ELIAHU ABUKASIS
v.
CITY FIRST MORTGAGE CORP., ET AL.
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
A trial court retains jurisdiction to adjudicate claims over which it expressly reserved jurisdiction, even after dismissal of the primary foreclosure claim. Prohibition is not available where the lower court plainly has jurisdiction over the matters before it.
[1] A trial court retains jurisdiction to adjudicate claims over which it expressly reserves jurisdiction under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.170(i), notwithstanding volu…
[2] Prohibition is not available as a remedy where the lower tribunal plainly possesses jurisdiction over the matters brought before it.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Notwithstanding City First's voluntary dismissal of its foreclosure claim, the lower tribunal plainly had jurisdiction to adjudicate the claims brought before it over which the trial court expressly reserved jurisdiction.”
Establishes that express reservation of jurisdiction preserves trial court authority over non-dismissed claims despite dismissal of the primary foreclosure action.
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAbukasis was a defendant in a commercial foreclosure action. The trial court authorized sale of the foreclosed property, and after the mortgagee City …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida
Opinion filed September 2, 2026.
No. 3D26-0862 Lower Tribunal No. 24-19934-CA-01
Eliahu Abukasis, Petitioner,
VS.
City First Mortgage Corp., et al., Respondents.
A Case of Original Jurisdiction Prohibition.
Eric J. Cvelbar, for petitioner.
Moshe Rubinstein, for respondent City First Mortgage Corp; Blaxberg Counselors at Law P.A., and I. Barry Blaxberg and Zachary S. McWilliams, for respondent 841 W. 40th St., LLC; Alan Silverstein (Palm Beach Gardens), for respondent Hilary Kates.
Before SCALES, C.J., and LINDSEY and GOODEN, JJ.
ON PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR REHEARING
PER CURIAM.
Petitioner Eliahu Abukasis was a defendant, and is still a crossdefendant, in the instant commercial foreclosure action (lower tribunal case number 2024-19934-CA-01) that is pending in the lower court. After a series of frivolous filings in a related appeal, by virtue of an August 13, 2025 order, a separate panel of this Court barred Abukasis from any further pro se filings in this Court related to lower tribunal case number 2024-19934-CA-01. See Abukasis v. City First Mortgage Corp., 3D2025-1302 (“Abukasis I”).
In the lower proceedings, the trial court authorized the sale of the subject foreclosed property to respondent 841 W 40TH ST., LLC ("841 LLC"), and some of the proceeds from the sale paid off the plaintiff/mortgagee below, respondent City First Mortgage Corp. (“City First"). City First then dismissed its foreclosure claim and released the lis pendens. In its order approving the sale to 841 LLC, the trial court expressly reserved jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the sale and to adjudicate respondent Hillary Kates's crossclaim against Abukasis. The crossclaim and proceedings against Abukasis regarding his alleged interference with the turnover of the property to 841 LLC remain pending in the lower court.
Abukasis, represented by counsel, then filed in this Court an "emergency” petition for writ of prohibition and/or certiorari on April 23, 2026
(the instant matter, 3D26-0862). Abukasis asserted that the trial court's continued proceedings are being conducted without jurisdiction because of City First's dismissal of its foreclosure claim. Contemporaneously with the filing of his "emergency” petition, Abukasis filed in this Court an “emergency" motion to stay the lower proceedings.
We initially dismissed the “emergency” petition because Abukasis did not pay the filing fee. On May 9, 2026, Abukasis finally paid the filing fee, and we granted Abukasis's motion to reinstate the petition.
On May 29, 2026, we ordered Abukasis to file a rules-compliant petition and appendix, and the respondents to respond to Abukasis's stay motion. On June1, 2026, Abukasis's lawyer filed in this Court a motion to withdraw as Abukasis's counsel. Abukasis's lawyer also filed a corrected “emergency” petition and a corrected appendix. Notwithstanding our May 29 order and the requirements of Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.100(g), the corrected “emergency” petition failed to contain any citations to the corrected appendix.
We did not order a response to Abukasis's corrected “emergency” petition because his corrected “emergency” petition and corrected appendix, the respondents' responses to Abukasis's stay motion and Abukasis's unauthorized reply thereto demonstrated no basis whatsoever for relief. See
Fla. R. App. P. 9.100(h). Notwithstanding City First's voluntary dismissal of its foreclosure claim, the lower tribunal plainly had jurisdiction to adjudicate the claims brought before it over which the trial court expressly reserved jurisdiction. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.170(i); Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.420(a)(1). Not wanting to inflict futile fees and costs on the parties, on July1, 2026, we denied Abukasis's corrected "emergency” petition, and denied, as moot, all pending motions (including Abukasis's stay motion and his lawyer's motion to withdraw).
Not content with this Court's disposition of his meritless corrected "emergency” petition, on July 31, 2026, Abukasis, through his lawyer, has now filed what is captioned as “Petitioner's Emergency Motion to Re-Open Case." The motion fails to explain the nature of the “emergency” or why Abukasis waited thirty days from our July1 denial order to file it. While not entirely clear, the motion suggests that Abukasis I's August 13, 2025 order barring Abukasis from any further pro se filings in this Court related to lower tribunal case number 2024-19934-CA-01 somehow precluded this Court from considering Abukasis's corrected “emergency” petition and corrected appendix that were filed by his lawyer.
Abukasis and his lawyer should rest assured that Abukasis I's August 13, 2025 order did not interfere with, or in any way affect, this Court's July1,
2026 adjudication of Abukasis's corrected “emergency” petition in 3D26- 0862. We denied it on the merits. We treat Abukasis's “Emergency Motion to Re-Open Case” as a motion for rehearing of our July1, 2026 denial order in 3D26-0862 and deny same. No motion for rehearing of this rehearing order is authorized.
Finally, we caution lawyers and parties that labeling filings in this Court with the word “emergency” is reserved exclusively for those cases genuinely requiring emergency treatment by this Court. Filings labeled as “emergencies" disrupt court procedures and interrupt work on cases that are already pending. Consequently, a party or an attorney who seeks “emergency” review “immediately loses credibility if this Court discovers there is no true emergency.” USAA Cas. Ins. Co. v. Pembroke Pines MRI, Inc., 24 So. 3d 588, 589 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009). Indeed, rampant abuse of using the word “emergency” in a filing's caption provided the catalyst for this Court's June1, 2026 adoption of Administrative Order AO3D26-01, requiring any attorney or self-represented litigant to complete and file a “Request for Emergency Treatment” form contemporaneously with any filing requesting this Court to give emergency treatment to the filing.1
So ordered.