S.K., THE FATHER
v.
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, ET AL.
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The trial court's denial of an agreed motion to allow remote testimony does not constitute reversible error warranting reversal of a parental rights termination judgment.
[1] A trial court's denial of an agreed motion to permit remote testimony by a party in a parental rights termination proceeding does not constitute reversible error under Fl…
Previewing 1 of 1 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“If that does not rise to the level of a structural error, I cannot imagine what would.”
Justice Logue's dissent arguing that barring a parent from testifying in his own behalf at a termination hearing constitutes structural error.
S.K., a father residing in Washington State, sought to testify remotely at a parental rights termination hearing due to poverty and inability to trave…
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Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed April 1, 2026. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
No. 3D25-1546 Lower Tribunal No. 20-15159 TPB-C
S.K., the Father, Appellant, vs. Department of Children and Families, et al., Appellee.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Scott M. Bernstein, Judge.
Thomas Butler, P.A., and Thomas J. Butler, for appellant.
Sara Elizabeth Goldfarb and Laura J. Lee (Tallahassee), for appellee Guardian Ad Litem; Karla Perkins, for appellee Department of Children and Families.
Before LOGUE, LINDSEY, and GOODEN, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
For the reasons set forth in M.C., the Mother v. Dep't of Children & Families, et al., 51 Fla. L. Wkly D461c (Fla. 3d DCA Mar. 13, 2026), we affirm.
LINDSEY and GOODEN, JJ., concur.
LOGUE, J., dissenting.
Case No. 3D25-1546 S.K. v. Dep't of Children & Families, et al.
In this case, S.K., the father, appeals a final judgment terminating his parental rights to two of his children. He contends he was wrongfully barred from testifying in his own behalf when the trial court denied an agreed motion for him to testify remotely because his poverty and residence in Washington State prevented him from testifying in person. The Department agreed to the motion, and, on appeal, properly and admirably confessed error. Yet the majority affirms. I dissent for the reasons set forth in my dissent in the companion case involving the mother of the children, M.C. v. Department of Children & Families, No. 3D25-1545, 2026 WL 705997, at *9-11 (Fla. 3d DCA Mar. 13, 2026). The trial court's error in denying the agreed motion was egregious. Its practical effect was to bar S.K. from testifying in his own behalf at a hearing in which the government was taking away his children. If that does not rise to the level of a structural error, I cannot imagine what would.