HERMAN BRECHNER, PETITIONER,
v.
FLORIDA INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION AND ARTISTIC EMBROIDERY, INC., RESPONDENTS
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Unemployment compensation claimant Brechner sought review of the Florida Industrial Commission's denial of benefits after a labor dispute. The court held that his brief subsequent employment (13 days total) was temporary "stopgap" work rather than permanent employment, and therefore did not insulate him from the unemployment caused by the initial labor dispute.
The court held that the record contained competent, substantial evidence supporting the Board's finding that the second employment was not regarded by Brechner as permanent and for an indefinite period, and therefore did not insulate him from the unemployment caused by the labor dispute.
“whether subsequent employment is to be regarded as "stopgap" depends on the facts of each case, and further that while the length of the subsequent employment has a bearing on the conclusion reached, the question is actually one of intent and good faith”
Establishes the legal standard for determining whether employment breaks the chain of unemployment from a labor dispute
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBrechner worked as a garment worker for nine years with one firm, during which he occasionally accepted temporary work lasting a few days with other e…
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Herman Brechner, a claimant for unemployment compensation, brings to this Court his petition for writ of certiorari, seeking review of an order of the Board of Review of the Florida Industrial Commission. The order denied petitioner’s application for unemployment compensation.
The sole issue to be resolved is whethe' petitioner’s last employment, which con sisted of two periods totaling 13 days, was temporary, “stopgap” employment or permanent, new employment sufficient to insulate the petitioner against the cause of unemployment which he suffered initially as. a result of a labor dispute.
This Court had before it a similar question in Bruley v. Florida Industrial Commission, Fla.App.1958, 101 So.2d 22. In that case the claimant’s employment with the second employer during the labor dispute was for a period of nine months. The court there recognized the rule that whether subsequent employment is to be regarded as-“stopgap” depends on the facts of each case, and further that while the length of the subsequent employment has a bearing' on the conclusion reached, the question is. actually one of intent and good faith. In that case we reversed the order denying compensation upon a holding that the record would not support a finding that the-second employment was not in good faith- or that it was not regarded by petitioner as-being permanent and for an indefinite period.
In the instant case the following salient facts appear. Petitioner was employed1 as a garment worker at one firm for a period of 9 years. During this period of' almost continuous employment, there were periods of slack work during which the petitioner accepted, for a few days at a time, temporary employment with other employers. In December of 1961 a labor dispute arose between the permanent employer and certain employees, including petitioner.. As a result of this labor dispute, petitioner-left his employment. Subsequently, petitioner accepted employment with one of the-employers who had previously furnished temporary employment for short periods. This second employment was for two periods, one of 8 days and another of S days;; *569thereafter, he was discharged because of the second employer’s lack of work.
We hold that the record contains competent, substantial evidence to support the finding of the Board that the second employment was not regarded by the petitioner as permanent and for an indefinite period. Florida Industrial Commission v. Ciarlante, Fla.1955, 84 So.2d 1; Meyer v. Florida Industrial Commission, Fla.App.1959, 117 So.2d 216.
Petition denied.
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Citator
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Carletta Johnston v. Homeowners Warehouse, Inc., 654 So. 2d 934 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994)…eree’s findings of fact. The record reflects competent, substantial evidence to support the findings of fact of the appeals referee as to claimant’s reason for leaving her job and the nature of such employment. See Brechner v. Florida Indus. Comm’n, 148 So. 2d 567 (Fla. 3d DCA 1963); § 443.231, Fla.Stat(1993). The Commission’s ruling exceeded its authorized scope of review, which precludes reweighing the evidence under these circumstances. Kan v. P.G. Cook Assoc., 566 So. 2d 932 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990). Accordingl…
Authorities Cited
- Fla. Indus. Comm'n v. Ciarlante, 84 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1955)
- Meyer v. Fla. Indus. Comm'n, 117 So. 2d 216 (Fla. 2d DCA 1959)
- Magdalena F. Mills v. Babcock Co., 101 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 3d DCA 1958)