STATE OF FLORIDA

v.

MOUYID BIN ISLAM

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA

SECOND DISTRICT

STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellant, v. MOUYID BIN ISLAM, Appellee.

No. 2D21-1797

December 30, 2022

BY ORDER OF THE COURT:

Upon consideration of appellee's motion for clarification filed on November 17, 2022,

IT IS ORDERED that the motion for clarification is granted to the extent that the opinion dated November 16, 2022, is withdrawn and the attached opinion is substituted therefor.

No further motions for rehearing will be entertained in this appeal.

I HEREBY CERTIFY THE FOREGOING IS A

TRUE COPY OF THE ORIGINAL COURT ORDER.

MARY ELIZABETH KUENZEL

CLERK

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA

SECOND DISTRICT

STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellant, v. MOUYID BIN ISLAM, Appellee.

No. 2D21-1797

December 30, 2022

Appeal from the County Court for Hillsborough County; Margaret R. Taylor, Judge.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Chelsea N. Simms, Assistant Attorney General, and Allison C. Heim, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa (substituted as counsel of record), for Appellant.

Michael Alexander Misa of Michael A. Misa, P.A., Tampa; and Jorge Leon Chalela of Jorge Leon Chalela, P.A., Tampa, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

This appeal is hereby transferred to the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit Court in and for Hillsborough County for disposition. See § 318.16(1), Fla. Stat. (2019); Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(c)(1)(A). While we recognize section 318.16(1) provides that "[i]f a person is found to have committed an infraction by the hearing official, he or she may appeal that finding to the circuit court," it certainly does not use any limiting language such as "only a person . . . ." Therefore, we conclude that if the circuit court has jurisdiction over a defendant's appeal in these matters, then it follows that the circuit court has jurisdiction over a State's appeal in these matters. Any other construction would lead to counterintuitive results.

MORRIS, C.J., and SMITH, J., Concur.

ATKINSON, Judge, dissenting.

I respectfully dissent. The State has appealed an order granting Mouyid Islam's motion to dismiss a noncriminal traffic citation entered by the county judge, acting in her capacity as a hearing official. Because section 318.16, Florida Statutes (2021), does not expressly provide that the State may appeal decisions of a hearing official to the circuit court, the circuit court lacks jurisdiction to hear the State's appeal in this case. Therefore, to the extent that the State has any right to appeal an order dismissing a noncriminal infraction, this court, and not the circuit court, would have jurisdiction to hear such an appeal. I would, therefore, deny the State's motion to transfer this appeal to the circuit court.

Mr. Islam was cited for failing to yield the right-of-way, a noncriminal traffic infraction pursuant to section 316.125(1), Florida Statutes (2020). Violations of section 316.125(1) are "punishable as . . . moving violation[s] as provided in chapter 318." § 316.125(3). Chapter 318 governs the disposition of traffic infractions. See § 318.11–.12. A person who has been cited for a traffic infraction may challenge the citation at a hearing. See § 318.14(5) ("Any person electing to appear before the designated official or who is required so to appear shall be deemed to have waived his or her right to the civil penalty provisions of s. 318.18. The official, after a hearing, shall make a determination as to whether an infraction has been committed."). Generally, a hearing official—a judge who is authorized to preside over hearings adjudicating traffic infractions—has jurisdiction to preside over hearings on traffic infractions. See § 318.13(4) (defining "[o]fficial" as "any judge authorized by law to preside over a court or hearing adjudicating traffic infractions"); .14(1) ("[A]ny person cited for a violation of chapter 316 . . . is charged with a noncriminal infraction and must be cited for such an infraction and cited to appear before an official." (emphasis added)). However, section 318.32(1) provides that hearing officers, qualified individuals who are not judges, also have jurisdiction to preside over hearings on traffic infractions. § 318.32(1) ("Hearing officers shall be empowered to accept pleas from and decide the guilt or innocence of any person, adult or juvenile, charged with any civil traffic infraction and shall be empowered to adjudicate or withhold adjudication of guilt in the same manner as a county court judge under the statutes, rules, and procedures presently existing or as subsequently amended . . . .").

Mr. Islam appeared before a hearing official—the county judge—for a hearing on his citation. After the judge dismissed Mr. Islam's traffic citation, the State appealed to this court. Shortly after filing its notice of appeal, the State filed a motion to transfer the appeal to the circuit court. This court denied the motion but allowed the State to argue jurisdiction in its brief on the merits. Mr. Islam disagreed with the State and argued that this court has jurisdiction over this appeal.

The Florida Constitution provides that "[d]istrict courts of appeal shall have jurisdiction to hear appeals, that may be taken as a matter of right, from final judgments or orders of trial courts, including those entered on review of administrative action, not directly appealable to the supreme court or a circuit court." Art. V, § 4(b)(1), Fla. Const.; see also Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(b)(1)A. It also provides that "[t]he circuit courts shall have . . . jurisdiction of appeals when provided by general law." Art. V, § 5(b), Fla. Const.; see also Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(c)(1)A.

