JOHN A. BARLEY
v.
ZACHARY M. WARD
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Mr. Barley appealed the trial court's dismissal of his Second Amended Complaint based on statute of limitations grounds. The appellate court reversed, finding that the complaint contained sufficient factual allegations to survive a motion to dismiss and raised genuine issues regarding whether the claims were time-barred.
The court held that the facts alleged in the Second Amended Complaint do not conclusively demonstrate that any of the four counts are barred by their respective statutes of limitations. The complaint raised sufficient factual issues to survive the motion to dismiss, and therefore the trial court erred in dismissing it with prejudice.
[1] On a motion to dismiss based on statute of limitations, the complaint must raise sufficient factual issues such that the defense is not conclusively established from the…
[2] When a motion to dismiss addresses only certain counts but the trial court applies dismissal to all counts, due process concerns arise regarding adequate notice to the pl…
Previewing 2 of 2 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“[QUOTE REDACTED — failed verbatim audit (paraphrase, not verbatim). See original_text for the text as originally displayed.]”
Court's statement of law regarding the severity of dismissal with prejudice
Mr. Barley filed a Second Amended Complaint asserting four counts against a defendant. The defendant moved to dismiss based on statute of limitations …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Adequate Notice cases and more on FLexlaw
taken as true, conclusively show that the action is barred by the statute of limitations.’” Id. (quoting Ambrose v. Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc., 736 So. 2d 146, 149 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999)); Banks, 275 So. 3d at 215 (citing Goodwin, 114 So. 3d at 1094).
Drawing all inferences in favor of Mr. Barley as the complainant, and confining our review to the four corners of the complaint and its attachments as we must, see Banks, 275 So. 3d at 215, we conclude that the facts set forth in the Second Amended Complaint do not conclusively show that any of the four counts are barred by their respective statutes of limitations. In other words, it raised sufficient factual issues to withstand the motion to dismiss. Id. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s Order Granting Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. ∗ REVERSED and REMANDED.
MAKAR, JAY, and M.K. THOMAS, JJ., concur. ∗ It is worth noting that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint, either intentionally or by oversight, addressed only counts I and II, while the trial court applied it to all four counts. While Mr. Barley did not bring this fact to the trial court’s attention at the hearing—where it was apparently assumed all counts were at peril of being dismissed based on the parties’ arguments—or in his Motion to Reconsider and Rehear, see Pensacola Beach Pier, Inc. v. King, 66 So. 3d 321, 324 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (holding that the appellants did not preserve their argument that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on an issue for which summary judgment was not sought because they did not file “a motion for rehearing or any other post-judgment relief on this or any other ground”), we take this opportunity to highlight the issue for purposes of remand, since it implicates Mr. Barley’s fundamental right to due process. See, e.g., Hall v. Marion Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 236 So. 3d 1147, 1154 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018) (“‘Adequate notice is a fundamental element of the right to due process.’” (quoting Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Carolina Wings, Inc., 655 So. 2d 1231, 1235 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995))).
_____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331.
_____________________________ John A. Barley, pro se, Appellant. Scott A. Cole and Alexandra Valdes of Cole, Scott & Kissane, P.A., Miami, for Appellee.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Pensacola Beach Pier, Inc. v. King, 66 So. 3d 321 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011)
- Hooters OF Am., Inc. v. Carolina Wings, Inc., 655 So. 2d 1231 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)
- Spurgiesz v. Lesley J. Graves, 750 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)
- Ambrose v. Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc., 736 So. 2d 146 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999)
- Goodwin v. Sphatt, 114 So. 3d 1092 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013)
- Hall v. Marion Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 236 So. 3d 1147 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018)
- Carolyn Banks v. Alachua Cnty. Sch. Bd., 275 So. 3d 214 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019)