EAGLE STEVEDORES, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION; AND ROBERT L. HUNTER, APPELLANTS,
v.
JOHN THOMAS, APPELLEE
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Eagle Stevedores and its operator appealed a jury verdict awarding damages to a pedestrian struck by their unlicensed tow-motor in a harbor dock area. The court affirmed, holding that the dangerous instrumentality doctrine applies to motor vehicles operated on public streets regardless of licensing status, and that the trial judge did not abuse discretion in denying a continuance for an absent expert witness.
The dangerous instrumentality doctrine applies to motor vehicles on public streets regardless of licensing status. An owner or driver cannot escape liability for negligent operation of a motor vehicle on a public street or highway merely because the vehicle is unlicensed. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the continuance request for the absent doctor-witness.
“An owner or driver may not escape liability for negligent operation of a motor vehicle on a public street or highway because the required licensing of the vehicle has been omitted.”
Establishes the core holding that lack of licensing does not shield defendants from liability under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe plaintiff was standing near a lunch truck in a street extension in a harbor dock area when struck and injured by a small motor-operated tow-motor …
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Appellee, plaintiff below, while standing near a lunch truck in. a street end or extension located in a harbor dock area, was struck and injured by a small motor operated vehicle referred to as a “tow-motor.” The vehicle was owned by the corporate defendant and operated by the individual defendant with the former’s knowledge and consent. A jury trial resulted in a verdict and judgment for plain*552tiff for $7,500. .On appeal it is contended that the dangerous instrumentality doctrine as referable to motor vehicles1 was not applicable because the vehicle involved was not licensed and because the accident did not occur on a publicly maintained street or thoroughfare. Further, appellants contended that it was error to refuse a requested recess to await an absent doctor-witness, the court appointed physician. On consideration of the record, arguments and briefs we uphold and affirm the judgment.
On the evidence, the jury was entitled to find that the injury occurred on a public street or highway maintained by the city for vehicular and pedestrian trafile,2 and that the “tow-motor” was a motor vehicle. On those facts the dangerous instrumentality doctrine was properly applied. An owner or driver may not escape liability for negligent operation of a motor vehicle on a public street or highway because the required licensing of the vehicle has been omitted.3
The request for a recess or delay in the course of the trial because of the non-appearance of the doctor witness, who previously had been subpoenaed and informed of the time of trial, was a matter which rested in the sound discretion of the trial judge. The facts in the instant case differ from those in the case relied on by appellant,4 in which a refusal to recess was held to be an abuse of discretion. There the requested delay was from one afternoon until the next morning at which time it was known the doctor would be available. In that case the doctor was absent because it was necessary for him to remain with a patient in labor, at the place where he resided which was 30 miles from the place of trial. Here the doctor, who lived and practiced in Miami where the trial was held, had gone to Jamaica and had not returned. The record does not reflect the reason for the doctor’s absence, nor was it disclosed with any certainty just when he would return. In the circumstances presented the denial of the request for delay in the trial was not shown to be an abuse of judicial discretion.
Affirmed.
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Meister v. Fisher, 462 So. 2d 1071 (Fla. 1984)…utomobiles can qualify as such instrumentalities, and indeed, the doctrine in Florida has not been so limited. In later years it has been applied to trucks, buses, tow-motors and other motorized vehicles. See, e.g., Eagle Stevedores, Inc. v. Thomas, 145 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962). And although we have found no cases from other jurisdictions dealing with the precise issue involved here, those states which have enacted legislation in this area have not limited liability to the owner of an automobile. Instead…
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Rippy v. Shepard, 80 So. 3d 305 (Fla. 2012)…of instruments deemed to be dangerous .... ”). Courts often consider whether the device falls within the statutory definitions of a motor vehicle. See, e.g., Meister, 462 So. 2d at 1072; Rippy, 15 So. 3d at 922-23; Eagle Stevedores, Inc. v. Thomas, 145 So. 2d 551, 552 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962). However, whether the item is a motor vehicle is not controlling. See Edwards v. ABC Transp. Co., 616 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993) (holding that a trailer is not a dangerous instrumentality even though it meets the statutor…1 / 2
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Harding v. Allen-Laux, Inc., 559 So. 2d 107 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)…have applied this doctrine to other types of heavy equipment on job sites. Scott & Jobalia Constr. Co. v. Halifax Paving, Inc., 538 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 5th DCA), jurisdiction accepted, 544 So. 2d 199 (Fla.1989) (crane); Eagle Stevedores, Inc. v. Thomas, 145 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 3d DCA 196.2) (tow motor). In a strict construction of a criminal statute, this court has' held that a backhoe is not a conveyance because it is “special mobile equipment” and not a “motor vehicle” within the definitions of chapter 316 of the…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Anderson v. S. Cotton Oil Co., 73 Fla. 432 (Fla. 1917)
- Finney P. Lynch v. Walker, 159 Fla. 188 (Fla. 1947)
- Burns v. McDaniel, 104 Fla. 526 (Fla. 1932)
- Herbert v. Garner, 78 So. 2d 727 (Fla. 1955)
- Singleton v. City OF Jacksonville, 107 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 1st DCA 1958)