EMORY G. RICH, APPELLANT,
v.
HARPER NEON CO., INC., ET AL., APPELLEES
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In this eminent domain case, the Florida District Court of Appeal dismisses an appeal from an apportionment order because it was filed 55 days after the order became final, exceeding the 30-day appeal deadline under Florida Statutes § 73.14.
The 30-day limitation in § 73.14 applies to any order or judgment arising out of eminent domain proceedings, including apportionment orders between lessors and lessees. The appeal was untimely and must be dismissed.
“We construe the 30 day limitation upon the time for taking an appeal to relate to any order or judgment arising out of eminent domain proceedings.”
Establishes that the 30-day appeal deadline applies broadly to all orders and judgments in eminent domain proceedings, not just final judgments.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAn apportionment order allocating a condemnation award between a landlord and lessee became final on July 18, 1962, when the court denied the appellan…
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This is an appeal taken from an order apportioning a condemnation award between a landlord and a lessee. The case is before us on a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that it was not taken within 30 days from the date of the apportioning order.
The order appealed became final on July 18, 1962, upon denial of appellant’s petition for rehearing. Notice of Appeal was filed in the lower court on September 11, 1962.
This appeal is a companion case to the cases involving the same parties, Fla.App., 147 So.2d 176, a petition for writ of cer-tiorari, Fla.App., 147 So.2d 175, an appeal directed solely to the aforementioned order denying appellant’s petition for rehearing, both of which we shall deny and dismiss respectively in separate opinions to be filed this date.
*175Section 73.14, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., which relates to eminent domain, authorizes appeals to be taken within 30 days from final judgments entered in eminent domain proceedings. The Third District Court of Appeal discussed this statute in a recent case, Dean v. State Road Department, Fla.App.1962, 144 So.2d 867, holding that an appeal from an order granting a new trial, filed 44 days after the entry of the order, was untimely and thus dismissing the appeal.
The appellant argues that the factual situation in the instant appeal is different from the Dean case since in the instant case the appeal is directed to an apportionment order allocating the respective interests of a lessor and lessee.
We construe the 30 day limitation upon the time for taking an appeal to .relate to any order'or judgment arising out of eminent domain proceedings.
In the Dean case, supra, the appeal was taken from an order granting a new trial in an eminent domain proceeding. The appellants argued that, since the law otherwise authorizes 60 days within which to appeal an order granting a new trial, their appeal was timely filed even though it was from an order entered in an eminent domain proceeding where the statute limited the time in which to appeal to 30 days. The Court of Appeal of the Third District stated:
“ * * * There are many different appeal periods prescribed in the Florida Statutes, among which are: § 39.14 (2), providing 10 days in juvenile matters ; § 83.27, providing 2 days in landlord and tenant proceedings; § 924.09, providing 90 days in criminal matters; § 932.53, providing 30 days on appeals from Justice of the Peace courts. The appellants have shown us nothing to the contrary and it appears that it would be the better rule if the time for seeking appellate review was uniform in a given proceeding.”
If, in the instant case, there had been only one property owner and he was dissatisfied with the amount awarded him, he would undoubtedly have had but 30 days to take an appeal. We see no logical reason why, in a dispute between the landlord and lessee over the amount apportioned between them by the judge subsequent to the jury verdict awarding total compensation for the property taken, either of the parties should have a longer period than the 30 days prescribed by the eminent domain statute to take an appeal.
We shall, therefore, dismiss the appeal in this case.
SHANNON, C. J., and WHITE, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Emory G. Rich v. Harper Neon Co., Inc., 147 So. 2d 175 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962)…g a petition for rehearing entered subsequent to an order of the trial judge apportioning a condemnation award between the appellant-landlord and appellee-lessee. This is a companion case to Emory G. Rich v. Harper Neon Co., Inc., et al, Fla. App., 147 So. 2d 174, in which we have this day granted a motion to dismiss' the appeal because it was not brought within the 30 day period permitted for taking an appeal in eminent domain proceedings. We also dismiss this appeal because it is taken from an order that i…
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Emory G. Rich v. Harper Neon Co., Inc., 147 So. 2d 176 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962)…ondent-lessee. This is a companion case to two appeals filed by the same parties, Fla.App., 147 So. 2d 175, which we have this day dismissed because it was appealed from an order denying petition for rehearing, a non-appealable order, and Fla.App., 147 So. 2d 174, which we have dismissed because the appeal was not taken within the 30 day period as required by the eminent domain statute, F.S. § 73.14, F.S.A. The petitioner’s remedy was by appeal, which, unfortunately was filed too late to be effective. We ar…
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Dean v. State Rd. Dep't of Fla., 156 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 1963)…situation where a different rule might seem to us to be preferable but legislative action is required to accomplish it. We have not overlooked the decision of the District Court of Appeal, Second District, in Rich v. Harper Neon Co. Inc., Fla.App., 147 So. 2d 174. It is appropriate to note that this decision was not submitted to us for review. To summarize, our holding here is that under existing statutes, appeals from final judgments in eminent domain proceedings must be filed within the time stipulated by…
Authorities Cited
- Dean v. State Rd. Dep't of Fla., 144 So. 2d 867 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962)
- Emory G. Rich v. Harper Neon Co., Inc., 147 So. 2d 175 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962)
- Emory G. Rich v. Harper Neon Co., Inc., 147 So. 2d 176 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962)