VILLAGE CENTER COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT DISTRICT, ET. AL

v.

ILLECK

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

No. 1D2025-3075

VILLAGE CENTER COMMUNITY

DEVELOPMENT DISTRICT and

PREFERRED GOVERNMENTAL

CLAIMS SOLUTIONS/PGCS, Appellants,

v.

CHELSEA ILLECK, Appellee.

On appeal from the Office of the Judges of Compensation Claims. Robert A. Arthur, Judge of Compensation Claims.

Date of Accident: March 12, 2024.

OSTERHAUS, C.J.

September 23, 2026

Florida's heart-lung statute, § 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (2024), confers on firefighters who are disabled by “heart disease” a statutory presumption of compensability in workers' compensation cases. See Lakatis v. Citrus Cnty. Sheriff's Off./Fla. Sheriff's Risk Mgmt. Fund, 429 So. 3d 52, 56 (Fla. 1st DCA 2026). In this case, the claimant, firefighter Chelsea Illeck, developed disabling heart conditions supraventricular tachycardia (SVT) and atrial tachycardia (AT) from an indeterminate source. Both

parties' medical doctors agreed that Claimant's condition constituted a “heart disease” of her heart's electrical system. But they also testified that her condition didn't meet the definition of "heart disease" as applied in our prior case North Collier Fire Control & Rescue District v. Harlem, 371 So. 3d 368 (Fla. 1st DCA 2023). The Employer-Carrier argues that Harlem prevents Claimant from benefitting from § 112.18's presumption of compensability. Because Harlem, however, didn't address or purport to cover arrythmia-based heart diseases involving the heart's electrical system, it does not control here. In view of unrebutted medical evidence that Claimant suffers from "heart disease," we affirm the final compensation order's award of benefits to Claimant.

I.

Claimant joined the fire department in the Villages Community Development Districts as a full-time firefighter in 2014. In the run-up to her employment Claimant underwent a preemployment physical that showed no evidence of heart disease. But in the Fall of 2023, Claimant suffered heart issues while transporting a patient at work, including chest pain, shortness of breath, and a racing heart. She was placed on a monitor at the hospital and told she was in SVT—an abnormal heart rhythm emanating from the heart's upper chambers. The hospital gave Claimant fluids and discharged her. She continued seeing a cardiologist and when her condition persisted, she underwent an ablation of heart tissue to address the SVT in March 2024. Claimant missed some work following the ablation and subsequently transitioned to light duty and quality assurance roles.

Claimant reported her heart injury on April 1, 2025, and filed a petition for benefits seeking various workers' compensation benefits exclusively under the § 112.18 presumption. The Employer-Carrier (E-C) filed a notice of denial one month later, asserting, among other things, that the § 112.18 presumption did not apply. Claimant had a second heart ablation procedure in August 2025, because of ongoing symptoms and persistent arrhythmias.

In subsequent workers' compensation litigation between the parties before a Judge of Compensation Claims, the E-C argued that SVT and AT are not covered conditions under § 112.18(1), because they fail to meet Harlem's definition of “heart disease." Claimant responded that Harlem didn't foreclose her reliance on § 112.18 because it involved a cardiac plumbing-related discussion of "heart disease,” while her case involved the heart's electrical system.

As for the medical evidence, the E-C obtained an independent medical exam with a cardiologist Dr. Borzak. Dr. Borzak diagnosed Claimant with SVT and AT. Dr. Borzak considered Claimant to be disabled as of the March 2024 date of her first ablation and not to have yet reached maximum medical improvement. He opined that Claimant's SVT and AT constituted “heart disease” and a rhythm disorder involving the heart's electrical system. He stated that the type of arrhythmia suffered by Claimant was debilitating and could cause additional disease such as cardiomyopathy and weakening of the heart muscle. He acknowledged, however, that Claimant's condition did not meet the definition of “heart disease" applied in this court's Harlem decision.

Claimant obtained her own IME with a different cardiologist, Dr. Mathias. Dr. Mathias's diagnosis and testimony substantially agreed with Dr. Borzak. Dr. Mathias diagnosed Claimant with SVT and arrhythmia where the upper chambers of her heart race out of control. His testimony agreed with Dr. Borzak that Claimant's condition constituted “heart disease” as that term has been understood since the enactment date of the heart-lung statute in 1965. Dr. Mathias also agreed that under Harlem's definition Claimant's condition would not be considered heart disease. Dr. Mathias distinguished Claimant's circumstances from the plumbing-system-based facts in Harlem because SVT and AT involve an “electrical malfunction” of the heart that “causes the heart to race out of control and can weaken the heart muscle."

Ultimately, the JCC ruled for the Claimant. Crediting the doctors' testimony that Claimant's SVT and AT diagnoses constituted "heart disease” under § 112.18(1)(a), the JCC found that Claimant's condition qualified to receive the heart-lung statute's presumption. The JCC additionally cited numerous First

District cases confirming that cardiac conditions like Claimant's affecting the heart's electrical system have been routinely considered heart disease. The JCC found none of these cases to have been overruled or distinguished in Harlem, specifically: Carney v. Sarasota County Sheriff's Office, 26 So. 3d 683 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (finding a claimant to meet the statutory presumption for firefighters because he demonstrated disability for his elevated, irregular heartbeat); Martz v. Volusia County Fire Services, 30 So. 3d 635 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (stating an irregular heart rate is heart disease); Rodriguez v. Tallahassee Fire Department/City of Tallahassee, 240 So. 3d 788 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (noting arrhythmias are heart disease); City of Jacksonville v. O'Neal, 297 So. 3d 630 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020) (recognizing that congenital SVT could be heart disease if triggered by a work-related cause); and Fuller v. Okaloosa Correctional Institution, 22 So. 3d 803 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (finding tachycardia to be heart disease).

