STATE OF FLORIDA

v.

CHESTER ROBINSON

IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL, LAKELAND, FLORIDA

April 15, 2020

STATE OF FLORIDA, ) ) Appellant, ) )

V.

) ) CHESTER ROBINSON, ) ) Appellee. ) ) Case No. 2D17-468

BY ORDER OF THE COURT:

Following supplemental briefing by the parties, this court's opinion filed March 7, 2018, is withdrawn sua sponte, and the following opinion is substituted therefor. No further motions for rehearing will be entertained in this appeal.

I HEREBY CERTIFY THE FOREGOING IS A

TRUE COPY OF THE ORIGINAL COURT ORDER.

MARY ELIZABETH KUENZEL, CLERK

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

OF FLORIDA

SECOND DISTRICT

STATE OF FLORIDA, ) ) Appellant, ) )

V.

) ) CHESTER ROBINSON, ) ) ) ) Appellee. ) Case No. 2D17-468

Opinion filed April 15, 2020.

Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(b)(2) from the Circuit Court for Pinellas County; Frank Quesada, Judge.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Kiersten E. Jensen, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellant.

Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Stacey M. Schroeder, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellee.

SLEET, Judge.

The State appealed an order granting Chester Robinson's motion to correct illegal sentence, which he filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850(a)(1), (b)(2). Pursuant to State v. Michel, 257 So. 3d 3 (Fla. 2018), we reverse.

Chester Robinson was sentenced to life imprisonment with a possibility of parole after twenty-five years for a first-degree murder that he committed when he was sixteen years old. In accordance with the decision in Atwell v. State, 197 So. 3d 1040

(Fla. 2016), the postconviction court granted Robinson's motion seeking to correct illegal sentence, and the State appealed. Initially, we affirmed the postconviction court's order without written opinion. We thereafter granted the State's motion for written opinion and affirmed the postconviction court's order with a citation to State v. Ratliff, 42 Fla. L. Weekly D2361, 2363 (Fla. 2d DCA Nov. 3, 2017) ("[U]nder Atwell, juveniles serving life sentences with parole eligibility are entitled to relief under Miller[ v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012),] and Graham[ v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010),] regardless of whether their [presumptive parole release date] results in their sentence being a 'de facto' life sentence"). We stayed issuance of our mandate pending the supreme court's decision in State v. Michel, 257 So. 3d 3 (Fla. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1401 (2019). Thereafter, we directed the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing the application of that decision to this appeal.

In its supplemental brief, the State correctly argues that under the holding in Michel, Robinson's sentence is not illegal and that he is not entitled to resentencing. The United States Supreme Court held in Miller that mandatory life imprisonment sentences without parole for juvenile homicide offenders are unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. 567 U.S. at 489. The Court found that children are different from adults for the purposes of sentencing and that they have diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform such that they are less deserving of the most severe punishments. Id. at 479. The Florida Supreme Court extended Miller's reasoning in Atwell and held that Florida's parole system failed to include special protections for juvenile offenders and did not take into consideration their diminished culpability at the time of the offense as required by

Miller. Atwell, 197 So. 3d at 1049. The court concluded that a life sentence with a possibility of parole under Florida's parole system violated the Eighth Amendment under Miller. Atwell, 197 So. 2d at 1050.

However, in Michel, a plurality of the supreme court renounced the holding in Atwell, finding that the majority's analysis in Atwell had been faulty:

[T]he majority's holding [in Atwell] does not properly apply United States Supreme Court precedent. . . .

. . . [J]uvenile offenders' sentences of life with the possibility of parole after [twenty-five] years under Florida's parole system do not violate "Graham's requirement that juveniles have a meaningful opportunity to receive parole." [Virginia v. ]LeBlanc, 137 S. Ct. [1726,] 1729 [(2017)]. Therefore, such juvenile offenders are not entitled to resentencing under section 921.1402, Florida Statutes.

257 So. 3d at 6-8. In Franklin v. State, 258 So. 3d 1239 (Fla. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 2646 (2019), the court reiterated the analysis set forth in Michel and abrogated the holding in Atwell.

Because Robinson's life sentence with a possibility of parole after twentyfive years is not unconstitutional, we reverse the postconviction court's order granting Robinson's motion for postconviction relief. We deny without discussion Robinson's request to certify a question of great public importance.

Reversed.

KELLY and SALARIO, JJ., Concur.