CLARE L. GOODMAN, APPELLANT,
v.
DANIEL GOLDSTEIN, D/B/A DANNY'S RESTAURANT, APPELLEE
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The court held that a complaint alleging defamatory statements made during a judicial proceeding is sufficient if it asserts the statements were not relevant, as the defendant's belief in relevance is a matter for defensive pleading.
The plaintiff appealed the dismissal of her complaint, which alleged false and malicious defamatory statements made during a Small Claims Court trial.…
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The appellant was plaintiff in the trial court and the appellee was defendant. The plaintiff appeals an order dismissing her complaint with prejudice. We reverse.
The complaint alleged false and malicious statements which were defamatory per se made during the progress of a trial in the Small Claims Court in Dade County. It was specifically asserted that the alleged defamatory statements were not relevant or material to the matter being heard in the Small Claims Court.
The allegations were sufficient to state a cause of action under the rule set forth in Myers v. Hodges, 53 Fla. 197, 44 So. 357, wherein it was stated that in order for defamatory words published by parties in the course of judicial proceedings to be absolutely privileged they must be connected with or relevant or material to the cause in hand or subject of inquiry. We are mindful of the limitation upon this rule set forth in Taylor v. Alropa Corporation, 138 Fla. *883137, 189 So. 230, to the effect that when said statements are irrelevant, they are privileged if the speaker or writer believed that the words used were relevant and had reasonable or probable cause so to believe.
It does not affirmatively appear from the complaint that the defendant-appellee believed that the words used were relevant or had reasonable or probable cause so to believe. Therefore, such a contention is a matter for defensive pleading to be raised by answer. Accordingly, the judgment of dismissal is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings.
Reversed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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ST. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Icard, Merrill, Cullis & Timm, P. A., 196 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967)…privileged under the law of libel, so long as they are reasonably connected with or material to the “cause in hand.” Myers v. Hodges, 1907, 53 Fla. 197, 44 So. 357; Fisher v. Payne, 1927, 93 Fla.1085, 113 So. 378; Goodman v. Goldstein, Fla.App.1962, 145 So. 2d 882. And such absolute privilege in judicial proceedings obtains to defamatory testimony by a witness, though given maliciously and with knowledge of its falsity, so long as it is “material to the inquiry.” State v. Tillett, Fla.App.1959, 111 So. 2d 716…
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Delacruz v. Peninsula State Bank, 221 So. 2d 772 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969)…e words so used are relevant. Buchanan v. Miami Herald Publishing Company, Fla.App.1968, 206 So. 2d 465; Fisher v. Payne, 1927, 93 Fla. 1085, 113 So. 378; Budd v. J. Y. Gooch Co., 1946, 157 Fla. 716, 27 So. 2d 72; Goodman v. Goldstein, Fla.App.1962, 145 So. 2d 882. This Second District Court in St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Icard, Fla.App. 1967, 196 So. 2d 219, said: “Even statements of fact made in a pleading filed in a law suit, however false and malicious they may be, are considered to be absolutely…
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Matthews v. State, 359 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978)…, or witnesses in the due course of a judicial proceeding are absolutely privileged if they are connected with or relevant or material to the cause in hand or subject of inquiry. Myers v. Hodges, 53 Fla. 197, 44 So. 357 (1907); Goodman v. Goldstein, 145 So. 2d 882 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962); 53 C.J.S. Libel and Slander § 104. The statements at issue here, however false or malicious they may in fact be, constitute the alleged facts underlying appellant’s claim against Judge Wehle. As such they are privileged. See Fair…
Authorities Cited
- Myers v. Freeman S. Hodges, 53 Fla. 197 (Fla. 1907)
- Taylor v. Alropa Corp., 138 Fla. 137 (Fla. 1939)