JOSEPH WAINWRIGHT

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

JOSEPH WAINWRIGHT, Appellant,

V.

STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee.

No. 1D2025-1880

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Suwannee County. Mark E. Feagle, Judge.

September 9, 2026

PER CURIAM.

Joseph Wainwright appeals a final order denying his motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. The postconviction court held an evidentiary hearing on grounds two and eight and summarily denied the remaining grounds. We affirm except as to a subclaim of ground four.

A jury convicted Wainwright of trafficking in methamphetamine and possession of a firearm or ammunition by a convicted felon. The State's theory was that he knew of and controlled methamphetamine and firearms found at the property he shared with Ashley Hancock. The defense theory was that Hancock, not Wainwright, controlled the safes, firearms, and contraband.

We review de novo the summary denial of the claims addressed in this opinion and accept the motion's factual allegations as true unless the record conclusively refutes them. Foster v. State, 810 So. 2d 910, 914 (Fla. 2002). A facially sufficient claim of ineffective assistance must allege deficient performance and resulting prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 694 (1984). We independently analyze each distinct subclaim to determine whether the allegations, accepted as true, establish both elements and whether the record conclusively refutes relief. When the record conclusively refutes relief, the final order's failure to separately analyze the theory does not require remand. Mejia v. State, 434 So. 3d 131, 141 (Fla. 2d DCA 2026) (“We do hold, however, that a postconviction court is not automatically subject to reversal when it fails to expressly address a claim, provided the order's targeted attachments nonetheless permit meaningful appellate review and conclusively refute the omitted claim.").

When a timely motion contains both sufficient and insufficient claims, rule 3.850(h)(3) governs the amendment procedure.

Ground one challenged counsel's handling of a continuance and counsel's failure to object to witnesses and prospective jurors wearing masks. We affirm the continuance ruling without further discussion. The juror and witness components of the maskobjection subclaim require separate analysis, and we affirm as to both. As to prospective and seated jurors, the Confrontation Clause does not apply because jurors are not witnesses, and courts have rejected ineffective-assistance claims based on counsel's failure to object to pandemic masking during voir dire and trial. See United States v. Ayala-Vieyra, No. 21-1177, 2022 WL 190756, at *5 (6th Cir. Jan. 21, 2022); People v. Molina, 96 Cal. App. 5th 516, 520–21, 314 Cal. Rptr. 3d 465, 468–69 (2023). Counsel is not ineffective for failing to make a meritless objection. Hitchcock v. State, 991 So. 2d 337, 361 (Fla. 2008).

The witness component presents a different question. Any departure from face-to-face confrontation ordinarily requires a case-specific finding of necessity. See Pitts v. Mississippi, 607 U.S. 1, 2, 5 (2025). But a masking claim still fails absent a particularized showing of prejudice. See United States v. Shelton, 179 F. 4th 1020, 1036–38 (6th Cir. 2026). We need not decide

whether counsel performed deficiently because the record conclusively refutes prejudice. Wainwright did not identify any particular masked witness, credibility issue, obscured demeanor cue, examination decision, or other concrete connection between masking and the verdict. His generalized allegations would not overcome the controlled call, Depremio's testimony, the firearms and methamphetamine found in a safe containing Wainwright's passport and mail, or the additional firearms and ammunition found beneath the mattress and bed in the shared bedroom. Thus, there is no reasonable probability that an objection to witness masking would have changed the verdict.

Ground three alleged that counsel failed to impeach State witness Melanie Depremio with deposition statements that the firearms were for Hancock and that Hancock handled them. Although the final order addressed other impeachment theories without separately analyzing this one, the record conclusively refutes prejudice. The deposition statements would still have shown that Wainwright bought the firearms for Hancock. They did not negate his possession of the firearms before or while purchasing them for someone else. The jury also heard the defense theory that Hancock controlled the safes and firearm locations. Because the proposed impeachment was partly cumulative and did not exculpate Wainwright on possession, there is no reasonable probability that it would have changed the verdict.

Ground four alleged both a failure to object to Depremio's testimony about an alleged telephone call between Wainwright and Corey Robinson and a failure to obtain evidence that Wainwright claimed would show the call did not occur. We affirm the failure-to-object subclaim for the reasons explained in the postconviction court's order. The distinct failure-to-obtainevidence subclaim, however, was not separately analyzed and is legally insufficient as pleaded. Wainwright identified phones and categories of possible data—call logs, memory data, and cell-tower information—but did not allege what specific evidence existed, whether counsel could have obtained it, or how it would have disproved the alleged call.

Because Wainwright timely filed his motion, the motion sufficiently stated other claims, and the postconviction court did

not give him an opportunity to amend this insufficient subclaim, rule 3.850(h)(3) required a nonappealable order granting sixty days to amend. Spera v. State, 971 So. 2d 754, 761–62 (Fla. 2007). We therefore reverse only this portion of ground four and remand for the required amendment order.

In ground seven, Wainwright alleged that counsel misadvised him that his criminal record would be exposed if he testified. The trial colloquy establishes that he voluntarily chose not to testify, but it does not reveal or conclusively refute the alleged legal advice that led to that choice. Askew v. State, 265 So. 3d 693, 694 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019). That does not end the analysis because Wainwright must independently establish prejudice. See Rizkkhalil v. State, 316 So. 3d 802, 805–06 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021). Even accepting the alleged misadvice as true, the record conclusively refutes prejudice. Wainwright's proposed testimony denying the Robinson call, gun purchase, access, dominion, and control, and attributing the contraband to Hancock would have repeated the defense theory presented at trial. Against the controlled call, Depremio's testimony, the firearms and methamphetamine found in a safe containing Wainwright's passport and mail, and the additional firearms and ammunition found beneath the mattress and bed in the shared bedroom, the proposed testimony does not create a reasonable probability of a different verdict. Id. at 806.

We affirm all other portions of the order without further discussion, including the denial of cumulative relief. The limited remand provides only an opportunity to amend the subclaim in ground four.

AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; and REMANDED.

OSTERHAUS, C.J., and BILBREY and NEFF, JJ., concur.