MARCIA GORDON FRIEDMAN, APPELLANT,
v.
ORRIE M. FRIEDMAN, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The appellate court reversed an order awarding attorney's fees in a divorce case, finding no statutory or contractual basis for the award.
No, attorney's fees can only be awarded when permitted by statute or contract.
“Attorney's fees as such are granted only when permitted by statute or contract.”
Establishes the general rule for awarding attorney's fees.
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe wife in a divorce action moved to transfer the child custody and support issue to a different court. The chancellor denied this motion. The husban…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Statutory Authority For Fees cases and more on FLexlaw
The appellant seeks review of a post decretal order in a divorce action directing the payment of attorney’s fees. The record discloses that the appellant wife moved the chancellor to transfer the question of child custody and support to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Dade County. This motion was denied, and subsequent thereto, the appellee petitioned for attorney’s fees, based on the contention that the appellant’s motion to transfer was frivolous. The petition was granted and the order appealed was entered.
Attorney’s fees as such are granted only when permitted by statute or contract. Neither existed in this instance. The specific question raised here was answered adverse to the appellee by this court in Davies v. Davies, Fla.App.1959, 113 So.2d 250.
Accordingly, the order appealed is reversed.