ANTONIO LEBARON MELTON
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
A postconviction court has inherent authority to reconsider and vacate its prior order granting a rule 3.800(a) motion before resentencing is complete, based on an intervening change in controlling law. The law in effect at the time of appeal governs the issues raised, and a sentence that is not illegal under current law provides no basis for resentencing.
[1] An order granting a motion to correct an illegal sentence under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a) is not a final or appealable order until resentencing is compl…
[2] The law in effect at the time an appeal is decided governs the issues raised on appeal, even where there has been an intervening change in law since the time of trial or…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“An order granting a rule 3.800(a) motion is not final or appealable, and thus a postconviction court has inherent authority to reconsider its ruling before resentencing is complete.”
Establishes that the postconviction court did not lose jurisdiction to reconsider its prior order simply because the State failed to timely challenge it.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMelton was sentenced to life with parole for first-degree murder committed at age seventeen. He filed a pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence u…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Decisional Law cases and more on FLexlaw
FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA
No. 1D19-1286
ANTONIO LEBARON MELTON, Appellant, v. STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee.
On appeal from the Circuit Court for Escambia County. Jan Shackelford, Judge.
RAY, C.J.
May 29, 2020
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
The State asks us to rehear our decision holding that the postconviction court lacked jurisdiction to vacate a prior order in which it had granted Antonio Melton's motion to correct an illegal sentence and ordered resentencing. Alternatively, the State requests that we certify a question of great public importance. We deny the motion for certification but grant the motion for rehearing, withdraw our prior opinion, and substitute the following opinion in its place.
I.
Melton was sentenced to life imprisonment with a possibility of parole after twenty-five years for a first-degree murder he committed when he was seventeen years old.1 Over two decades later, he filed a pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a), claiming that he was entitled to resentencing under Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and Atwell v. State, 197 So. 3d 1040 (Fla. 2016).2
The State at first agreed that Melton was entitled to relief, and so did the postconviction court. The court granted Melton's motion and noted that it would set his resentencing by separate order. But that never happened. Melton had since been sentenced to death row for an unrelated crime, and the parties asked the court to delay scheduling the resentencing hearing in this case.
In the meantime, the law on juvenile sentencing continued to evolve. Based on the intervening decision of State v. Michel, 257 So. 3d 3 (Fla. 2018),3 the State changed its position and argued that Melton was no longer entitled to resentencing because his life sentence includes the possibility of parole. In turn, Melton contended that the State should be barred from making this
argument, in part because it had previously agreed that he was entitled to resentencing under Miller and Atwell.
Considering the new controlling law, the postconviction court vacated the order it had entered more than a year and a half earlier and denied Melton's motion for resentencing on his firstdegree murder conviction. This appeal followed.
II.
Melton contends that the initial postconviction order granting him relief under rule 3.800(a) was a final appealable order, even though his resentencing had not taken place. And because the State failed to timely seek rehearing or appeal, the court lacked authority to reconsider the prior ruling. What's more, he argued it would be a manifest injustice to deny him resentencing when it had been granted to similarly situated Atwell defendants.
On Melton's first point, this Court, sitting en banc, recently held that an order granting a rule 3.800(a) motion is not final or appealable, and thus a postconviction court has inherent authority to reconsider its ruling before resentencing is complete. Rogers v. State, 45 Fla. L. Weekly D1069 (Fla. 1st DCA May1, 2020). So too here, the postconviction court did not err by vacating its previous ruling simply because the State failed to challenge it before it did. Because resentencing had not yet occurred, the court retained jurisdiction to reconsider its order granting resentencing based on an intervening change in the law. Id. at D1072.
Melton next contends that denying him a resentencing would be a manifest injustice because other Atwell defendants were resentenced in the time before Michel and Franklin were decided. But it is well settled that "[t]he decisional law in effect at the time an appeal is decided governs the issues raised on appeal, even where there has been a change of law since the time of trial.” Wheeler v. State, 344 So. 2d 244, 245 (Fla. 1977). Melton cannot show that his life-with-parole sentence is illegal under the law as it now stands. And “[i]f the sentence is not illegal, then there is neither reason nor authority to have a resentencing hearing or grant a 3.800(a) motion and enter a corrected sentence.” Rogers, 45 Fla. L. Weekly at D1078 (Tanenbaum, J., concurring in result).
We thus affirm the postconviction court's order denying Melton's motion for relief under rule 3.800(a).
AFFIRMED.
ROWE and TANENBAUM, JJ., concur.