Section 26.012, Florida Statutes (2021), governs the jurisdiction of circuit courts. Effective January¹, 2021, the legislature amended section 26.012, limiting the appellate jurisdiction of circuit courts. See ch. 2020-61, Laws of Fla. In relevant part, the current version of the statute provides, "Circuit courts shall have jurisdiction of appeals from final administrative orders of local government code enforcement boards and of reviews and appeals as otherwise expressly provided by law." § 26.012(1) (emphasis added).¹

Chapter 318 includes two sections governing appeals of decisions in traffic infraction cases—one governing appeals of orders entered by

hearing officials (judges) and one governing appeals of orders entered by hearing officers (qualified individuals who are not judges but are otherwise authorized to preside over traffic infraction hearings). §§ 318.16, .33. Appeals from orders rendered by a hearing officer are appealable to the circuit court. See § 318.33 ("Decisions of the hearing officer are appealable, under the rules of court, to the circuit court."). However, the language of section 318.16, which governs appeals of orders rendered by a judge acting as a hearing official, is different than that of section 318.33. In relevant part, section 318.16(1) provides, "If a person is found to have committed an infraction by the hearing official, he or she may appeal that finding to the circuit court." (Emphasis added.) "Courts must afford statutory language 'its plain and ordinary meaning, giving due regard to the context within which it is used.' " Mesen v. State, 271 So. 3d 164, 167 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019) (quoting Hampton v. State, 103 So. 3d 98, 110 (Fla. 2012)); see also Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Gore, 47 Fla. L. Weekly D867 (Fla. 4th DCA Apr. 13, 2022) ("The words of a governing text are of paramount concern, and what they convey, in their context, is what the text means." (quoting Advisory Op. to Governor re Implementation of Amend. 4, the Voting Restoration Amend., 288 So. 3d 1070, 1078 (Fla. 2020))).

Section 318.16 uses the language "a person is found to have committed an infraction by the hearing official" to indicate who "may appeal [a] finding [that a person has committed a traffic infraction] to the circuit court." § 318.16(1). In context, the "person" in section 318.16(1) is the accused—the individual who was found to have committed a traffic infraction. Cf. Mesen, 271 So. 3d at 167 (concluding that "[a] reasonable reader would understand" the terms used in the relevant statute to carry their ordinary meaning and that the "an ordinary meaning of those words

[was] all the more reasonable in light of their context"). The opposite conclusion would be nonsensical: The State cannot be the "person" indicated in the statute who has been "found to have committed an infraction by the hearing official," because the State is the entity prosecuting the individual who is alleged "to have committed an infraction." See § 318.16(1). In other words, no reader could reasonably conclude that the term "person" as used in section 318.16(1) includes the State, and Section 318.16(1) does not include any language concerning an appeal of a hearing official's decision filed by the State.² See id.

The circuit court only has jurisdiction to hear appeals of orders other than final administrative orders of local government code

enforcement boards "as otherwise expressly provided by law." § 26.012(1) (emphasis added). Section 318.16(1) does not expressly provide that the State may appeal adverse decisions of a hearing official in a traffic infraction case to the circuit court. See § 318.16. Therefore, the circuit court does not have jurisdiction to hear the State's appeals of decisions made by a hearing official. See §§ 26.012(1); 318.16(1).

The majority's reliance on the lack of "limiting language such as 'only a person' " is misguided for several reasons. The State is not expressly mentioned as a party that may appeal a decision of a hearing official in section 318.16(1). Rather, the only party mentioned in the statute is "a person [who] is found to have committed an infraction by the hearing official." § 318.16. "[U]nder the expressio unius est alterius canon [of interpretation], 'the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another.' " Advisory Op. to Governor re Implementation of Amend. 4, 288 So. 3d at 1080 (quoting White v. Mederi Caretenders Visiting Servs. of Se. Fla., LLC, 226 So. 3d 774, 784 (Fla. 2017)). Applying this canon to section 318.16(1), the State is not a party that may appeal adverse decisions of a hearing official in traffic infraction cases to the circuit court because "a person [who] is found to have committed an infraction by the hearing official" is mentioned as a party who may appeal to the circuit court and the State is not such a party. Cf. Advisory Op. to Governor re Implementation of Amend. 4, 288 So. 3d at 1080. Further, as explained above, the "person" referred to in section 318.16(1) is one who has been "found to have committed an infraction by the hearing official," which categorically eliminates any reading of the language that would permit the term to include the State—the party prosecuting the person for allegedly committing an infraction.

