PERSON

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA

SECOND DISTRICT

DAVID GENE PERSON,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

No. 2D2025-1027

November 6, 2026

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Pinellas County; Joseph A. Bulone, Judge.

Blair Allen, Public Defender, and Caroline Joan S. Picart, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.

James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Marena S. Ramirez, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.

SILBERMAN, Judge.

David Gene Person appeals his judgment and sentence after entering a no contest plea to possession of cocaine but reserving the right to appeal the denial of his dispositive motion to suppress.¹ The trial court accepted Person's plea and sentenced him to time served.

Because the trial court did not err by denying Person's motion to suppress, we affirm his judgment and sentence.

Officer Tuggle testified at the motion to suppress hearing. He and another officer were patrolling during the midnight shift in a "high narcotic area" in St. Petersburg. The officers stopped Person because Person was riding his bicycle without affixed front or rear lights, which is a traffic violation. Initially, Person was cooperative. After the officers noticed a bulge in Person's exposed sock and asked what the bulge was, Person became more defensive, appeared nervous, and started to fidget. He told the officers that he had money in his sock.

Officer Tuggle testified without objection as to his experience and training. He described multiple drug-related courses that he had taken, including training in "identifying crack pipes, meth pipes, [and] marijuana smoking devices." He stated that he observed a cylindrical tube inside of Person's sock. But when Person stepped off his bike, he adjusted his pant leg so that it covered his sock.

Officer Tuggle later explained that at that point, based on his training and experience, he believed that there was a "fair probability that [Person] had a crack pipe inside of [his] sock." He added that the outline of what he saw in the sock was in plain view, and again, based on his training and experience, it "was not money inside of [Person's] sock, but a crack pipe," which was contraband. Also, the shape that was visible was inconsistent with a tobacco pipe or a pen.

Officer Tuggle patted down Person's left leg and felt a hard cylindrical tube that confirmed his belief that it was a crack pipe. He testified that the item was, in fact, a crack pipe and that there were multiple pieces of crack cocaine in the pipe.

The trial court found that based on the totality of the circumstances and the plain view doctrine, the officers had probable cause for the pat down and seizure. The court noted that the visible shape outlined inside the sock was not consistent with Person's claim that money was inside his sock. Instead, the court found that based on the testimony, the shape was consistent with that of a crack pipe and not a tobacco pipe, money, a pen, or anything else.

On appeal, Person does not challenge the legality of the stop. Instead, he argues that his motion to suppress should have been granted because officers had no reasonable belief that he was armed with a dangerous weapon and was thus a threat to the officers' safety. The State responds that under the totality of the circumstances, the officer had probable cause to search Person after seeing the outline of the crack pipe in Person's sock.

We review the denial of a motion to suppress under a mixed standard of review. We must determine whether the court's factual findings are supported by competent, substantial evidence and review the court's application of the law to the facts de novo. O.W. v. State, 357 So. 3d 283, 286 (Fla. 2d DCA 2023) (citing Dawson v. State, 58 So. 3d 419, 421 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011)). A court's ruling on a motion to suppress comes to this court "clothed with a presumption of correctness; we must interpret the evidence and draw reasonable inferences and deductions in a manner most favorable to sustaining the trial court's ruling." State v. Jones, 203 So. 3d 972, 972 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016).

"Probable cause must exist before an object can be seized . . . ." Gay v. State, 138 So. 3d 1106, 1109 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) (quoting Crawford v. State, 980 So. 2d 521, 525 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)). And when it is asserted that the object is in plain view, "it must be 'immediately

apparent to the officer that the [seized] object constitutes evidence of a crime.'" Id. (alteration in original) (quoting M.L. v. State, 47 So. 3d 911, 912 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010)). " '[I]mmediately apparent' means that 'at the time police view the object to be seized, they must have probable cause to believe that the object is contraband or evidence of a crime.' " Id. (alteration in original) (quoting M.L., 47 So. 3d at 913).

In In re P.L.R., 435 So. 2d 850, 851 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983), approved, 455 So. 2d 363, 366 (Fla. 1984), an officer was approached by P.L.R. after the officer had arrested an individual in a high narcotics area. The officer saw that P.L.R. had a small manila envelope protruding from his pocket. Id. The officer testified that the envelope was commonly used in the area and was known to officers as a "nickel bag of marijuana." Id. The officer took the envelope from P.L.R.'s pocket, smelled it, determined that it smelled like marijuana, opened the envelope, and saw what appeared to be marijuana inside. Id. The officer then arrested P.L.R. Id. P.L.R. filed a motion to suppress, arguing that he was illegally searched and arrested. Id. His motion was denied, and he appealed. Id. The Fourth District, while "troubled" "by the extent to which police officers may rely upon their experience to identify articles of an apparent innocent nature as containers of contraband to a sufficient certainty to establish probable cause for the arrest of the possessor of the container," affirmed the trial court's ruling. Id. at 853. The court reiterated that the trial judge is in the best position to judge the credibility and efficacy of the police officer's testimony. Accepting that testimony and the inferences to be drawn therefrom as true, we believe the evidence is sufficient to sustain the trial court's findings. Judges must evaluate the police officers' actions based . . . upon the experience of the officers considered in the context of the situation existing at the time of seizure or arrest.

Id. at 853-54 (citing Dixon v. State, 343 So. 2d 1345, 1348 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977)).

In Ferrell v. State, 391 So. 3d 645, 650 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024), this court concluded that the trial court did not err in denying Ferrell's motion to suppress. We recognized that "[a]n officer need not know, for sure, that the item is contraband." Id. at 648 (citing State v. Futch, 715 So. 2d 992, 993 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)). "Instead, the facts available to the officer require a 'reasonable man of caution to believe that certain items may be contraband.' " Id. at 649 (quoting State v. Walker, 729 So. 2d 463, 464 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)).

Here, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the trial court's ruling, we conclude that the trial court did not err by denying Person's motion to suppress. Thus, we affirm Person's judgment and sentence.

Affirmed.

LaROSE and GUARD, JJ., Concur.

Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.