnotes

[1] A claim that the Sixth Amendment requires a jury, rather than a judge, to find facts supporting a Prison Releasee Reoffender designation challenges the sentencing process…

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Key Quotes

“a claim that a jury, not the judge, is required to make a particular finding beyond a reasonable doubt 'alleges an error in the sentencing process—not an error in the sentencing order itself'”

Court's explanation of why Apprendi claims cannot be raised via Rule 3.800(b) motion, citing Shinault v. State

Facts & Procedural History

Carpenter was convicted by jury of burglary of a dwelling with battery, criminal mischief, and petit theft, and was sentenced to life imprisonment as …

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Opinion of the Court

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

No. 1D2024-2821

CHARLES MORGAN CARPENTER, Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee.

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Franklin County. Francis J. Allman, Jr., Judge.

August 26, 2026

PER CURIAM.

Following jury trial, the court convicted Charles Morgan Carpenter of burglary of a dwelling with a battery, criminal mischief, and petit theft. The court sentenced Carpenter to life imprisonment as a Prison Releasee Reoffender (PRR). We affirm the judgment and sentence, rejecting each of the arguments Carpenter raises on appeal. We write only to address Carpenter's claim that his designation as a PRR and resulting sentence were unconstitutional under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and its progeny.

After appealing the judgment and sentence, Carpenter filed a motion to correct sentencing error pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 3.800(b)(2), claiming in part that his designation as a PRR and resulting sentence violated the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution because the judge, rather than the jury, found the facts that supported PRR designation, namely, that his offenses occurred within three years after being released from a state correctional facility. See § 775.082(9)(a)1., Fla. Stat. The court denied the motion.

Carpenter claims that the trial court erred in denying his rule 3.800(b)(2) motion. We reject this argument because an Apprendi claim cannot be made by a motion under rule 3.800(b)(2). Shinault v. State, 51 Fla. L. Weekly D1390, 1391 (Fla. 1st DCA July 8, 2026) (finding that a “claim that a jury, not the judge, is required to make a particular finding beyond a reasonable doubt ‘alleges an error in the sentencing process—not an error in the sentencing order itself" and therefore may not be raised by motion under rule 3.800(b) (citation omitted)). See also Maye v. State, 51 Fla. L. Weekly S116, 119 (Fla. May 14, 2026) (Francis, J., concurring) (footnote omitted) (finding that a claim that the PRR statute violates the Sixth Amendment “is, ultimately, a challenge to the how the procedure required by the PRR statute—not a challenge to the what—the legality of [the] sentence.”) (emphases in original, footnote omitted).1 Because Carpenter could not raise this issue by rule 3.800(b) motion, he was required to preserve it at trial. See Jackson v. State, 983 So. 2d 562, 573 (Fla. 2008) (holding that errors in the sentencing process can only be preserved for review by contemporaneous objection, not by motion under rule 3.800(b)).2 He failed to do so; therefore, we affirm.

AFFIRMED.

ROBERTS, WINOKUR, and NORDBY, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1 Even if we found that Carpenter could raise this issue by rule 3.800(b) motion, and even if we found that the failure to have a jury make the findings that supported PRR sentencing was error, we would conclude that the error was harmless. Hicks v. State, 422 So. 3d 607, 609 (Fla. 1st DCA 2025).
2 Presuming that the appeal does not follow a guilty plea, we can reverse an unpreserved sentencing process error only if the error is fundamental. Jackson, 983 So. 2d at 569 (holding that an appellate court may consider an unpreserved claim that could not

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