W. B. SHELBY CRICHLOW, ET UX.,
v.
EQUITABLE LIFE ASSURANCE SOCIETY OF THE UNITED STATES
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The Florida Supreme Court granted a motion to dismiss an appeal by the Crichlows, who sought to vacate a decree pro confesso and final decree entered against them nearly three years after entry. The court found the appeal was taken in bad faith for purposes of delay and presented no meritorious issues for adjudication.
The appeal is dismissed. The court held that the law of the case had been settled by prior appeals, the Crichlows had their day in court, no procedural or other errors were committed, and the Crichlows' dilatory tactics in keeping the case in court for an extended period inconsistent with the purposes of procedural rules, combined with their failure to present any substantial or meritorious defense, demonstrated the appeal was not taken in good faith.
“it is apparent from the record that the law of the case has been settled by the two appeals in the case, that the Crichlows have had their day in court; that there have been no procedural or other errors committed in the cause”
Establishes that the court viewed the legal questions as already adjudicated and the appellants as having had adequate opportunity to litigate their claims
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe Crichlows were defendants in a suit by Equitable Life Assurance Society. They demurred to the bill of complaint and appealed the order overruling …
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W. B. Shelby Crichlow and wife entered an appeal on August 4, 1934, from an order of the Chancellor made the same day denying a motion made by the Crichlows to set aside and vacate a decree pro confesso, an order appointing a special master, his report of the testimony and the final decree entered in pursuance thereof. The final decree was entered in November, 1931.
The Crichlows appealed from an order overruling their demurrer to the bill of complaint. They were allowed a month to interpose an answer. They waited until the month expired and then without answering took an appeal from the order. No supersedeas was obtained. On the day the appeal was taken the court entered the decree pro confesso against them.
The cause proceeded in the lower court and in November, 1931, the final decree was entered. The Supreme Court affirmed the order and decrees from which both appeals were taken.
Now in August, 1934, the Crichlows moved to vacate the decree pro confesso and set aside other proceedings and the final decree and allow them to answer the bill.
The court denied the motion, and in the order stated that it had no jurisdiction. From that order the Crichlows appealed, as stated above.
The appellees have moved to dismiss the appeal. Among the grounds urged are that it affirmatively appears from the record that the appeal is not taken in good faith and that it was taken merely for delay; nothing is presented for adjudication by the court.
It is apparent from the record that the law of the case has been settled by the two appeals in the case, that the Crichlows have had their day in court; that there have been no procedural or other errors committed in the cause; that *237the Crichlows have kept by their dilatory tactics the case in court for a period inconsistent with the purpose of the rules of procedure, have delayed the administration of justice and presented at no time within the rules of procedure any substantial or meritorious defense to the bill.
So the motion to dismiss the appeal is granted.
So ordered.
Whitfield, C. J., and Ellis, Terrell, Buford, and Davis, J. J., concur. “
Brown, J., not participating.