JB GREEN ESTATE, LLC, ET AL.

v.

FREDRIC N. KARLTON, ET AL.

Third District Court of Appeal

State of Florida

Opinion filed November 4, 2026.

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

No. 3D24-2069

Lower Tribunal No. 20-8909-CA-01

JB Green Estate, LLC, et al.,

Appellants,

VS.

Fredric N. Karlton, et al.,

Appellees.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Thomas J. Rebull, Judge.

Sanchez-Medina, Gonzalez, Quesada, Lage, Gomez & Machado LLP, and Gustavo D. Lage and Augusto R. Lopez, for appellants.

Lerman & Whitebook, P.A., and Carlos D. Lerman (Hollywood); Law Offices of Victor K. Rones, P.A., and Victor K. Rones, for appellees Fredric

N. Karlton and Beneficial Funding Corp.

Before SCALES, C.J., and BOKOR and GOODEN, JJ.

SCALES, C.J.

JB Green Estate, LLC, William Holly and KLIP Associates, Inc. (collectively, "JB Green") appeal an October 24, 2024 final judgment of foreclosure in favor of appellees Fredric N. Karlton and Beneficial Loan Corp. (together, the “Lender”), entered after a two-week bench trial. We write only to address JB Green's central argument on appeal: that the trial court's factual findings – notably, its finding that William Holly executed the subject loan documents on behalf of JB Green were not supported by competent, substantial evidence.

JB Green first suggests that the trial court erred by not accepting its handwriting expert's testimony that Holly's signatures on the loan documents were forged. While a trial judge sitting as a fact-finder may not arbitrarily disregard the testimony of an expert witness, the judge may disregard an expert's testimony if the judge provides a reasonable explanation for doing so. See Coday v. State, 946 So. 2d 988, 1005 (Fla. 2006) (“While we have given trial judges broad discretion in considering unrebutted expert testimony, we have always required that rejection to have a rational basis. For example, the expert testimony could be rejected because of conflict with other evidence, credibility or impeachment of the witness, or other reasons."); see also Da Silva v. Labriola, 51 Fla. L. Weekly D1478, 2026 WL 2104174, at *8-9 (Fla. 3d DCA July 22, 2026).

Here, the trial court gave two quite reasonable explanations for disregarding the testimony of JB Green's expert witness: (i) the expert's testimony was contradicted by the notary who testified that he actually witnessed the signatures in question;¹ and (ii) contrary to industry standards, the expert reviewed only photocopies, rather than available originals, of the relevant loan documents.

JB Green also argues that approximately two dozen of the factual findings made by the trial court were unsupported by competent, substantial evidence; therefore, cumulatively, they warrant reversal. We disagree. The trial court entered a comprehensive, detailed final judgment adjudicating several claims, counterclaims, and cross-claims. As the Lender's briefing notes, each of the trial court's factual findings – including those challenged by JB Green are supported by record evidence.

JB Green misconstrues our standard of review by suggesting that the trial court's factual findings are not properly supported because JB Green adduced competing evidence at trial. It is not within our purview to reweigh the evidence. Keys Country Resort, LLC v. 1733 Overseas Highway, LLC, 324 So. 3d 988, 988 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021) (“[I]t is not our function to conduct

a de novo review of the evidence, but simply to determine whether there exists in the record competent substantial evidence to support the judgment of the trial court[.]” (quoting Morey v. Everbank, 93 So. 3d 482, 489-90 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012))). Indeed, when conducting a review of whether factual findings are supported by competent, substantial evidence, the reviewing court looks only at the evidence supporting the findings, without regard to competing evidence. See State, Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Wiggins, 151 So. 3d 457, 464 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (“The sole starting (and ending) point is a search of the record for competent substantial evidence supporting the decision.”). We do not disturb factual findings, such as those made by the trial court below, that are supported by competent, substantial evidence. Mowder v. Smith, 390 So. 3d 106, 109 (Fla. 3d DCA 2024).

Affirmed.