Following entry of the Final Compensation Order, the E-C filed a motion for rehearing that was denied. The E-C then filed a timely notice of appeal.

II.

The sole question in this case is whether our previous Harlem decision precludes a firefighter with an arrythmia-based heart disease diagnosis from receiving the benefit of Florida's heart-lung statute, § 112.18. The E-C seeks reversal of the final compensation order on the basis that Claimant's SVT and AT conditions are not “heart disease” according to Harlem's definition of what qualifies. The trouble with this argument is that both parties' IME doctors testified to that Claimant's condition is considered “heart disease,” and has been so considered since 1965, when the Legislature first enacted the heart-lung statute. No medical evidence rebuts this testimony. Because the only competent medical evidence is that Claimant's arrythmia-related condition constitutes "heart disease," we find no basis to reverse the final compensation order.

The E-C's argument for reversal relies solely on our Harlem decision which applied a limited definition of heart disease suitable for evaluating the different cardiovascular issue involved in that case. Specifically, Harlem addressed a cardiac plumbingrelated issue that relates to arteries, valves, and blood pressurerelated conditions. Harlem, 371 So. 3d at 369–70. Harlem closely examined the heart's physiology versus its proximate cardiovascular structures in concluding that a claimant's thoracic aortic aneurysm did not involve the heart itself (or heart disease) but an outside, proximate artery. Id. at 372–74. On its facts, Harlem applied a definition of "heart disease" inclusive of only "processes that put pressure on the heart muscle and reduce its functioning, increasing the risk of heart failure—which is to say, clogged coronary arteries; high blood pressure; and valves.” Id. at 377. This limited-purpose definition of “heart disease" didn't purport to address or foreclose the application of the heart-lung statute to other types of heart disease, such as the electricaloriented heart condition involved here and long identified in this court's § 112.18(1) jurisprudence. See, e.g., O'Neal, 297 So. 3d at 632 (AT and atrial fibrillation); Rodriguez, 240 So. 3d at 789 (cardiac arrhythmias); Miami-Dade Cnty. v. Mitchell, 159 So. 3d 172 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (SVT); Martz, 30 So. 3d at 635 (atrial fibrillation); Carney, 26 So. 3d at 683–84 (atrial fibrillation); Fuller, 22 So. 3d at 805–06 (RVOT tachycardia); Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff's Off. v. Bair, 965 So. 2d 1210 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (atrial fibrillation); Sledge v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, 497 So. 2d 1231 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) (chronic atrial fibrillation); Marci Ann Sportswear v. Busquet, 393 So. 2d 1132 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981) (paroxysmal SVT). Both cardiac-plumbing and cardiac-electrical issues have a long pedigree of qualifying as “heart disease” under § 112.18.

Indeed, the E-C's IME doctor did a good job crystallizing the reason that Harlem's "heart disease" definition falls short of controlling this case. Dr. Borzak's testimony distinguished Harlem-type, cardiac-plumbing diseases from cardiac-electrical diseases as follows:

Even before the electrocardiogram was invented and began its use approximately 120 years ago, it was recognized that there were disorders of the rhythm of the heart even before the electrical system was described. And those rhythm disorders could exist together with or independently from other disorders of the heart involving the valves, the muscles, and the coronary circulation. So just like a house has a plumbing system, an electrical

system, a roof and doors, the heart has its own electrical system as well. And diseases of the electrical system are part and parcel of heart disease, even if they don't arise secondary to a valve or a coronary problem but can be primary problems.

Dr. Borzak also emphasized that Claimant's SVT and electrical-system arrhythmias originated in heart muscle cells themselves, unlike the heart-adjacent issue addressed in Harlem:

[T]he heart muscle cells are all electrically active. They have electrical properties. And the normal functioning of the heart's mechanical performance is regulated by the electrical activity of each cell, as determined by the electrical system which initiates and triggers the beat. So the electrical system are heart muscle cells that are not exactly like the squeezing cells, but they conduct electricity and transmit the impulse from the sinus node where the beat is originated to the rest of the muscle cells.

Claimant's IME doctor, Dr. Mathias, covered similar ground in stating that SVT and AT do not cause weakening of the heart muscle through clogged arteries, high blood pressure or valve dysfunction; rather, it is an “electrical malfunction” of the heart that "causes the heart to race out of control and can weaken the heart muscle.” And so, based on the doctors' unrebutted medical testimony distinguishing Harlem's plumbing-focused definition of "heart disease” from this case, we see no error in the final compensation order.

Finally, just as Harlem dove deeply into the medical literature, Claimant's answer brief cites older publications in arguing that “a skilled, reasonable user of the term ‘heart disease' would have associated the same with cardiac arrhythmias such as SVT and AT in 1965." See Frank Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 59, 65 (1988) (“We should look at the statutory structure and hear the words as they would sound in the mind of a skilled, objectively reasonable user of words."). Appellants' briefing doesn't dispute the history argued by Claimant or cite to any contrary literature. Nevertheless, we needn't rely on new medical-publication evidence

(which wasn't part of the hearing record before the JCC) to decide this case. It suffices for our purposes to affirm Claimant's case based on the unrebutted medical evidence supplied by the doctors at the hearing below, who both agreed that Claimant's cardiac rhythm-related ailments constitute “heart disease” as that term has been medically understood since Florida's heart-lung statute was enacted in 1965.

III.

The final compensation order is AFFIRMED.

ROWE and WINOKUR, JJ., concur.