MICHAEL SCOTT STURGEON
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA

Fla. 4th DCA | 2019-04-10
No. 18-3406
Ken Paxton
275 So. 3d 630 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (2019)

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Synopsis

Michael Sturgeon, convicted of eleven counts of possession of child pornography, challenged a circuit court's denial of his motion to terminate sex offender probation early. The court denied his petition for writ of certiorari, upholding the enforcement of a 'no early termination' clause in his negotiated plea agreement. The court distinguished this case from prior appellate decisions invalidating such provisions when imposed unilaterally by courts, finding that plea-bargained provisions are enforceable.


Holding

The no early termination provision in Sturgeon's plea agreement is enforceable because it constitutes a valid and binding negotiated agreement where both parties received reciprocal benefits. Although appellate courts have invalidated such provisions when imposed as special conditions of probation by courts, plea-bargained provisions are distinguishable and enforceable, and a defendant cannot selectively enjoy the benefits of a plea agreement while avoiding its burdens.


Headnotes

[1] A no early termination of probation provision is enforceable when negotiated as a material term in a valid plea agreement, even though such provisions violate section 948…

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Key Quotes

“To ignore the no early termination provision and allow Sturgeon to terminate probation would allow him to enjoy the benefits of the plea bargain but avoid the burden.”

The court's explanation for enforcing the negotiated provision despite prior precedent against court-imposed no early termination clauses.

Facts & Procedural History

Sturgeon pleaded guilty to eleven counts of possession of child pornography and was sentenced to four years in prison followed by five years of sex of…

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Opinion of the Court

PER CURIAM. Petition Denied. MAY and FORST, JJ., concur. KUNTZ, J., concurring with opinion. KUNTZ, J., concurring.

I fully join the Court’s denial of Michael Sturgeon’s petition for writ of certiorari to quash the circuit court’s order denying his motion to end his probation. Sturgeon pleaded guilty to eleven counts of possession of child pornography. The court sentenced Sturgeon to four years in prison followed by five years of sex offender probation. Under the plea agreement, his sentence included a “no early termination” of probation clause.

After four years of probation, Sturgeon moved to end his probation. The circuit court denied the motion. But, it noted that it would have granted the motion if not for the State’s objection because of the no early termination provision.

Sturgeon argues the no early termination provision is unenforceable because it violates the controlling statute, violates the separation of powers, contravenes public policy, and is unenforceable and severable under contract law.

Sturgeon is correct that appellate courts have held that where a circuit court imposes special conditions of probation, the imposition of a no early termination provision violates section 948.05, Florida Statutes. See, e.g., Arriaga v. State, 666 So. 2d 949, 950 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); Jones v. State, 666 So. 2d 191, 192 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Baker v. State, 619 So. 2d 411, 412 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993). But, even if those cases were correctly decided,1 they are distinguishable because this case involves a negotiated plea agreement.

Here, Sturgeon and the State entered into a valid and binding plea agreement that included a no early termination provision. Both the State and Sturgeon received benefits to the detriment of the other from the plea agreement. To ignore the no early termination provision and allow Sturgeon to terminate probation would allow him to enjoy the benefits of the plea bargain but avoid the burden.

The circuit court correctly declined to relieve Sturgeon from the burden of the valid agreement. I fully join the Court’s affirmance of the circuit court’s order. * * * Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

Footnotes
1 But see Arriaga, 666 So. 2d at 950 (Farmer, J., dissenting) (“If . . . Baker stands for the proposition that the sentencing judge is barred from expressing an intention that the offender serve the full period of probation imposed without premature remission, I should have difficulty in accepting it. It certainly seems to me that, in deciding to forego commitment to prison, the sentencing judge may intend that the full period of probation is the price for the avoidance of prison.”).

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