If the majority's rationale were taken to its logical conclusion, the legislature would be required to specifically use the term "only" to limit a general term in a statute that the legislature has already specified using other language. Under the majority's rationale, if a statute were to provide that "it is unlawful for a person to import an Indian elephant," a person could be charged with violating the statute for importing an African elephant—a different species of elephant than Indian elephants— or for importing a giraffe—an animal that is not an elephant at all— because the legislature did not specify that importation of only Indian elephants is unlawful. The adjective "Indian" limits the category of elephants that may not be imported under the hypothetical statute, and the noun "elephant" similarly limits the category of animals that may not be imported; no other specific language is necessary. Likewise, the legislature's use of the language "found to have committed an infraction by the hearing official" to describe "person" is sufficient to limit the category of "person[s]" who "may appeal [a] finding [in a traffic infraction case] to the circuit court." See § 318.16(1). No other specific limitations are necessary.

Section 318.16(1), when read with the recently amended version of section 26.012(1), creates an incongruous result. When a hearing official—a judge—has entered an adverse decision in a traffic infraction case, the circuit court has jurisdiction to hear only those appeals filed by the person who is found to have committed a traffic infraction. See §§ 26.012(1); 318.16(1). However, the circuit court lacks jurisdiction to hear appeals filed by the State in the same kinds of cases that are heard by the same hearing officials. See §§ 26.012(1); 318.16(1). This result is even more curious when considering section 318.33, which provides that any decisions of hearing officers in the same kinds of cases are appealable by either party to the circuit court. See §§ 26.012(1); 318.33. One possible interpretation that avoids this ostensible conundrum is a reading that infers that the State has no appellate rights at all from an adverse ruling in a civil case involving an adjudication of an alleged traffic infraction—i.e., whether from a decision of an officer or an official, only the accused may appeal. At any rate, while that result—or one in which the State may only appeal in cases adjudicated by an official—may have been unintended, the statutes are clear; therefore, the statutes should be given their plain and obvious meaning. See Macchione v. State, 123 So. 3d 114, 119 n.3 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013) ("[W]hatever the consequences, we must accept the plain meaning of plain words." (quoting United States v. Brown, 260 U.S. 240, 244 (1907))).

Neither result can be avoided using the absurdity doctrine. Under the absurdity doctrine, "a 'provision may be either disregarded or judicially corrected as an error (when the correction is textually simple) if failing to do so would result in a disposition that no reasonable person could approve.'" Kirk v. State, 303 So. 3d 604, 606 (Fla. 5th DCA 2020) (quoting Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 235–39 (2012)). Although the absurdity doctrine is an exception to the rule that courts must apply the plain meaning of statutes, it "should not be used to avoid an unintended result, only an absurd or patently unreasonable one." Mesen, 271 So. 3d at 169 (emphasis added) (quoting Maddox v. State, 923 So. 2d 442, 452– 53 (Fla. 2006) (Cantero, J., dissenting)); cf. Kirk, 303 So. 3d at 605–06 (concluding that section 948.06(2)(f)¹, Florida Statutes (2019), produced a patently absurd result because "the statute by its terms would require the modification or continuation of probation of all who have violated probation," "limit the sentencing of those on probation to a maximum of ninety days in county jail, even in the face of conflicting statutes," and "effectively nullify [other provisions] of the [same] statute"). The result here, while arguably incongruous, does not rise to the level of absurd or patently unreasonable. Plausible rational explanations for treating appeals by the State differently from appeals by the person found to have committed a traffic infraction include the relative infrequency of appeals by the State and the potential complexity or novelty of issues raised in an appeal from a ruling in favor of the person found not to have committed a traffic infraction. And given the relative importance of an accused's appellate rights when compared to the State's, it stands to reason that the latter might be viewed as more readily dispensable when weighed against the cost of further litigation for a civil traffic infraction. Cf. State v. Lewars, 259 So. 3d 793, 801–02 (Fla. 2018) (declining to apply the absurdity doctrine in light of multiple rational explanations postulated for what was alleged to be an absurd result). Therefore, this court should apply sections 318.16(1) and 26.012(1) as written even if it produces a result the court reasonably surmises was unintended. See id.; Mesen, 271 So. 3d at 169–71 (declining to apply the absurdity doctrine despite the unintended result of the plain language of the relevant statute).

The circuit court lacks jurisdiction over the State's appeal of the trial judge's order dismissing-Mr. Islam's citation because section 318.16(1) does not expressly provide that the State may appeal hearing officials' decisions to the circuit court. See § 26.012(1); see also art. V, § 5(b), Fla. Const.; Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(c)(1)A. Therefore, to the extent that the State has the right to appeal the dismissal of a noncriminal traffic infraction, this court, and not the circuit court, would have jurisdiction over the State's appeal. See art. V, § 4(b)(1), Fla. Const.

("District courts of appeal shall have jurisdiction to hear appeals, that may be taken as a matter of right, from final judgments or orders of trial courts . . . not directly appealable to the supreme court or a circuit court."); Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(b)(1)A. Thus, I would deny the State's motion to transfer the case to the circuit court.

Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.