CYNTHIA MCFARLANE

v.

DALE HOLNESS, AS THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF DELROY JUNIOR MCFARLANE

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

CYNTHIA MCFARLANE, Appellant,

v.

DALE V.C. HOLNESS, as personal representative of the ESTATE OF DELROY JUNIOR MCFARLANE, Appellee.

No. 4D2025-2750

[September 23, 2026]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Nicholas R. Lopane, Judge; L.T. Case No. 062025CP000047A001CE.

Morgan L. Weinstein of Twig, Trade, & Tribunal, PLLC, Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.

Marva L. Wiley, Miami Shores, for appellee.

KLINGENSMITH, J.

Appellant Cynthia McFarlane, as the decedent's surviving spouse, appeals an order dismissing her petition to determine the homestead status of real property formerly owned by her late husband. The trial court dismissed the case after considering an enhanced life estate deed that was not attached to the petition, and deciding how that deed affected the decedent's ownership interest and the Appellant's homestead rights. Because a motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of the pleading and ordinarily confines the court to the pleading and its attachments, the trial court exceeded the proper scope of dismissal. We therefore reverse and remand for further proceedings. We do not reach the parties' competing arguments concerning the ultimate effect of the deed or the homestead devise restrictions.

Background

The decedent and his then-wife acquired the property during their marriage. They later executed an enhanced life estate deed, commonly referred to as a “Lady Bird Deed.” The deed reserved broad powers in the grantors during the life tenancy, including authority to sell, convey, mortgage, lease, or otherwise dispose of the property in fee simple without joinder of the named remainderman, with any remainder passing to Appellee at termination of the life estate.

After the decedent's then-wife died, he married Appellant. However, the decedent died shortly after. Following the decedent's death, Appellant, as his surviving spouse, petitioned for administration of his estate and separately petitioned to determine the property to be constitutional homestead. The petition alleged that the property had been the decedent's domicile, the decedent had retained fee simple ownership at his death, and Appellant, as the surviving spouse, had not waived her homestead rights. The petition referenced the enhanced life estate deed in a footnote, but the deed itself was not attached to the petition.

Appellee moved to dismiss. Relying on the deed, Appellee argued that the decedent held only a life estate when he married Appellant, and no fee simple homestead interest remained in the decedent at death. Appellant responded that the decedent had retained complete dominion over the property, and the purported remainder was contingent and subject to divestment. Appellant also disputed other factual assertions made in the motion to dismiss.

During a hearing on the motion to dismiss before the trial court, the enhanced life estate deed was used as an exhibit.

The trial court ultimately dismissed Appellant's homestead petition. In doing so, the trial court determined that Appellant's election as the surviving spouse was invalid, because the decedent had not retained any fee simple interest in the property at death through the premarital enhanced life estate deed. This appeal followed.

Analysis

We review an order granting a motion to dismiss de novo. Aquarius Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. Goldberg, 312 So. 3d 86, 87 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021). At that stage, the well-pleaded allegations must be accepted as true, and reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. Air Quality Experts Corp. v. Fam. Sec. Ins. Co., 351 So. 3d 32, 36–37 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022) (quoting Gann v. BAC Home Loans Servicing LP, 145 So. 3d 906, 908 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014)).

A motion to dismiss serves a limited function. It tests whether the pleading states a legally sufficient claim; it does not resolve disputed facts or determine whether the claimant will ultimately prevail. The Fla. Bar v. Greene, 926 So. 2d 1195, 1199 (Fla. 2006). Consistent with that function, the trial court's review ordinarily is confined to the four corners of the pleading and the attachments incorporated into it. Walsh v. Abate, 336 So. 3d 50, 53 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022) (citing Swerdlin v. Fla. Mun. Ins. Tr., 162 So. 3d 96, 97 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014)).

Swerdlin illustrates the point. There, we reversed a dismissal because the circuit court had relied on allegations and an exhibit outside the complaint. Id. at 97–98. We explained that the trial court's review on a motion to dismiss is limited to the complaint and its incorporated attachments, and collateral factual matters cannot be used to determine whether the plaintiff ultimately can prove the claim. Id. A motion to dismiss may not be converted, in substance, into a vehicle for adjudicating ultimate facts while bypassing the procedural protections applicable to summary judgment or trial. Behnam v. Zadeh, 132 So. 3d 951, 952 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014); Baycon Indus., Inc. v. Shea, 714 So. 2d 1094, 1095 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998).

That is what occurred here. The homestead petition alleged that the decedent had retained fee simple ownership of the property at death and that the property constituted his homestead. Although the petition referred to an enhanced life estate deed, the deed was not attached to the petition. The dismissal order nevertheless resolved the petition by determining the deed's legal effect, concluding that the decedent had not retained any fee simple interest at death and, therefore, Appellant's homestead claim by election as the surviving spouse was invalid. See Swerdlin, 162 So. 3d at 97 (“T]he circuit court's order granting the defendant's motion to dismiss . . . clearly went beyond the four corners of the complaint and its attachment. The order instead relies upon the allegations contained in the defendant's motion to dismiss, the defendant's counterclaim for declaratory judgment, and the exhibit attached to the counterclaim. . . .”).

Those determinations did not test whether the allegations of the petition were legally sufficient when accepted as true. See Fla. Bar, 926 So. 2d at 1199. Instead, those determinations resolved the central merits dispute between the parties: what estate the decedent had retained after execution of the enhanced life estate deed, and what consequences followed for the surviving spouse's claimed homestead rights. See Holland v. Anheuser Busch, Inc., 643 So. 2d 621, 624 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (explaining that a motion to dismiss is not used to determine issues of ultimate fact). Reaching those conclusions required the trial court to rely on material outside the petition and to choose between competing legal characterizations of the decedent's property interest. That inquiry exceeded the proper scope of a motion to dismiss.

Appellee argues that dismissal was nonetheless proper because the petition itself did not establish an entitlement to homestead relief. But the relevant question is not whether Appellant ultimately will prove that the deed was ineffective against her homestead rights. At the dismissal stage, the question is whether the petition's well-pleaded allegations, taken as true, state a legally sufficient basis for the relief sought. Stein v. BBX Cap. Corp., 241 So. 3d 874, 876 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018). The trial court did not limit its ruling to that question. Instead, it improperly adjudicated the deed's effect and the decedent's retained ownership interest.

Nor does the evidentiary hearing alter the character of the motion that was before the court. Behnam, 132 So. 3d at 952. The motion to dismiss was never converted into a properly noticed summary judgment proceeding under the procedure set forth in Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510. The admission of the deed during the hearing did not authorize the court to decide disputed merits questions on a motion directed to the petition's facial sufficiency.

We reverse the order dismissing the petition and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We express no view on the ultimate merits of the homestead claim or the legal effect of the deed. Those questions remain for further proceedings in an appropriate procedural posture.

Reversed and remanded.

LEVINE, J., and SIPERSTEIN, CARYN, Associate Judge, concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely-filed motion for rehearing.