BELLAMY

v.

LEE LAW PLLC, LEE

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

KIMBERLY BELLAMY, Petitioner,

V.

No. 1D2026-2415

LEE LAW PLLC and KYLE J. LEE, ESQ., Respondents.

Petition for Writ of Prohibition—Original Proceedings.

August 26, 2026

PER CURIAM.

DENIED.

LEWIS and NORDBY, JJ., concur; NEFF, J., concurs with opinion

Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331.

NEFF, J., concurring.

Below, the Petitioner sought to disqualify the trial judge because of a one-page run-of-the-mill order issued on July 29, 2026. Within that order, the lower court merely stated, “The Court may not advocate or coach a litigant in a lawsuit, even a pro se litigant.” The order further stated, “The Court urges plaintiff to seek the advice of an attorney and to retain an attorney for the case if possible." The Petitioner took this language as an insult and as an attack on her pro se status. She further understood the advice to consult with an attorney as a “directive" that “demonstrates a disqualifying bias." As important factual background, the Petitioner sent at least two emails to the trial judge's judicial assistant during the proceedings below. One of those emails requested the following: “Please advise if any additional procedural steps are required from me at this time."

After this July 29, 2026, order was issued, the Petitioner filed a Motion for Disqualification. The trial court denied that Motion on August 3, 2026, as legally insufficient. As required under Fla. R. Gen. Prac. & Jud. Admin. 2.330(h), the trial judge made no comment on the facts alleged. Thereafter, on August 18, 2026, the instant petition was filed in this court as an “emergency.”

In accordance with Fla. R. Gen. Prac. & Jud. Admin. 2.330(e)(1):

A motion to disqualify shall set forth all specific and material facts upon which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to the following circumstances: (1) the party reasonably fears that he or she will not receive a fair trial or hearing because of specifically described prejudice or bias of the judge[.]

A critical component of a motion to disqualify is "material facts upon which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned." Id. Those facts must demonstrate a reasonable fear that the party will not receive a fair hearing. In this case, no reasonable person in the Petitioner's position could read the onepage order and fear that she would not receive a fair hearing. A party's unreasonable speculation or inference about an order's meaning, when not reflected in the order's actual words, will not suffice. See Enter. Leasing Co. v. Jones, 789 So. 2d 964, 968 (Fla. 2001) (expressing that other states also “follow the presumption disfavoring prejudice or bias on the part of the judge”). The trial court here did no more than suggest that the pro se Petitioner consider retaining an attorney and explain that neither the court nor its judicial assistant may provide legal guidance to a litigant. Nothing about that guidance is inconsistent with the court's impartial role. An order from a busy trial court judge stating as much is not grounds for disqualification. Again, no reasonable person would believe otherwise.

Because motions for disqualification can be made with such ease, reviewing courts must be vigilant to ensure that good-faith motions are not discouraged while also guarding against these motions being thoughtlessly wielded as a mere litigation tactic. See Quiambao v. Quiambao, No. 6D2026-1147, 2026 WL 2207228, at *5 n.4 (Fla. 6th DCA July 31, 2026) (Pratt, J., specially concurring).* This petition crossed the line into the latter, as it can only be described as a tactic aimed at a judge whose rulings the Petitioner dislikes. Fischer v. Knuck, 497 So. 2d 240, 242 (Fla. 1986) (“We find that petitioner's subjective fears, as alleged, are not 'reasonably sufficient' to justify a 'well-founded fear' of prejudice. To the contrary, the allegations are frivolous and appear designed to frustrate the process by which petitioner suffered an adverse ruling.”). I would deny this petition as frivolous and order the Petitioner to show cause why an appropriate sanction should not be imposed against her. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.410.

* I fully agree with Judge Pratt's thoughtful analysis of section 38.10, Fla. Stat., and the trial court disqualification framework in this State. From my experience as a former trial judge, his observations are accurate and his proposed solution is sound: the Florida Legislature should consider amending section 38.10 “to close the trial-court-disqualification-gamesmanship loophole.” Quiambao, 2026 WL 2207228, at *8 (Pratt, J., specially concurring).

Kimberly Bellamy, pro se, Petitioner.

No appearance for Respondents.