JOHN SING AND FRIEDA SING, PETITIONERS,
v.
LOUIE L. WAINWRIGHT, AS DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF CORRECTIONS, STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT

Fla. | 1962-11-14
No. 32031
ROBERTS, C. J., and DREW, O’CON-NELL and CALDWELL, JT., concur.
148 So. 2d 19 Florida Supreme Court (1962) Positive Treatment
Cited by 24 cases

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Holding

The court held that a habeas corpus petition cannot be used to raise issues that were or could have been raised on direct appeal, especially when the underlying legal principle was already recognized in state law.

Facts & Procedural History

Petitioners were convicted of a felony and their conviction was affirmed on appeal. They later sought release via habeas corpus, arguing their convict…

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Topics
Mapp V. Ohio Writ Of Error Coram Nobis Unreasonable Searches And Seizures Exclusionary Rule

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Opinion of the Court
THORNAL, Justice.

THORNAL, Justice.

John and Frieda Sing, by their petition for a writ of habeas corpus, seek release from the state prison.

The sole question for determination is whether their conviction and subsequent imprisonment were accomplished by a denial of organic due process.

On March 1, 1957, the petitioners were found guilty of committing a non-capital *20felony. A judgment of conviction and a prison sentence followed. They appealed to the District Court of Appeal, First District. The conviction was affirmed but a correction of the sentence was directed. Sing v. State, Fla.App., 1959, 115 So.2d 773. This Court was not requested to review the decision of the Court of Appeal. On October 13, 1960, the petitioners requested leave of the Court of Appeal to file a petition for a writ of error coram no-bis. The petition was grounded on the alleged bias of the trial judge. It was denied by the Court of Appeal. Review of that order was sought by appeal to this Court. We dismissed the appeal by order dated March 1, 1961. The Supreme Court of the United States subsequently denied certiorari without opinion. Sing v. State of Florida, 366 U.S. 964, 81 S.Ct. 1924, 6 L.Ed.2d 1255.

The instant petition for habeas corpus tenders the contention that at the original trial certain exhibits were allowed in evidence which allegedly had been obtained as the result of an unreasonable search. The petitioners point out that recent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States have applied the provisions of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States condemning unreasonable searches to the conduct of state judicial proceedings. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081. Petitioners further contend that inasmuch as Mapp v. Ohio, supra, was announced subsequent to their conviction they should now have the benefit of the rule of that decision in this habeas corpus proceeding.

It should be noted in passing that Mapp v. Ohio, supra, was a direct attack on a judgment of the Ohio court by way of an appeal taken to the Supreme Court of the United States. It was not a collateral post-conviction assault on the state court judgment.

The basic weakness in the position of the petitioners, however, is the fact that the decision in Mapp v. Ohio, supra, added nothing whatever to the law of Florida. It created no new procedural right so far as the jurisprudence of this State is concerned. This Court long ago concluded that evidence obtained as the product of an unreasonable search is not admissible in a criminal proceeding. Florida has long recognized the so-called “exclusionary rule” regarding the inadmissibility of such evidence. Thurman v. State, 116 Fla. 426, 156 So. 484; Jackson v. State, 87 Fla. 262, 99 So. 548; Chacon v. State, Fla., 102 So.2d 578. While this Court has consistently excluded such evidence under Section 22 of the Declaration of Rights, Florida Constitution, F.S.A., it has with equal consistency noted the similarity between the provisions of the Florida Constitution and the provisions of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Thurman v. State, supra; Jackson v. State, supra; see also F.S. 933.19, F.S.A. By virtue of this interpretation of the Florida Constitution and the recognized similarity between the state and federal constitutions regarding unreasonable searches, it is clear that the rule of Mapp v. Ohio, supra, created no new right in favor of those being tried for crimes in this state.

It should be recalled that we are now considering a post-conviction habeas corpus proceeding. It is well established that habeas corpus may not be substituted for a direct review by appeal. Where one has exercised his right of appeal he may not thereafter resort to habeas corpus to obtain a review of questions which were presented or which might have been raised in the course of his appeal. Collingsworth v. Mayo, Fla.1948, 37 So.2d 696; State ex rel. Buckner v. Culbreath, 147 Fla. 560, 3 So.2d 380; Washington v. Mayo, Fla. 1955, 77 So.2d 620.

The claimed right which the petitioners now assert was available to them throughout the entire proceeding. It was the type of procedural protection which they were entitled to assert at the trial level, in the District Court and on up to *21the Supreme Court of the United States if they had desired to do so. It is not the type of procedural right which can be asserted by them in an independent post-conviction habeas corpus proceeding.

The writ of habeas corpus is denied.

It is so ordered.

ROBERTS, C. J., and DREW, O’CON-NELL and CALDWELL, JT., concur.

Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus

Citator

Cited By (12 total)

  • State v. Lavazzoli, 434 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 1983)
    …s with a higher standard of protection from governmental intrusion than that afforded by the federal constitution. See, e.g., State v. Dodd; Odom v. State, 403 So. 2d 936 (Fla.1981); State v. Sarmiento, 397 So. 2d 643 (Fla.1981); Sing v. Wainwright, 148 So. 2d 19 (Fla.1962); Gildrie v. State, 94 Fla. 134, 113 So. 704 (1927); Taylor v. State, 355 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978). The reason, of course, was that our state exclusionary rule was specifically articulated in our constitution and hence part of organic…
  • Odom v. State, 403 So. 2d 936 (Fla. 1981)
    …t case, we find that the war-rantless recording of the conversation between appellant and witness Jones was an unreasonable interception. Evidence obtained in violation of article I, section 12 is inadmissible in Florida courts. Sing v. Wainwright, 148 So. 2d 19 (Fla.1962); Gildrie v. State, 94 Fla. 134, 113 So. 704 (1927). This constitutional principle applies regardless of whether the evidence in question was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and regardless of the scope of the Fourth Amendmen…
  • Taylor v. State, 355 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)
    …information’ obtained unreasonably, within the meaning of Art. I, § 12, ‘shall not be admissible in evidence.’ ” Croteau v. State, 334 So. 2d 577, 580-581 (Fla.1976) (Hatchett, J., concurring). As the Supreme Court of Florida in Sing v. Wainwright, 148 So. 2d 19, 20 (Fla.1962), has cogently noted: “Mapp v. Ohio, supra, added nothing whatever to the law of Florida. It created no new procedural right so far as the jurisprudence of this State is concerned. This Court long ago concluded that evidence obtained…

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