JOHNNY A. JAMES
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA

Fla. 1st DCA | 2019-07-09
No. 18-3421
Higginbotham, Prado, Haynes
275 So. 3d 251 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (2019) Positive Treatment
Cited by 1 case

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Johnny James appealed the denial of a Rule 3.800(a) motion challenging the legality of his 30-year habitual felony offender sentence on Count II, arguing the trial court failed to properly designate him as an HFO on that count. The court affirmed the denial, finding the claim procedurally barred by collateral estoppel and previously rejected on direct appeal.

Holding

The court affirmed the denial of James's Rule 3.800(a) motion, holding that the claim was procedurally barred by collateral estoppel because James had unsuccessfully raised the identical claim on direct appeal and in three prior Rule 3.800(a) motions, and the issue had been squarely addressed and rejected in the direct appeal opinion.

Headnotes

[1] Collateral estoppel bars a defendant from rearguing in a successive rule 3.800(a) motion the same issue of sentence illegality that was squarely addressed and rejected on…

[2] A postconviction filing challenging issues previously addressed on direct appeal and in successive motions may be deemed frivolous, warranting referral for potential disc…

Previewing 2 of 2 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence
Key Quotes

“Collateral estoppel . . . precludes a defendant from rearguing in a successive rule 3.800 motion the same issue argued in a prior motion.”

Court citing State v. McBride to establish the procedural bar for successive rule 3.800(a) motions raising identical claims.
Facts & Procedural History

Johnny James received a 30-year sentence as a habitual felony offender on Count II. He filed a Rule 3.800(a) motion arguing the sentence was illegal b…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.

Topics
Rule 3.800(A) Motion Habitual Felony Offender Procedural Bar Habitual Felony Offender Sentencing

Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Rule 3.800(A) Motion cases and more on FLexlaw

Opinion of the Court

July 9, 2019 PER CURIAM.

Johnny James appeals the denial of the rule 3.800(a) motion in which he argued that his 30-year habitual felony offender (HFO) sentence on Count II is illegal because the trial court never properly designated him as an HFO on that count.1 We affirm.

Clerk of Court to reject all pro se pleadings filed by James in that case.

AFFIRMED.

WETHERELL, OSTERHAUS, and WINOKUR, JJ., concur. _____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331.

_____________________________ Johnny A. James, pro se, Appellant. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Julian E. Markham, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

Footnotes
1 It is unclear why this pro se motion was not rejected or stricken as unauthorized because, in the order that was affirmed by this Court in case number 1D12-4742, the trial court prohibited James from filing future pro se pleadings in the underlying criminal case (case no. 1998-270-CF) unless the pleading is signed by a member of The Florida Bar and directed the Columbia County The claim raised in the current motion is procedurally barred because James unsuccessfully raised the same claim—and variations of it—on direct appeal2 and in three prior rule 3.800(a) cases that were affirmed on appeal.3 See State v. McBride, 848 So. 2d 287, 290 (Fla. 2003) (“Collateral estoppel . . . precludes a defendant from rearguing in a successive rule 3.800 motion the same issue argued in a prior motion.”). Additionally, because this claim was squarely addressed—and rejected—in this Court’s opinion on direct appeal,4 we find this appeal to be frivolous and, pursuant to section 944.279(1), Florida Statutes, we direct the Clerk of this Court to send a certified copy of this opinion to the appropriate institution within the Department of Corrections for potential disciplinary action against James. See Ponton v. Willis, 172 So. 3d 574, 576 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (explaining that a Spencer order is not required before referring the inmate for disciplinary action based upon a frivolous filing). Finally, we caution James that further frivolous postconviction filings may result in an order barring him from proceeding pro se in this Court. See State v. Spencer, 751 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 1999).
2 James v. State, 845 So. 2d 238 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003).
3 James v. State, Case No. 1D12-45, 90 So. 3d 278 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (table); James v. State, Case No. 1D09-2646, 22 So. 3d 73 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (table); James v. State, Case No. 1D08-2526, 990 So. 2d 1064 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (table).
4 James, 845 So. 2d at 239-40 (“Appellant now argues that, on resentencing for Count II, the trial court was bound to reduce the sentence to a guidelines sentence. Appellant's argument is premised upon the assertion that the HFO sentence imposed on Count II violates the double jeopardy prohibition and his due process rights because he was not initially subjected to HFO treatment on that count. We reject appellant's argument . . . .”).

Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus

Citator

Cited By

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw