ERIC DEMOND PARRISH VS STATE OF FLORIDA

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

No. 1D2021-1435

ERIC DEMOND PARRISH, Appellant,

V.

STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee.

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Escambia County. Thomas V. Dannheisser, Judge.

September 9, 2026

ON REMAND FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA

WINOKUR, J.

Eric Demond Parrish appealed a judgment and sentence entered against him. On September 28, 2022, this court issued an opinion affirming the decision in part and dismissing the appeal in part. In particular, we dismissed the portion of Parrish's appeal where he claimed the sentencing court erred by refusing to impose a departure sentence, citing Wilson v. State, 306 So. 3d 1267 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020). The Supreme Court of Florida then quashed our decision to the extent that it had concluded that we did not have jurisdiction to hear Parrish's challenge to the refusal to impose a departure sentence and remanded to us for further proceedings

consistent with its opinion. Parrish v. State, 434 So. 3d 692 (Fla. 2026).

We withdraw our opinion of September 28, 2022, only to the extent that it ruled that we did not have jurisdiction to hear Parrish's claim that the trial court erred in choosing not to impose a departure from the lowest permissible sentence.¹,2 We now consider Parrish's argument and conclude that he does not provide a legitimate basis to reverse the sentence. Accordingly, we affirm.

I

Parrish was found guilty of sexual battery with force on his foster mother, as well as battery and false imprisonment of her. Parrish's lowest permissible sentence was 146.85 months (just under 12 and one-quarter years) in prison;³ his maximum sentence was life in prison. Parrish requested a sentence below the lowest permissible sentence on two statutory grounds for departure: (1) he was a youthful offender under Chapter 958, Florida Statutes; and (2) he required specialized treatment for a medical disorder unrelated to substance abuse. See § 921.0026(2)(d), (2)(l), Fla. Stat.

Parrish presented testimony supporting his request, but the court chose not to impose a departure sentence. “[D]espite whether [Parrish] would qualify [for] a downward departure or not," the court noted that it had “never seen a case where someone has such a high risk for reoffending” and opined that Parrish's case was not "appropriate for a downward departure at all. It's not even a close question for me.”

The trial court adjudicated Parrish guilty and sentenced him to thirty years in prison for sexual battery, with concurrent sentences for the other charges.

II

On appeal, Parrish claims that the trial court “should have" imposed a departure sentence because the evidence presented at sentencing “demonstrates the need for youthful offender status and treatment more than punishment." Parrish offers no analysis showing why this sentence was erroneous beyond his claim that the evidence showed that the court “should have” departed.

This is precisely the argument we rejected in Gazoombi v. State, 406 So. 3d 371 (Fla. 1st DCA 2025). Although we held there that we had jurisdiction to consider this type of claim, we highlighted that this type of claim is meritless. Because "[t]here is no constitutional or statutory right to have a trial court impose a sentence of one length or another within an otherwise properly determined range[,]" "a bald assertion that the trial court should have imposed a sentence different from the one it did is not a cognizable claim for appellate relief.” Gazoombi, 406 So. 3d at 375, 376-77 (emphasis in original). In other words, while a court is obligated to provide a sentencing process and decision that comports with statutory and constitutional requirements, it is never obligated to impose a departure sentence. Put another way, a mitigating circumstance does not create an entitlement to a departure from the lowest permissible sentence. Therefore, a defendant claiming that the court “should have" imposed a departure sentence and erred by failing to do so cannot establish reversible error.

Gazoombi explains why. “When a defendant . . . asks the trial court to impose a sentence below the lowest permissible sentence,

he effectively requests that the sentencing range be expanded beyond what the scoresheet establishes as the floor.” Gazoombi, 406 So. 3d at 379 (emphasis in original). "As part of that request, if the defendant identifies a legally cognizable, mitigating factor or set of circumstances and sufficiently establishes a factual basis for that mitigation, the floor drops to zero, and the authorized sentencing range becomes zero to the statutory maximum.” Id. at 379-80. Stated differently, the only outcome of a successful claim that a departure ground has been proven is that the permissible sentencing range has been expanded, permitting a wider range of sentencing options. However, because sentencing within a legally permissible range is generally not subject to appellate review,⁴ “even if there were mitigating circumstances to support a departure sentence, there is no meritorious appellate claim to a particular sentence within a statutorily authorized range because a defendant does not have a right to have the trial court impose one sentence instead of another." Id. at 380.

This occurred here. The sentencing court expressed its view that a departure sentence was an inappropriate sentencing option regardless of whether Parrish “would qualify" for one. In other words, without any finding of a mitigating circumstance, the trial court could impose a sentence between 12 and one-quarter years and life in prison. Alternatively, if the court had found that a mitigating factor was proven, then the court could have chosen a sentence ranging from no time in prison to life in prison. Either way, a thirty-year sentence represents an appropriate exercise of sentencing discretion. Therefore, pursuant to Gazoombi, we reject Parrish's claim that the trial court “should have” imposed a departure sentence.

AFFIRMED.

BILBREY and LONG, JJ., concur.